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asia policy<br />

whose cooperation is the most critical for reunification. 24 Another survey<br />

found that the South Korean public believed that North Korea’s nuclear<br />

program (37.2%) and inter-Korean cooperation for reunification (20.6%) are<br />

the two most important issues for PRC-ROK relations. 25<br />

Despite decades of diplomacy, however, South Korea’s engagement<br />

strategy has not been successful in gaining Chinese cooperation on North<br />

Korea. The crux of the problem is that although Beijing publicly supports the<br />

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and peaceful Korean unification, its<br />

core geostrategic interest lies in maintaining the current status quo with North<br />

Korea as a crucial buffer state. China’s greatest fear is a reunification of the<br />

North and South, presumably under the governance of South Korea, whereby<br />

China loses that buffer zone and faces the U.S. Forces Korea immediately at<br />

its border, as well the likely massive inflow of North Korean refugees. Only<br />

by supporting the regime in Pyongyang can China avert such a daunting<br />

outcome. As a result, these diverging interests have led China to apply<br />

pressure on North Korea to rein in its nuclear weapons program and appease<br />

other countries, on the one hand, but also provide oil and other political and<br />

economic aid to North Korea so as to prevent the regime’s collapse, on the<br />

other hand. 26 This two-track approach has been successful only in serving<br />

China’s interests.<br />

Nonetheless, cracks in what was once called a “lips and teeth” relationship<br />

between China and North Korea have slowly begun to emerge, especially after<br />

Kim Jong-un took power. The quintessential example is the fact that there has<br />

not yet been a summit between Xi and Kim, whereas Xi and Park have held<br />

six summits, including two state visits. North Korea’s missile tests in July 2014,<br />

a day before Xi’s state visit to Seoul, were a clear sign of vehement protest over<br />

China’s increasing closeness with South Korea. To reduce its overwhelming<br />

dependence on China, Pyongyang made diplomatic overtures to Japan,<br />

Russia, South Korea, and even the United States, but to no avail. Meanwhile,<br />

a growing distance between Beijing and Pyongyang has allowed the Park and<br />

Xi governments to draw closer than had previously been possible. In Seoul,<br />

this is regarded as a window of new opportunity to pull China farther away<br />

from North Korea and closer to South Korea. Successful summits, diplomatic<br />

24 “Half of S. Koreans Pick China as Key Help in Korean Unification: Poll,” Yonhap News Agency,<br />

February 5, 2014 u http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/02/05/36/0301000000AEN201<br />

40205007200315F.html.<br />

25 “South Koreans and Their Neighbors,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies, April 19, 2014 u<br />

http://en.asaninst.org/contents/south-koreans-and-their-neighbors-2014.<br />

26 Friedberg, A Contest For Supremacy, 191.<br />

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