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asia policy maritime player, citing its acceptance of a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration last year in which a maritime territorial dispute between India and Bangladesh was settled largely in favor of the latter. 13 India and the Indian Ocean Region For all the hype surrounding India’s resurging interest in the Pacific, New Delhi’s Indian Ocean bias in managing operational security issues is clear. While the security establishment acknowledges concerns over China’s South China Sea policy, the Indian Navy’s main operational thrust is in the Indian Ocean region, where India’s political influence is seen to be losing out to China’s growing economic and diplomatic clout. Beijing’s announcement of its maritime Silk Road, in particular, has posed a challenge for India’s policy in the region. Outwardly, this maritime masterplan is focused on creating massive infrastructure and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region, but New Delhi believes there is a broader strategic motive. Notwithstanding the project’s inherent economic benefits, Indian analysts believe its sales pitch conceals a larger design: securing Chinese resource and energy shipments in the Indian Ocean through greater operational presence by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy. 14 With African oil and minerals increasingly at the heart of China’s proposals for the Indian Ocean, it seems likely that the maritime Silk Road’s eventual aim is the establishment of naval facilities in the region to safeguard Chinese material interests. Beijing’s acknowledgement of its first logistics base in the Indian Ocean, in Djibouti, only confirms Indian apprehensions, prompting further speculation about an alleged Chinese plan for multiple logistical hubs in the Indian Ocean. 15 In particular, there are doubts about the dual-use nature of the planned facilities, by which ostensibly commercial sites could be upgraded to naval centers in times of geopolitical crises. Despite the rising acceptability index of the maritime Silk Road among Indian Ocean states, Indian observers continue to be apprehensive of China’s growing naval footprint. 16 13 “Philippines Wants India at ‘Head Table’ to Tackle China’s Maritime Moves,” Business Standard, July 18, 2015 u http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/philippines-wants-india-athead-table-to-tackle-china-s-maritime-moves-115071800732_1.html. 14 Brahma Chellaney, “China’s Indian Ocean Strategy,” Japan Times, June 23, 2015 u http://www. japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/06/23/commentary/world-commentary/chinas-indian-ocean-strategy. 15 K.J.M. Varma, “China to Build Military Logistics Base at Djibouti,” India Today, November 26, 2015 u http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-to-build-military-logistics-base-at-djibouti/1/532125.html. 16 Abhijit Singh, “China’s ‘Maritime Bases’ in the IOR: A Chronicle of Dominance Foretold,” Strategic Analysis 30, no. 3 (2015). [ 18 ]
oundtable • non-claimant perspectives on the south china sea To be sure, New Delhi and Washington broadly agree that Beijing’s Indian Ocean objectives are subservient to its core maritime interests in the Pacific. But Indian analysts differ with their U.S. counterparts in viewing the Chinese reclamation efforts in the South China Sea as a precursor to greater power projection into the Bay of Bengal. From an Indian vantage point, the dispute over maritime territory in Southeast Asia provides Beijing with a useful excuse for a strategic thrust into the Indian Ocean region, invoking the threat of containment by democratic powers around the Asia-Pacific rim. The difficulty for New Delhi is that it also disagrees with Washington’s interpretation of maritime law and the freedoms enjoyed by foreign warships in littoral spaces. In particular, India does not fully support U.S. attempts at claiming a “right to uninterrupted passage” in coastal waters without the prior permission of the subject state—especially in areas that are deemed to be within a nation’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 17 New Delhi’s view on the subject, in fact, broadly corresponds with Beijing’s—particularly on the need for prior notification by foreign warships before entering a coastal state’s territorial waters or EEZ. 18 Viewed through an Indian prism, unannounced forays through territorial waters and EEZs under the rubric of “innocent passage” or “freedom of navigation” are a problematic proposition. Even though UNCLOS permits continuous and expeditious passage—necessitated by needs of navigation—a maneuver undertaken solely for the purpose of scoring political points would be an illegitimate act, even if technically legal. Moreover, with the use of autonomous unmanned systems on the rise, legal provisions allowing unfettered access to littoral spaces appear to warrant a re-examination. The legality of littoral patrols in the South China Sea also has consequences for the Indian Navy’s strategy in dealing with the presence of foreign militaries near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. New Delhi believes the island group deserves legal status as an “archipelago,” without 17 Lalit K. Jha, “U.S. Regularly Conducts Operational Challenges in Indian EEZ,” India Today, October 20, 2015 u http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/us-regularly-conducts-operationalchallenges-in-indian-eez/1/503344.html. See also Raj Narain Mishra, Indian Ocean and India’s Security (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1986), 102, 138. 18 In March 2001, India issued a protest to Washington against the presence of the USNS Bowditch, a military survey vessel in the EEZ of the Nicobar Islands. For more on this case, see Colin Warbrick, Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, and Micheal Bohlander, eds., International Law and Power: Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice (Boston: IDC Publishers, 2009), 565. [ 19 ]
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