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asia policy very aptly capturing the real essence of Sino-Pakistani relations. As Small notes, “even as the Sino-Indian relationship has improved, India’s rise as a potential competitor to Beijing has further reinforced the original rationale for its partnership with Pakistan” (p. 4). In the past, China often did not provide the kind of support that Pakistan wanted during conflicts with India and instead tried to defuse crises in cooperation with the United States. A case in point is China’s refusal to provide military or diplomatic support during the Kargil conflict. Small explains China’s conditional support for its supposedly all-weather friend by noting that “the most significant backing that China provides does not come in the midst of the latest crisis, but from the steady, long-term commitment to ensure that Pakistan has the capabilities it needs to play the role China wants it to” (p. 61). India thus will remain the central pillar of the Sino-Pakistani relationship despite the changing geopolitics of Sino-Indian, U.S.-Indian, and Sino-U.S. relations. Even with Beijing’s improving ties with New Delhi, India continues to bind China and Pakistan. Small very aptly describes this aspect of the relationship when he writes that for China “whatever the ebbs and flows in its bilateral ties with New Delhi, Pakistan’s utility as a balanced, potential spoiler, and standing counterpoint to India’s ambitions has never gone away” (p. 65). He goes on to note that China would like to see the India-Pakistan relationship exist in a state of managed mistrust” (p. 54). There are many anecdotes in The China-Pakistan Axis that help explain the complex yet strong bond between the two countries. One of the book’s most interesting passages is its discussion of how the Islamicization of the Pakistan Army reveals an often overlooked ambivalence in China’s approach toward Pakistan. It is here, in chapter four, that the limitations of Sino-Pakistani ties are most visible. China has always relied on Pakistan to manage the threat of jihadi forces affecting its own territory. Pakistan’s relevance for China in this regard is twofold: first, Pakistan is China’s conduit to the Islamic world; and second, Islamabad is useful for countering the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in Xinjiang, a Muslim-majority region where Beijing is struggling to fight the Uighurs and their linkages to the extremist forces present in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and (now with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS) in West Asia. The importance of Xinjiang for China’s internal security is immense: it is one of the world’s top unexplored oil basins and also has coal reserves crucial for China’s energy security. Moreover, China has a large arsenal of nuclear ballistic missiles located in the region, along with twelve army divisions and six air force bases. In addition, Xinjiang functions as a buffer between [ 162 ]
ook review roundtable • the china-pakistan axis China and Central Asia. These factors will continue to enhance Pakistan’s relevance for China and make “a strong, capable Pakistan…an asset to China in its own right” (p. 3). China’s adventures and misadventures in dealing with Islamist forces are well documented by Small. Readers, however, are left with some unanswered questions. First, are economic relations between China and Pakistan win-win? The fifth chapter argues that the strategic dimension of their cooperation in grand economic projects continues to provide momentum, but it does not explain the commercial rationale of the relationship. Though Small refers to economic relations between the two sides as being traditionally weak—that is, a problem to fix rather than a source of strength—this issue needs more attention. In fact, China’s argument that its huge economic package for infrastructure development could bring about change in Pakistan’s social and economic makeup does not sound very convincing, given the past failures of large-scale U.S. and Western financial and military aid to the country. A second question that merits attention is whether Sino-Pakistani relations will have any positive impact on relations between India and Pakistan. Third, and more important, the role of Russia, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea in building Sino-Pakistani relations is worthy of attention. Analysis of Chinese concerns about Pakistan’s relations with both Saudi Arabia and North Korea would be of great value because these ties could significantly influence future trends in Asian geopolitics. In addition, China has now decoupled India from Russia and is facilitating Russian arms sales to Pakistan. Growing ties between Russia, Pakistan, and China are likely to establish a new front of cooperation in Asian geopolitics. Finally, the concept of a potential trilateral U.S.-India-China relationship could have been examined further. Overall, however, The China-Pakistan Axis is a very useful contribution for helping unravel the complexity of Sino-Pakistani relations. This strategic partnership, despite its conditional engagement, is likely to grow in the future. [ 163 ]
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