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kim and cha • between a rock and a hard place
ambitions,” 11 while others saw it as an indication of Chinese strategic
intent in the event of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. 12 In the end,
China’s revisionist claim was a wake-up call for South Koreans and had a
dramatically chilling effect on their increasingly positive view of China. 13
This power dilemma is a constant, not a variable, in South Korea’s policy
calculations toward China. The sheer differences in various measures of
power between the two countries are a source of vulnerability and skepticism
while at the same time providing incentive to South Korea not to antagonize
its big neighbor.
The Economic Dilemma
If trade was one of the main conduits of limited cooperation and
bilateral exchanges in the pre-normalization period of the 1970s and
1980s, it has become an end in itself that provides a major impetus to
greater bilateral cooperation between China and South Korea given their
current robust trade and commercial ties. This economic logic gained
traction in Seoul when China surpassed the United States as South Korea’s
largest trading partner in 2004. Ten years later, in 2014, China imported
approximately $145 billion worth of products from South Korea, which
constituted 25.4% of South Korea’s total exports that year. 14 In comparison,
the United States, the ROK’s second-largest trade partner, imported only
$70 billion worth of South Korean products in 2014—a little less than
half of what China imported. 15 China has also remained the country with
which South Korea has the largest trade surplus, ranging from $62 billion
in 2013 to $55 billion in 2014. 16 Furthermore, its total trade volume with
China dramatically increased to more than $270 billion in 2013, surpassing
South Korea’s combined bilateral trade volume with the United States and
11 Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, “The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan,
and South Korea: U.S. Policy Choices,” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress,
RL32882, January 13, 2006, 26. See also Jin-sung Chun, “Our Dispute with China Isn’t about
Ancient History,” Chosun Ilbo, February 27, 2007 u http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_
dir/2007/02/27/2007022761035.html.
12 See “‘Dulyeoun yeogsa naljo’ Jung-gug-ui Dongbuggongjeong wangyeol” [The “Dreadful History
Hoax” of China’s Northeast Project Concludes], dongA.com, January 26, 2007 u http://news.donga.
com/3/all/20070126/8400671/1.
13 For South Korean views of China and the United States, see Jae Ho Chung, “Leadership Changes
and South Korea’s China Policy,” Korea Economic Institute, Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Series,
vol. 23, 2012.
14 “Segyetong-gye: Hangug-ui 10dae muyeongguk” [World Statistics: South Korea’s Ten Major
Trading Countries], K-stat u http://stat.kita.net/stat/world/major/KoreaStats06.screen.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
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