ICON S Conference 17 – 19 June 2016 Humboldt University Berlin

Zsuzsanna Gedeon: Constitutional constraints
on the governing majority in a comparative
perspective
Today’s constitutions are based on the traditional
theoretical framework of legislative-executive relations,
presuming that there are two different (rivaling)
interests. This traditional approach does not take
into account today’s political reality: the competition
of modern political parties for governmental office
and the party discipline, which defines the actions of
these parties. When the same party forms the executive
power, which has the majority in the legislature,
the governing majority -consisting of the legislative
majority and executive power- follow the same interest
in many cases. This paper proposes a reading of
constitutions that takes into account the political reality
of political parties. It aims to explore the available
constitutional constraints on this governing majority.
It analyzes the institutions of supreme/constitutional
courts and second chambers/expert bodies, how they
work under the context of political parties; and it shows
how effectively they can constrain the governing majority.
The paper uses cases from different jurisdictions.
There are examples from the US, France and the UK,
since these countries represent different models of
executive-legislative relations.
Zoltán Pozsár-Szentmiklósy: Judicial review
of constitutional amendments as a normative
requirement originating from the principle of
separation of powers
The doctrine and challenge of unconstitutional
constitutional amendments is well known. Some constitutions
contain “eternal clauses” which can guide
courts when dealing with the related dilemmas, in other
cases courts can base their examination only on abstract
principles. However, courts usually do not have
explicit competence for substantive examination of
constitutional amendments. By analyzing theoretical
approaches related to constitutional amendments and
the principle of separation of powers, as well as the relevant
practice of national courts, this conference paper
intends to reach a better understanding of the judicial
review of unconstitutional constitutional amendments.
My position is that judicial review of constitutional
amendments is not an exceptional competence, rather
a normative requirement originating directly from the
principle of separation of powers.
Mariana Velasco Rivera: The Broken Bridge
between Constitutional Reform and Implementation
From politically broken systems to more or less
well functioning democracies constitutional reform
and replacement have become recurring answers to
address a wide range of public needs around the world.
However, reform and replacement sometimes pose
unexplored challenges. What happens after a new
constitution or reform is adopted? Are political actors
well aware of the implications of reforming a constitution?
Mexico presents an interesting case study in
which political actors are not always aware of the fact
that constitutional reforms have to be implemented.
Constitutional reforms are easily adopted, but implementation
processes are either blocked or overlooked.
This requires further research because incomplete
implementation risks creating even more problematic
situations than the issues the reforms were intended to
address and solve in the first place. Besides describing
the Mexican case, the paper will discuss constitutional
reform as an effective means to address public issues.
Concurring panels 145