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asia policy
of four frigates completing a two-month tour in June 2015 and one frigate
making a subsequent deployment to the Philippines in November.
Several non-claimant states have also stepped up their military
cooperation with and arms sales to some of the Southeast Asian claimants.
India has strengthened its military engagement with Vietnam and Malaysia.
Japan, Admiral Yoji Koda notes, has commenced initiatives to improve the
maritime and coast guard capabilities of some of its Southeast Asian partners,
including Vietnam and the Philippines, to help alleviate political and military
pressure from China. Several European countries are also helping strengthen
the maritime and coast guard capabilities of the Southeast Asian claimants.
Vietnam has placed orders to purchase frigates from the Netherlands and
anti-ship cruise missiles from France, while the Philippines is importing
French and Italian armed light helicopters. These still-modest measures are
not attempts to take sides or encourage militarization of the disputes. Rather,
they are part of non-claimants’ efforts to shore up important relationships,
prevent the escalation of tensions, and signal concern to China.
However, there are other factors beyond these shared economic and
security interests driving the non-claimants’ overall positions. As noted
by several of the contributors to this roundtable, some non-claimants hold
unique geostrategic concerns. For Japan and South Korea, as Lee Jaehyon
argues, the outcome of the South China Sea disputes could set a precedent
for the separate territorial disputes in which each is embroiled—Japan with
China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, and South
Korea with Japan over the island grouping of Dokdo/Takeshima in the
Sea of Japan. For India, as Singh notes, China’s actions in the South China
Sea are perceived as part of a broader strategy to establish a Chinese naval
presence in the Indian Ocean, and Indian concern about this helps inform
New Delhi’s responses to the disputes. These distinct national interests add
a challenging dimension to the already strong interests in trade and freedom
of navigation that drive these major powers’ approach to the disputes.
For most of the non-claimants studied here, the South China Sea disputes
are also viewed through the lens of regional geopolitics. China’s increasing
assertiveness in the South China Sea, coupled with its growing power and profile
on the global stage, seems designed to challenge the U.S.-led regional order that
has prevailed since the end of World War II. This perception has implications
for U.S. treaty allies Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as well as for ASEAN.
As the sovereignty disputes divide China and ASEAN claimants,
non-claimant ASEAN member states are seeking to bring the China-ASEAN
relationship back on track. Jane Chan notes that Singapore is working to
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