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ICON S Conference 17 – 19 June 2016 Humboldt University Berlin

160606-ICON-S-PROGRAMME

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most important example is the European union (EU). In<br />

the EU the Member States are under an obligation to follow<br />

decisions made by international institutions, which<br />

are outside the full control of each individual State. How<br />

decision-making power can be delegated in this way<br />

is often regulated in a State’s constitution. In Sweden,<br />

rules concerning international delegation can be found<br />

in Chapter 10 of the Instrument of Government. Needless<br />

to say, this type of regulation is of great importance,<br />

inter alia because it may allow deviations from other<br />

constitutional rules. This paper analyses <strong>–</strong> from a national<br />

and an international law perspective <strong>–</strong> how international<br />

delegation is regulated in the Swedish constitution,<br />

in an attempt to draw some general conclusions<br />

concerning the construction of this type of regulation.<br />

Lisa L. Miller: Back to Basics: Constitutions for<br />

Ordinary People<br />

This paper argues for more robust scholarly attention<br />

to how constitutional structures shape ordinary<br />

political dynamics. We are especially interested in how<br />

constitutional rules and institutions enable or disable<br />

mass popular control over political decision-making. We<br />

begin by highlighting the degree to which constitutional<br />

scholarship has focused on legal rules, legal institutions<br />

and democratic constraint, with far less attention to how<br />

legal structures can increase the capacity of ordinary<br />

people to challenge prevailing power. We then ask what<br />

key provisions constitutions would need in order for<br />

regular citizens to mount sustained political pressure<br />

for the creation and maintenance of public goods. We<br />

emphasize the need to understand the manner in which<br />

different constitutional structures facilitate broad collective<br />

action in the public interest and limit the number<br />

of opportunities for small groups to veto the interests<br />

of the many. We illustrate the intersection of constitutional<br />

structure and the political capacity of ordinary<br />

people through a brief exploration of the U.S. case.<br />

Maxim Tomoszek: Accountability in Constitution:<br />

Purpose Alternatives and Efficiency<br />

This paper will address three questions: Through<br />

which tools do constitutions achieve accountability?<br />

How efficient are these tools in ensuring public control<br />

of power? How universal or country-specific are answers<br />

to these questions? First, the paper will overview the<br />

tools of accountability in comparative perspective, dividing<br />

them in three categories <strong>–</strong> legal (for example judicial<br />

review), political (for example parliamentary debate) and<br />

social (for example investigative journalism or public<br />

debate). Then, using the context of Visegrad countries<br />

(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) the<br />

efficiency of particular tools of accountability will be<br />

compared with the aim to explain latest constitutional<br />

developments in analyzed countries, especially interferences<br />

of governments with judiciary (in particular constitutional<br />

courts) and freedom of media. The presentation<br />

will conclude by discussing possible constitutional<br />

measures available for strengthening accountability.<br />

74 EQUALITY, VULNERABILITY AND<br />

MIGRANT MEMBERSHIP<br />

This panel explores how the increasing use of the<br />

concepts of equality and vulnerability in international<br />

human rights law affects the rights of migrants in immigrant<br />

receiving states. The papers in this workshop<br />

analyze and compare the way these concepts are used<br />

in legal reasoning and relate them to theoretical debates<br />

on citizenship and migrant membership.<br />

Participants Karin de Vries<br />

Lieneke Slingenberg<br />

Bas Schotel<br />

Sylvie Da Lomba<br />

Corina Heri<br />

Name of Chair Karin de Vries and<br />

Lieneke Slingenberg<br />

Room UL6 31<strong>19</strong><br />

Karin de Vries and Lieneke Slingenberg:<br />

Citizens’ or residents’ rights? Territoriality,<br />

Membership and legal status in the Article 14<br />

case law of the ECtHR<br />

In her work on the rights of immigrants, Bosniak<br />

discerns two ways of obtaining rights: rights can derive<br />

from formal immigration status under law or from territorial<br />

presence. Under the ‘status-based approach’<br />

rights are based on legal qualifications and political<br />

consent, whereas under the territorial conception of<br />

rights, are based on a fact of social reality by stressing<br />

the significance of physical presence in the national<br />

territory. While she acknowledges that the territorial<br />

model begs its own questions and has its own hangups,<br />

she stresses that ethical territoriality still represents<br />

the best argument for immigrants’ rights that we<br />

have. In this paper, we would like to examine to what<br />

extent this idea of ‘ethical territoriality’ is reflected in<br />

the ECtHR’s case law on discrimination on the ground<br />

of nationality and immigration status in the field of immigrant’s<br />

material rights.<br />

Bas Schotel: Refugee Protection beyond Human<br />

Rights. Asylum as a negative duty<br />

Today asylum and international protection are primarily<br />

understood as positive duties: receiving states<br />

are supposed to actively do stuff (eg provide for shelter<br />

and housing, food, health care, safety, education,<br />

etc.). By contrast, this paper explores the idea that<br />

asylum should be construed as primarily a twofold<br />

negative duty for the target state: duty not to prevent<br />

refugees from accessing the territory and duty not<br />

to expel from the territory. Understanding asylum as<br />

a negative duty makes clear that not offering asylum<br />

often involves many active coercive measures. From<br />

a practical legal perspective it is easier to apply the<br />

proportionality test to active coercive measures (eg<br />

detention, construction of a border fence), than to<br />

Concurring panels 115

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