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asia policy dependence on the mainland but would also limit Taiwan’s dependence on the United States, integrating the island more successfully into natural trade flows of the region. One possible diplomatic option for the United States is to work privately toward Taiwan’s inclusion in the TPP—provided it meets the same requirements as current members—to blunt the effect of a veto by Beijing. This option could be pursued alongside a strategy of accelerating China’s TPP entry and is not inconsistent with that clear U.S. policy goal. the road forward and policy recommendations Taiwan has an opportunity now to take the necessary steps toward TPP membership. If it does, the island’s economy will evolve and its competitive position in the region will be enhanced. Being a bystander at a time of accelerating regional integration and bilateral special deals will inevitably reduce Taiwan’s competitiveness and marginalize its role. The most significant challenge may be the KORUS FTA. That agreement, which entered into force on March 12, 2012, has changed regional trade and supply-chain structures in just three years. Some of that change was well chronicled before the fact, while other features have underperformed. 28 Nonetheless, the KORUS FTA is the United States’ second-largest bilateral deal, and it gives South Korea advantages in key sectors where it competes directly with Taiwan. As they work to overcome the obstacles to TPP membership, Taiwan’s leaders should consider the following five points: First, Taiwan should focus its efforts on the areas of the TPP where it can achieve successful outcomes, such as the services sector, rather than attempting to tackle all aspects of the TPP at once, which would require considerable political and economic capital. Taking incremental steps toward meeting TPP standards will enable Taiwan’s leaders to build public support for more difficult reforms in agriculture and investor-state dispute resolution. Second, transparency and stakeholder engagement will be extremely important in convincing the public that joining the TPP is in Taiwan’s best interests. The American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei’s 2015 white paper claims that “sometimes important policy changes are not communicated to the public, leaving stakeholders in the dark.” 29 Moving forward, the 28 Brock R. Williams, Mark E. Manyin, Remy Jurenas, and Michaela D. Platzer, “The U.S.–South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implementation,” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, RL34330, September 16, 2014 u https://fas.org/sgp/ crs/row/RL34330.pdf. 29 American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, “2015 Taiwan White Paper.” [ 80 ]
nealer and fimbres • taiwan and regional trade organizations government should actively engage the public and businesses on TPP issues and promote increased transparency over trade deals. The leadership in Taiwan should consider the U.S. Trade Representative’s advisory committee system as a model for creating an engagement and advisory mechanism that is structured, open, and formal. The U.S. system was created to ensure that policy and trade-negotiating objectives adequately reflect U.S. public and private sector interests, with the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs and Engagement spearheading the effort to engage with outside groups in order to build support for a robust trade agenda. 30 Third, Taiwan should engage in bilateral discussions with current TPP nations to review key trade and investment issues and consider how it might reform its economy so as to be prepared to engage in a follow-on round for potential new members. In particular, Taiwan should engage with Japan, which has publicly supported Taiwan joining negotiations and is facing similar difficulties in passing the domestic reforms required by the TPP. Taiwan should also resolve any outstanding trade issues with the twelve TPP members, given that unanimous approval from all founding members is required for new nations to join in the second round. Fourth, Taiwan should not view the TPP as a competition with China. Whether China ultimately seeks to join the agreement is not a matter over which Taiwan has any influence. Taiwan’s membership should rise or fall on its own merits. With this in mind, Taiwan should move forward with domestic reforms to be prepared to comply with TPP requirements. Finally, Taiwan should continue to pursue closer economic cooperation with the United States through the TIFA framework, resolving outstanding issues, especially in the agriculture sector. The TIFA with the United States and FTAs with New Zealand and Singapore can showcase the value of Taiwan’s future participation in the TPP. conclusion Trade flows and investment indicate that Taiwan is an important exporter and investor in the Asia-Pacific, but this economic reality has outrun policy. Taiwan’s economic role in the region is diluted by its exclusion from regional trade deals, which are increasing in number and significance. This is in large part due both to China’s political opposition 30 “About Us: Advisory Committees,” Office of the United States Trade Representative u https://ustr. gov/about-us/advisory-committees. [ 81 ]
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the national bureau of asian resear
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asia policy number 21 • january 2
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is south korea in china’s orbit?
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2) To help bridge the policy and ac
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