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oundtable • non-claimant perspectives on the south china sea
and operations.” 17 In addition, Indonesia is a target recipient country of the
U.S.-funded Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative that was announced
in 2015. Such U.S. assistance could help Indonesia develop its nascent coast
guard agency to better patrol the country’s vast maritime swathes, including
waters around the Natuna Islands. However, this development should not
be interpreted as a sign of Indonesia’s alignment with the United States.
If all things stay the same, Indonesia still wishes to see all major powers,
especially the United States and China, keep each other in check. Thus, its
interests continue to lie in preserving ASEAN unity and centrality against
the domination of a single major power.
Conclusion: Future Instability
Without doubt, the most interesting question is what happens if all
things fail to stay the same. In other words, what if the claimant states—and
interested parties—engage in behaviors that make the South China Sea
less stable and more prone to conflict? From the moment China revealed
its U-shaped line at an Indonesia-facilitated workshop in 1993 until 2010,
Indonesia could simultaneously both cultivate closer cooperation with
China and reject the U-shaped line. This is the status quo Indonesia wishes
to uphold.
The strategic ambiguity that China carefully and masterfully
maintained in the last two decades helped sustain this status quo. By
keeping the U-shaped line from claiming the insular features of the Natuna
Islands, China removed the most sensitive of Indonesia’s sovereignty
concerns. It is becoming clearer, however, that China’s ambiguity is more
declaratory than actual. Despite this vague stance on the potential overlap
between the U-shaped line and Indonesia’s EEZ boundary, China’s behavior
suggests that the line can stretch as far south as Beijing wants. Even if China
were to decide to “compromise” and adjust the southern extremity of the
U-shaped line to align with Indonesia’s EEZ boundary, Jakarta would still
not accept such a move because of the intimidating and coercive nature via
which Beijing enforces its claim vis-à-vis the ASEAN claimants, even apart
from the illegality of the U-shaped line itself under UNCLOS.
17 Kanupriya Kapoor and Randy Fabi, “Indonesia Eyes Regular Navy Exercises with U.S. in
South China Sea,” Reuters, April 13, 2015 u http://in.reuters.com/article/indonesia-ussouthchinasea-idINKBN0N40NT20150413;
and Brian Reynolds, “Submarine Group 7
Strengthens Ties with the Indonesian Submarine Force,” Submarine Force Pacific, April 20,
2015 u http://www.csp.navy.mil/Media/News-Articles/Display-News/Article/633587/
submarine-group-7-strengthens-ties-with-the-indonesian-submarine-force.
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