ICON S Conference 17 – 19 June 2016 Humboldt University Berlin
160606-ICON-S-PROGRAMME
160606-ICON-S-PROGRAMME
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most important example is the European union (EU). In<br />
the EU the Member States are under an obligation to follow<br />
decisions made by international institutions, which<br />
are outside the full control of each individual State. How<br />
decision-making power can be delegated in this way<br />
is often regulated in a State’s constitution. In Sweden,<br />
rules concerning international delegation can be found<br />
in Chapter 10 of the Instrument of Government. Needless<br />
to say, this type of regulation is of great importance,<br />
inter alia because it may allow deviations from other<br />
constitutional rules. This paper analyses <strong>–</strong> from a national<br />
and an international law perspective <strong>–</strong> how international<br />
delegation is regulated in the Swedish constitution,<br />
in an attempt to draw some general conclusions<br />
concerning the construction of this type of regulation.<br />
Lisa L. Miller: Back to Basics: Constitutions for<br />
Ordinary People<br />
This paper argues for more robust scholarly attention<br />
to how constitutional structures shape ordinary<br />
political dynamics. We are especially interested in how<br />
constitutional rules and institutions enable or disable<br />
mass popular control over political decision-making. We<br />
begin by highlighting the degree to which constitutional<br />
scholarship has focused on legal rules, legal institutions<br />
and democratic constraint, with far less attention to how<br />
legal structures can increase the capacity of ordinary<br />
people to challenge prevailing power. We then ask what<br />
key provisions constitutions would need in order for<br />
regular citizens to mount sustained political pressure<br />
for the creation and maintenance of public goods. We<br />
emphasize the need to understand the manner in which<br />
different constitutional structures facilitate broad collective<br />
action in the public interest and limit the number<br />
of opportunities for small groups to veto the interests<br />
of the many. We illustrate the intersection of constitutional<br />
structure and the political capacity of ordinary<br />
people through a brief exploration of the U.S. case.<br />
Maxim Tomoszek: Accountability in Constitution:<br />
Purpose Alternatives and Efficiency<br />
This paper will address three questions: Through<br />
which tools do constitutions achieve accountability?<br />
How efficient are these tools in ensuring public control<br />
of power? How universal or country-specific are answers<br />
to these questions? First, the paper will overview the<br />
tools of accountability in comparative perspective, dividing<br />
them in three categories <strong>–</strong> legal (for example judicial<br />
review), political (for example parliamentary debate) and<br />
social (for example investigative journalism or public<br />
debate). Then, using the context of Visegrad countries<br />
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) the<br />
efficiency of particular tools of accountability will be<br />
compared with the aim to explain latest constitutional<br />
developments in analyzed countries, especially interferences<br />
of governments with judiciary (in particular constitutional<br />
courts) and freedom of media. The presentation<br />
will conclude by discussing possible constitutional<br />
measures available for strengthening accountability.<br />
74 EQUALITY, VULNERABILITY AND<br />
MIGRANT MEMBERSHIP<br />
This panel explores how the increasing use of the<br />
concepts of equality and vulnerability in international<br />
human rights law affects the rights of migrants in immigrant<br />
receiving states. The papers in this workshop<br />
analyze and compare the way these concepts are used<br />
in legal reasoning and relate them to theoretical debates<br />
on citizenship and migrant membership.<br />
Participants Karin de Vries<br />
Lieneke Slingenberg<br />
Bas Schotel<br />
Sylvie Da Lomba<br />
Corina Heri<br />
Name of Chair Karin de Vries and<br />
Lieneke Slingenberg<br />
Room UL6 31<strong>19</strong><br />
Karin de Vries and Lieneke Slingenberg:<br />
Citizens’ or residents’ rights? Territoriality,<br />
Membership and legal status in the Article 14<br />
case law of the ECtHR<br />
In her work on the rights of immigrants, Bosniak<br />
discerns two ways of obtaining rights: rights can derive<br />
from formal immigration status under law or from territorial<br />
presence. Under the ‘status-based approach’<br />
rights are based on legal qualifications and political<br />
consent, whereas under the territorial conception of<br />
rights, are based on a fact of social reality by stressing<br />
the significance of physical presence in the national<br />
territory. While she acknowledges that the territorial<br />
model begs its own questions and has its own hangups,<br />
she stresses that ethical territoriality still represents<br />
the best argument for immigrants’ rights that we<br />
have. In this paper, we would like to examine to what<br />
extent this idea of ‘ethical territoriality’ is reflected in<br />
the ECtHR’s case law on discrimination on the ground<br />
of nationality and immigration status in the field of immigrant’s<br />
material rights.<br />
Bas Schotel: Refugee Protection beyond Human<br />
Rights. Asylum as a negative duty<br />
Today asylum and international protection are primarily<br />
understood as positive duties: receiving states<br />
are supposed to actively do stuff (eg provide for shelter<br />
and housing, food, health care, safety, education,<br />
etc.). By contrast, this paper explores the idea that<br />
asylum should be construed as primarily a twofold<br />
negative duty for the target state: duty not to prevent<br />
refugees from accessing the territory and duty not<br />
to expel from the territory. Understanding asylum as<br />
a negative duty makes clear that not offering asylum<br />
often involves many active coercive measures. From<br />
a practical legal perspective it is easier to apply the<br />
proportionality test to active coercive measures (eg<br />
detention, construction of a border fence), than to<br />
Concurring panels 115