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asia policy to Southeast Asia and engaged there because the challenge to peace in the South China Sea is also a challenge to three key U.S. interests. The first and foremost reason the United States will remain invested in the peace and stability of Pacific Asia is economic. In 2014, U.S. exports to Asia had a total value of $650.5 billion, while imports from Asia were worth $1.06 trillion, accounting for a respective 27.7% and 37.2% of total U.S. exports and imports. 1 Further, investment by American entrepreneurs in Asian economies gives the United States a stake in the regular and uninterrupted conduct of intrastate and intraregional trade and in predictable and inclusive growth. A second national interest is the security of allies and friends. The pursuit of peace beyond U.S. shores is, in turn, the most effective guarantee that the continental homeland will never itself become a battlefield. Third, both of these core interests—prosperity and security—are underpinned by the traditional rights of states to sail unimpeded on the high seas and, without impairing the peace or security of coastal states, travel through territorial waters without prior permission. From its earliest days, the law of the sea has protected trading nations’ access to foreign ports. In the modern global economy, all nations are traders and enjoy in common the benefits of open access. Further, maritime power, which is reliant on mobility at sea, plays a unique and irreplaceable role in U.S. power-projection strategies, being both flexible and visible. U.S. fleets make neighbors of our distant allies, assuring them of the United States’ commitment to their security. 2 The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program was established in response to the gradual erosion of traditional rights at sea. Rather than an attempt by the United States to claim special privileges, it was created in reaction to new claims to territorial zones that threatened to enclose the littoral space within a jumble of overlapping jurisdictions. 3 Announced in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter and endorsed by President Ronald Reagan in the 1983 U.S. Oceans Policy, the Freedom of Navigation Program has provided the auspices for U.S. Navy vessels to sail and operate in waters 1 “International Data: Table 2.3. U.S. International Trade in Goods by Area and Country, Not Seasonally Adjusted Detail,” Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, September 17, 2015; and “International Data: Table 2.3. U.S. Trade in Services, by Country or Affiliation and by Type of Service,” Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, October 15, 2015. Both sets of data are available at http://www.bea.gov/itable. 2 Hedley Bull, “Sea Power and Political Influence,” Adelphi Papers 16, no. 122 (1976): 6. 3 Elliot L. Richardson, “Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea,” Foreign Affairs 58, no. 4 (1980): 904. [ 60 ]
oundtable • non-claimant perspectives on the south china sea subject to coastal states’ opportunistic and overreaching claims. 4 The state practice established by these missions buttresses U.S. objections to coastal states’ excessive maritime claims that are inconsistent with international law. By challenging these excessive claims, the U.S. military demonstrates the nation’s resolve not to acquiesce to acts by other states to restrict freedom of navigation or other lawful uses of the sea and to preserve U.S. operational flexibility. 5 The energetic assertion of maritime rights should not, however, be interpreted as inconsistent with U.S. promotion of the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The Obama administration and its successors will need to maintain a resolute line with regard to freedom of navigation, while persuading all parties to de-escalate the tactics they have adopted for advancing their sovereignty claims. How Should the United States Advance Its Interests? The voyage in late October of the USS Lassen through the disputed waters of the Spratly Islands should have been a timely reminder of the indispensable role that the United States plays in safeguarding access to the maritime commons. 6 Passing within twelve nautical miles of Subi Reef, a low-tide elevation expanded into an artificial island by the Chinese dredging vessels, the ship had every right to follow normal underway operations, including use of its fire control radars and other exercises, since no territorial sea is internationally recognized in that area. Unfortunately, the ship appears to have conducted itself consistent with an unannounced innocent passage through territorial waters. As Joseph Bosco said in a 4 “U.S. Department of Defense: Freedom of Navigation Program: Fact Sheet,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense, Fact Sheet, March 2015 u http://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/gsa/cwmd/DoD%20FON%20Program%20--%20 Fact%20Sheet%20(March%202015).pdf. 5 Stephen A. Rose, “Naval Activity in the Exclusive Economic Zone—Troubled Waters Ahead?” Ocean Development and International Law 21, no. 2 (1990): 123–45; and George Galdorisi, “The United States Freedom of Navigation Program: A Bridge for International Compliance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?” Ocean Development and International Law 27, no. 4 (1996): 401–2. 6 For a summary of the legal issues raised by the operation, see Bonnie S. Glaser and Peter A. Dutton, “The U.S. Navy’s Freedom of Navigation Operation around Subi Reef: Deciphering U.S. Signaling,” National Interest, November 6, 2015 u http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-usnavy%E2%80%99s-freedom-navigation-operation-around-subi-reef-14272; Raul Pedrozo and James Kraska, “Can’t Anybody Play This Game? U.S. FON Operations and Law of the Sea,” Lawfare, November 17, 2015 u https://www.lawfareblog.com/cant-anybody-play-game-us-fon-operationsand-law-sea; and Adam Klein and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea: What to Watch For,” Lawfare, October 23, 2015 u https://www.lawfareblog.com/ freedom-navigation-operations-south-china-sea-what-watch. [ 61 ]
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the national bureau of asian resear
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asia policy number 21 • january 2
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is south korea in china’s orbit?
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