22vPaX

asia policy
whether India and South Korea can contribute to the common position: the
former might have an interest, while the latter may believe that relations
with China must be preserved for the sake of peninsular politics and trade.
Deter militarization of the South China Sea. As the primary provider
of maritime public goods, it is incumbent on the United States to advocate
against militarization of features in the South China Sea. Already, several
of the artificial islands built by China in the Spratly Islands feature radar
installations, armaments, and runways that can support sophisticated
military aircraft. In the future, these assets could lead to an expanded
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and Air Force presence in the
region that enables the calculated use of force in support of coercive
diplomacy—i.e., the intimidation of ASEAN interests.
Washington must clarify what kind of militarization activities it
considers escalatory. Beyond a significant and permanent deployment of
PLA personnel in the islands, the United States might also warn against
basing interceptor aircraft on new airfields or deploying sophisticated
air-defense systems. Furthermore, Washington should clarify how it would
respond to these developments, including actions that would undermine
broader Chinese strategic interests. In particular, a visible U.S. presence in
the region could serve as a deterrent to escalatory activities. The rotation
of U.S. forces in the Philippines is one such example of shoring up U.S.
interests by deepening an important alliance.
Engage from top to bottom. Finally, U.S. engagement should occur
at all levels of government and in all aspects of our interests: economic,
diplomatic, and security. Throughout the long wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, the U.S. military continued its deep engagement with allies in the
Asia-Pacific, training officers and enlisted personnel in accordance with
long-standing cooperation agreements. Military training and education is
a tool of U.S. statecraft that is well appreciated and practiced and should
continue to be a primary plank of engagement with the Asia-Pacific region.
The Obama administration gets high marks on this score with
frequent presidential and cabinet-level engagement. Major speeches and
well-publicized visits can be a powerful symbol of U.S. dedication to
regional partners, as demonstrated by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s
July 2010 speech after meetings with ASEAN leaders in Hanoi and Secretary
of Defense Ashton Carter’s announcement of the new Southeast Asia
Maritime Security Initiative at the 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.
While we face a world ever more demanding of high-level officials’ time,
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