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oundtable • non-claimant perspectives on the south china sea
the importance of maintaining peace in the South China Sea justifies a
concerted effort to keep up meaningful visits to the region.
Between U.S. troops routinely exercising with their ASEAN
counterparts and cabinet visits stand the middle managers of U.S. grand
strategy: senior military officials and their peers in the Foreign Service. They
too play an important role in communicating the nuances in Washington’s
approach to the region. In particular, dialogue among senior military
officials from the United States, Southeast Asian states, and China could go
a long way toward mitigating the operational risks of maritime encounters.
Maintaining cordial relations and personal familiarity between experienced
sailors and airmen could make the difference between unintentional
escalation and pragmatic steps toward de-conflicting tensions.
Conclusion
Many of the ingredients of an optimal strategy for advancing U.S.
interests in the South China Sea, such as freedom of navigation missions,
military engagement, thoughtful diplomacy, and trade liberalization
efforts, already exist. The key challenge for Washington is advancing these
activities as business as usual so that Asian partners understand that the
U.S. presence in the region will be principled, permanent, and peaceful.
Support for freedom of navigation will continue to be an important focus
of activity in the South China Sea but must be accompanied by a reinforced
message that there is much more to U.S. interests. The United States must
reiterate its support for the peaceful resolution of the disputes underlying
present tensions and guide its partners toward achieving the economic
prosperity that ultimately incentivizes cooperation and stability. To do so,
it should take advantage of its full range of diplomatic tools, ranging from
military-to-military engagement to head-of-state summits. Drawing on the
support of its allies and partners, the United States should define how it
will defend a shared vision of a peaceful maritime arena and what costs it is
willing to incur along the way. We need to say what we mean and mean what
we say. This strategy must be the common responsibility of all our friends in
the region and all levels of government from Washington to the Pacific.
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