22vPaX

ook review roundtable • the china-pakistan axis
unbreakable” 2 are indicative of China’s long-term commitment to Pakistan.
This aspect of the relationship is well captured in The China-Pakistan Axis.
The first chapter of the book looks at India as a key factor in the
formation of the China-Pakistan friendship during the early years. Here,
Small provides a comprehensive account of how the relationship developed
between the two countries over three crucial wars (the 1962 Sino-Indian
War, the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War). The
book rightly argues that
China and Pakistan have never been treaty allies and their
armies come from such radically different traditions that
the two sides have often talked past each other on matters of
strategy. But after Pakistan’s devastating defeat (in 1971), China
helped the country to develop a set of military capabilities to
ensure that it would never face the same fate again. (p. 3)
To enhance Pakistan’s military capabilities, China fully backed and
supported Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions through close cooperation, making
Pakistan the only nuclear weapons country in the Islamic world. The central
motive was to neutralize India’s nuclear weapons.
The second chapter presents a fascinating narrative account of this
nuclear cooperation. Small depicts China’s role in helping Pakistan obtain
nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles by supplying not only
technology but also the necessary expertise and materials, including highly
enriched uranium. Small correctly notes that “if the military relationship
lies at the heart of China-Pakistan ties, nuclear weapons lie at the heart
of the military relationship” (p. 29). But the most interesting dimension
explained in the book is what this relationship actually has meant both for
the Pakistani military and for its Chinese counterpart. When Pakistani
foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto traveled to China in 1965 to tell leaders
there that India had built a plutonium plant and ask them to help Pakistan
build a similar one, China suggested that Pakistan get assistance from
Canada. The Karachi Nuclear Power Plant subsequently became operational
in 1973, one year before India’s nuclear test. When Pakistan’s clandestine
program was discovered by the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Bhutto instead turned to A.Q. Khan for help with enrichment, using the
latest European design from Urenco. And then China saw the advantage of
cooperation with Pakistan to improve its own enrichment capabilities.
The third chapter of the book provides an in-depth analysis of China’s
dilemma on how to deal with Pakistan’s military adventurism against India,
2 Javed, Chinese Soft Power Code, 33.
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