22vPaX

asia policy
Nevertheless, movement toward an early conclusion of a CoC has been
slow—due largely to outstanding differences between ASEAN states and
China. While there has been progress in clarifying some areas of agreement
and cooperation, the pace of negotiations provides incentives for interested
parties to pursue or develop other options. Thus, ASEAN claimants, similar
to China, have resisted proposals to stop various complicating activities.
The Philippines’ decision to seek international arbitration via the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is sometimes characterized as
a case of a state pursuing an extra-ASEAN option at the expense of ASEAN.
But this interpretation is both true and false. It is true to the extent that
this decision appears to have been reached without much consultation
with other ASEAN states and certainly not with ASEAN as a collective
group. Further, it is worth noting that most ASEAN states initially viewed
this action as provocative and did not rally behind the Philippines, thus
reinforcing the existing perception of the organization as less than unified.
In general, ASEAN states have preferred to work out disagreements through
dialogue and negotiation rather than arbitration and litigation, as the latter
are considered more confrontational and zero-sum processes. Notably,
ASEAN’s collective declarations and statements have avoided mentioning
the ongoing arbitration process, despite strong pressure from the Philippines
to do so.
On the other hand, the peaceful resolution of disputes remains the
organization’s top interest and priority. Whether that outcome is pursued
via ASEAN or non-ASEAN means is less important. This is true of the
South China Sea disputes and has also been true of other interstate disputes
that previously challenged regional relations. Historically, for example,
extra-ASEAN processes have been considered acceptable and appropriate,
especially if a dispute is potentially too sensitive or divisive in terms of
intra-ASEAN relations. None of these historical cases are understood as
contrary to ASEAN principles—just the opposite, in fact. Equally important,
they are also not viewed as instances of ASEAN inaction. Rather, most see
ASEAN’s contributions to the resolution of these disputes as indirect—that
is, the organization created conditions that facilitated states’ support for
more peaceful options. Thus, ASEAN offers a space for states to interact,
exchange views, expand exchanges, and deepen regional integration, all
of which are understood to facilitate both common understanding and
common interests that, in turn, push states to exercise greater self-restraint.
As highlighted above, the goals of the CoC have notably been characterized
in some very similar terms.
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