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ICON S Conference 17 – 19 June 2016 Humboldt University Berlin

160606-ICON-S-PROGRAMME

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Michèle Finck: The Right to the City From a<br />

Legal Perspective<br />

My paper engages with the so-called ‘right to the<br />

city’, a concept that has recently gained in popularity<br />

in urban studies and urban social movements. In its<br />

essence, it refers to the fact that the inhabitants of a<br />

city should have the right to actively shape their city,<br />

and hence minimize the power of politics and markets<br />

in this regard. The paper briefly introduces the concept<br />

and then sets out to examine it from a legal perspective,<br />

taking into account a number of different legal orders. I<br />

analyze whether the law can actually recognize any such<br />

thing as a ‘right to the city’ or whether any precise legal<br />

rights may flow from the concept, such as for instance<br />

the right to political participation or housing at local<br />

level. In this context, I will examine, for instance, the<br />

right to the city as it exists in Brazil as well as elements<br />

of direct democracy at local level in Germany, in particular<br />

in <strong>Berlin</strong>. The paper will conclude that despite the<br />

existence of these tools most legal orders, as they currently<br />

stand, are incapable of recognizing ‘the right to<br />

the city’ for a number of reasons, including the conflict<br />

that would arise between this right and a number of established<br />

rights, especially the right to private property.<br />

Tilman Reinhardt and Michael Denga: From<br />

Dupnitsa to Inner London <strong>–</strong> Exploring the legal<br />

dimension of Lefebvre’s “Right to the City”<br />

Two major trends are changing the face of Europe’s<br />

capitals: Migration and Privatization. Whilst they are<br />

turning them into vibrant, cosmopolitan centers of our<br />

civilization, they are also associated with increasing<br />

segregation and social stratification. Be it at the limits,<br />

as in Paris’ sprawling Banlieues, or right in the center,<br />

as in London’s Borough of Tower Hamlets, migrant<br />

communities are often clustered together in socioeconomically<br />

marginalized quarters. As more and more<br />

public goods are left to the private sector, this clustered<br />

distribution may result in material differences in living<br />

conditions (insurance costs, access to health and<br />

education, “food deserts”, etc.).<br />

States and municipalities, when trying to counter<br />

spatial inequalities, are typically relying on topdown<br />

approaches, such as urban planning, housing<br />

schemes, and regulation. A recent ECJ-judgement<br />

C-83/14, CHEZ however, draws attention to the potential<br />

of addressing spatial inequalities “bottom-up”<br />

through European Antidiscrimination Law. Various legal<br />

questions arise in this context: Which subject matters<br />

are covered by Art. 21 CFR? Could the unequal treatment<br />

of residents from multiethnic quarters be considered<br />

a “racial or ethnic” discrimination? How could one<br />

define appropriate spatial reference frames? Does Art.<br />

21 CFR imply positive duties to prevent unequal results?<br />

Our presentation seeks to answer these questions<br />

and put the results into the larger context of Antidiscrimination<br />

Law, European Social Law and Urban Governance.<br />

78 HOW CAN THE ABSENT SPEAK?<br />

PRESUMPTIONS AND PARADOXES<br />

OF PRESENCE IN PUBLIC LAW<br />

As states exercise power outside of their territory and<br />

against nonmembers, public law is made to step out<br />

of its national and territorial context to negotiate its<br />

place within and beyond its own borders. As boundaries<br />

of state power become less fixed, the boundaries<br />

between national, transnational, and international principles<br />

and domains are also being redefined. Where<br />

public law is so intimately dependent on democratic<br />

legitimacy for its authority, the transgression of borders<br />

and the exercise of state power over ‘others’ raises<br />

questions of how public law deals with the absent. This<br />

panel tackles the conference themes by considering<br />

the relationship between presence, absence and legitimacy.<br />

How does public law negotiate legitimacy of<br />

authority over the ‘other’ who is physically absent, as in<br />

the case of migrants? What role does the ‘reasonable<br />

person’ play in creating legitimacy through absence?<br />

And how does the mere presence of the state complicate<br />

how we think about legitimacy?<br />

Participants Dana Schmalz<br />

Valentin Jeutner<br />

Nino Guruli<br />

Name of Chair Michaela Hailbronner<br />

Room DOR24 1.404<br />

Dana Schmalz: The part of the absent <strong>–</strong> or:<br />

physical boundaries and democracy<br />

Every notion of democracy operates with an idea<br />

of the respective people (or demos). My focus here<br />

is on those notions, which have abandoned any essentialist<br />

conception of the people, notably different<br />

approaches of radical democracy. Whereas the demos<br />

in these approaches is generally understood as open,<br />

the possibility to participate in actions identified as<br />

democratic typically hinges on the physical (co-)presence<br />

of persons. This gains significance for the question<br />

whether and how rules, which condition or hinder<br />

physical presence, can become subject to democratic<br />

contestation. We find numerous examples of such<br />

rules in the area of border and migration policies. In<br />

analyzing how these rules become contested, several<br />

scholars have drawn on a Rancièrian account of democratic<br />

struggle as the “climbing of a stage” (Rancière<br />

<strong>19</strong>99, 81). It is my suggestion that this Rancièrian account<br />

can be misleading when thinking about the position<br />

of persons, who are physically distanced by the<br />

rules from the polities and publics that decide about<br />

these very rules. Against this background, I would like<br />

to discuss the significance of physical presence for<br />

democratic processes and possible consequences<br />

for conceptualizing rules of physical deterrence.<br />

Anél du Plessis: Commentator<br />

Concurring panels 1<strong>19</strong>

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