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asia policy Nevertheless, movement toward an early conclusion of a CoC has been slow—due largely to outstanding differences between ASEAN states and China. While there has been progress in clarifying some areas of agreement and cooperation, the pace of negotiations provides incentives for interested parties to pursue or develop other options. Thus, ASEAN claimants, similar to China, have resisted proposals to stop various complicating activities. The Philippines’ decision to seek international arbitration via the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is sometimes characterized as a case of a state pursuing an extra-ASEAN option at the expense of ASEAN. But this interpretation is both true and false. It is true to the extent that this decision appears to have been reached without much consultation with other ASEAN states and certainly not with ASEAN as a collective group. Further, it is worth noting that most ASEAN states initially viewed this action as provocative and did not rally behind the Philippines, thus reinforcing the existing perception of the organization as less than unified. In general, ASEAN states have preferred to work out disagreements through dialogue and negotiation rather than arbitration and litigation, as the latter are considered more confrontational and zero-sum processes. Notably, ASEAN’s collective declarations and statements have avoided mentioning the ongoing arbitration process, despite strong pressure from the Philippines to do so. On the other hand, the peaceful resolution of disputes remains the organization’s top interest and priority. Whether that outcome is pursued via ASEAN or non-ASEAN means is less important. This is true of the South China Sea disputes and has also been true of other interstate disputes that previously challenged regional relations. Historically, for example, extra-ASEAN processes have been considered acceptable and appropriate, especially if a dispute is potentially too sensitive or divisive in terms of intra-ASEAN relations. None of these historical cases are understood as contrary to ASEAN principles—just the opposite, in fact. Equally important, they are also not viewed as instances of ASEAN inaction. Rather, most see ASEAN’s contributions to the resolution of these disputes as indirect—that is, the organization created conditions that facilitated states’ support for more peaceful options. Thus, ASEAN offers a space for states to interact, exchange views, expand exchanges, and deepen regional integration, all of which are understood to facilitate both common understanding and common interests that, in turn, push states to exercise greater self-restraint. As highlighted above, the goals of the CoC have notably been characterized in some very similar terms. [ 50 ]
oundtable • non-claimant perspectives on the south china sea Although the Philippines’ action may initially have been a source of division and consternation within ASEAN, it has also served to heighten interest in, or at least attention to, processes based on the rule of law. Since Manila’s submission in 2013, other states such as Vietnam have expressed greater interest in arbitration as a course of action. 5 Representatives in Indonesia, which is not a claimant, have also expressed interest in legal proceedings to clarify the area of the Natuna Islands if dialogue fails. 6 ASEAN’s Longer-Term Challenges In addition to growing intra-ASEAN insecurities about Chinese power, there has also been much external scrutiny of ASEAN, higher expectations, and pressure on the organization to take a more active role. By the same token, ASEAN’s perceived failures or shortcomings in performing such a role have tended to undercut its credibility in the eyes of some critical partners. One can debate the appropriateness of expectations for what ASEAN should do (as opposed to what it in fact does do), but the reality is that heightened tensions have increased questions about the organization. Moreover, unlike twenty years ago, ASEAN today is interested in occupying a central place in the Asia-Pacific’s mix of intersecting institutional arrangements involving external partners. Since the mid-1990s, when the South China Sea last posed a major challenge, ASEAN—seizing the institutional initiative from other actors like Australia and Japan—has carved out a space in which it performs a distinct role in the Asia-Pacific as a hub or focal point of various trade, diplomatic, and political security frameworks and initiatives as well as facilitator of regional exchanges. In that role, ASEAN states have exercised important agency in setting institutional agendas and convening a broad and diverse membership. Most important, through new frameworks, ASEAN put alternative conceptions of regional order that did not hinge on great-power deterrence or a priori great-power hierarchy into the mix of contending ideas. The challenge faced by ASEAN, however, is that its role now depends on external recognition. The assertive behavior by China in the South China Sea, along with ASEAN states’ own divisions and heightened great-power tensions, raises questions about whether the organization can hold the center. 5 See Alex Calvo, “China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and International Arbitration in the South China Sea,” Asia-Pacific Journal, October 26, 2015. 6 “Indonesia Says Could Also Take China to Court over South China Sea,” Reuters, November 11, 2015. [ 51 ]
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