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asia policy ally to influence China to adhere to global norms and behave as a responsible stakeholder. The AIIB will be a good test case for this approach. South Korea and other like-minded countries could come together and play a critical role in ensuring that the China-led bank operates according to global standards of governance and transparency. Instead of impeding Seoul’s cooperation with Beijing, Washington should instead support such engagement, especially if it helps South Korea gain insight into Chinese intentions and strategic views on North Korea, and also promotes quiet U.S.-ROK-China dialogue on North Korean contingencies. All these steps would help mitigate Seoul’s North Korea and entrapment dilemmas. The management of U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia should also be in tandem with bilateral or multilateral efforts to enhance the U.S.-ROK alliance and U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral relations, as well as to promote regional stability and cooperation. As a balancing act against South Korea’s growing economic dependence on China, particularly following the conclusion of the China-Korea FTA and ongoing negotiations of the RCEP, Washington would do well to bring South Korea in as one of the first post-agreement countries of the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. The United States should also play a more active role in managing ROK-Japan relations. In particular, it should work to prevent historical disputes from undermining bilateral relations between its two allies while facilitating a positive environment for constructive dialogue and also promoting and enhancing cooperation on functional issue areas of common interest, such as cybersecurity and disaster relief. Any misperceptions or misunderstandings by South Korea and Japan of each other’s actions should be managed through confidence-building measures among these three countries to prevent further deterioration of bilateral relations. As part of these efforts, holding regular U.S.-ROK-Japan summits or reinvigorating trilateral ministerial meetings and other consultative mechanisms would be helpful. In addition, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should make concerted efforts to slowly build consensus for a collective security statement regarding North Korean threats. Upgrading current information-sharing into a general security of military information agreement and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement would be a logical next step. Seoul certainly hopes that it can continue to operate strategically in a space in which it can reap security benefits from the United States and economic benefits from China, while maintaining good relations with both. As argued above, this is the optimal path for South Korea to circumvent the four dilemmas of power, economics, unification, and entrapment. However, [ 120 ]
kim and cha • between a rock and a hard place the degree to which this strategic space remains open for Seoul is not fully within its control. Indeed, the size of this space will depend greatly on the actions of South Korea’s great-power ally and its giant neighbor. Given Chinese complaints about THAAD, Seoul may be finding that Beijing is willing to afford South Korea little space to finesse the issue and that it instead may have to make a choice. And with U.S. complaints about Chinese land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, the space for South Korea to say nothing about freedom of navigation may be shrinking. It would behoove strategic thinkers in both Seoul and Washington to begin a serious discussion of how the alliance should prepare for such contingencies. [ 121 ]
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the national bureau of asian resear
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asia policy number 21 • january 2
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is south korea in china’s orbit?
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2) To help bridge the policy and ac
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Part 2: Foreign-Language Sources Wh
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asia policy, number 21 (january 201
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oundtable • non-claimant perspect
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