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asia policy Japan. 17 Naturally, South Koreans understand that their economic future is tied to China, as was shown in a June 2014 survey of regional experts across Asia-Pacific countries, where 86% of South Korean experts selected China as their country’s most important economic partner in ten years. 18 Inevitably, these burgeoning economic ties began to influence politics in South Korea: enhancing greater economic cooperation with China—even in times of difficult political relations with Beijing—became a major policy imperative for many South Korean leaders. This led to the emergence of a dual strategy of pursuing a strong economic partnership with China while relying on a military alliance with the United States. The current Park government is no less insensitive about South Korea’s economic reality. For her first state visit to China in 2013, President Park brought a record 71 business leaders in her delegation, signifying the importance her government places on its economic ties with China. (She brought 159 business leaders for her latest visit to China in September 2015.) In his reciprocal state visit to Seoul in July 2014, President Xi’s delegation included 200 Chinese business leaders, setting a record as the largest foreign business delegation to ever visit South Korea. To further strengthen already robust economic ties, both governments agreed to establish a direct trading market for their currencies and negotiated bilateral and multilateral trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and a trilateral free trade agreement (FTA) between China, Japan, and South Korea. These ongoing trade cooperation efforts led to the conclusion of the bilateral China-Korea FTA in November 2014 on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. While technical negotiations and legislative ratification of the agreement still must be completed, this bilateral FTA with China is expected to eliminate immediately $8.7 billion in tariffs on Korea’s exports to China when it takes effect, with another $45.8 billion to be eliminated over ten years. 19 The FTA will cover 91% and 92% of Chinese and South Korean goods, respectively, within twenty years. 20 The conclusion of the agreement also distinguishes 17 Jin Kai, “China’s Charm Offensive Toward South Korea,” Diplomat, July 8, 2014 u http://thediplomat. com/2014/07/chinas-charm-offensive-toward-south-korea. 18 Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, Power and Order in Asia: A Survey of Regional Expectations (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014). 19 “Korea, China Strike Free Trade Pact,” Korea.net, November 20, 2014 u http://www.korea.net/ NewsFocus/Policies/view?articleId=122781. 20 “Hanjung FTA sangseseolmyeongjalyo” [Detailed Material for the Explanation of Korea-China FTA], Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (ROK), March 2015 u http://www.fta.go.kr/ webmodule/_PSD_FTA/cn/doc/1_description.pdf. [ 108 ]
kim and cha • between a rock and a hard place South Korea as the third country after Chile and Peru, and the largest economy thus far, to have concluded FTAs with the world’s three largest economies: the United States, the European Union, and China. However, the agreement is not as high quality in scope as the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, and the potential economic benefits are limited. For example, the agreement covers only 70% of agricultural products and also excludes key products such as rice, steel, and auto parts from tariff elimination, which are points of sensitivity for both countries. The conclusion of negotiations acts more as a political boost for ties between Beijing and Seoul because the FTA adheres to the earlier summit agreement of the two countries’ leaders to strike a deal by the end of 2014. As South Korea becomes increasingly economically dependent on China, however, South Koreans also have begun to perceive China as an economic threat. The number of South Koreans who view China as an economic threat has increased sharply from 52.7% in 2012 to 71.9% in 2014, even though their favorable view of China was consistently high during this period. 21 Equally notable is the fact that more South Koreans perceived China as an economic threat than a military threat (66.4%). 22 Thus far, this trend has not translated into any sort of action or had any policy implication in South Korea. Yet there are underlying tensions and serious concerns emerging in the country about China as both a major economic competitor and a rising economic influence. 23 The North Korea Dilemma North Korea lies at the heart of South Korea’s strategic engagement with China. Given decades of confrontation and deadlocked negotiations between South Korea and North Korea as well as the latter’s isolation and faltering economy, China’s political ties with North Korea as that country’s only ally and largest trade partner have given Beijing enormous leverage over the North Korean regime. As a result, China’s cooperation has long been regarded as key to resolving the current nuclear standoff with North Korea and achieving Korean reunification. In a public opinion survey in December 2013, almost 50% of South Koreans responded that China is the country 21 Kim et al., “South Korean Attitudes on China,” 22. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. [ 109 ]
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asia policy number 21 • january 2
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is south korea in china’s orbit?
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