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oundtable • non-claimant perspectives on the south china sea
Here, it bears correcting or at least elaborating on a conclusion that is
sometimes arrived at too easily. Specifically, some observers suggest that
China’s wide-ranging maritime activities plus the expansion or consolidation
of U.S. strategic ties in Southeast Asia are evidence that ASEAN’s great-power
choice is clear. Such conclusions, however, oversimplify Southeast Asian
interests and predicaments. While developments in the South China Sea
have indeed produced greater consensus in ASEAN on the need to support
U.S. strategic engagement as a source of regional stability, few states, if any,
in Southeast Asia would agree that such engagement is sufficient. This is
not just because of their significant economic interests with China, as is so
often emphasized, but also because ASEAN autonomy demands a mix of
relationships. 7 In this sense, ASEAN’s longer-term challenge regarding the
South China Sea is to ensure its own autonomy in the face of very strong
great-power influences.
For all the challenges discussed in this essay, ASEAN and its processes
will remain an important emphasis in states’ responses to the South China
Sea disputes. The stakes for ASEAN are high and involve more than
questions of territory. Ultimately, the question is what the South China
Sea portends for regional order. A regional order created by Chinese power
or by U.S. deterrence alone is one in which the interests and agency of
ASEAN’s lesser states have diminished standing. Thus, ASEAN states are
likely to continue supporting regional and ASEAN-centered alternatives,
however challenging their implementation may be. In the face of such a
politically charged situation in which all countries, not just members of
ASEAN, are adapting and adjusting, the challenge for ASEAN states will
be to balance flexibility with firmness. They will need to be flexible in the
options pursued. This includes providing possible face-saving alternatives
(for example, when the international tribunal rules on the Philippines’
questions) and countering the zero-sum logic that both China and the
United States at times apply to their relationships in Southeast Asia. Perhaps
most of all, the efficacy of ASEAN’s efforts will also require a stronger and
more dependable ASEAN consensus on the way forward.
7 For this reason, some argue that great-power competition is not necessarily bad for Southeast
Asian states’ interests and security. See, for example, Bilahari Kausikan, “Asia’s Strategic Challenge:
Manoeuvring between the U.S. and China,” Australian National University, Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, Centre of Gravity Series, July 2015.
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