ICON S Conference 17 – 19 June 2016 Humboldt University Berlin
160606-ICON-S-PROGRAMME
160606-ICON-S-PROGRAMME
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Michèle Finck: The Right to the City From a<br />
Legal Perspective<br />
My paper engages with the so-called ‘right to the<br />
city’, a concept that has recently gained in popularity<br />
in urban studies and urban social movements. In its<br />
essence, it refers to the fact that the inhabitants of a<br />
city should have the right to actively shape their city,<br />
and hence minimize the power of politics and markets<br />
in this regard. The paper briefly introduces the concept<br />
and then sets out to examine it from a legal perspective,<br />
taking into account a number of different legal orders. I<br />
analyze whether the law can actually recognize any such<br />
thing as a ‘right to the city’ or whether any precise legal<br />
rights may flow from the concept, such as for instance<br />
the right to political participation or housing at local<br />
level. In this context, I will examine, for instance, the<br />
right to the city as it exists in Brazil as well as elements<br />
of direct democracy at local level in Germany, in particular<br />
in <strong>Berlin</strong>. The paper will conclude that despite the<br />
existence of these tools most legal orders, as they currently<br />
stand, are incapable of recognizing ‘the right to<br />
the city’ for a number of reasons, including the conflict<br />
that would arise between this right and a number of established<br />
rights, especially the right to private property.<br />
Tilman Reinhardt and Michael Denga: From<br />
Dupnitsa to Inner London <strong>–</strong> Exploring the legal<br />
dimension of Lefebvre’s “Right to the City”<br />
Two major trends are changing the face of Europe’s<br />
capitals: Migration and Privatization. Whilst they are<br />
turning them into vibrant, cosmopolitan centers of our<br />
civilization, they are also associated with increasing<br />
segregation and social stratification. Be it at the limits,<br />
as in Paris’ sprawling Banlieues, or right in the center,<br />
as in London’s Borough of Tower Hamlets, migrant<br />
communities are often clustered together in socioeconomically<br />
marginalized quarters. As more and more<br />
public goods are left to the private sector, this clustered<br />
distribution may result in material differences in living<br />
conditions (insurance costs, access to health and<br />
education, “food deserts”, etc.).<br />
States and municipalities, when trying to counter<br />
spatial inequalities, are typically relying on topdown<br />
approaches, such as urban planning, housing<br />
schemes, and regulation. A recent ECJ-judgement<br />
C-83/14, CHEZ however, draws attention to the potential<br />
of addressing spatial inequalities “bottom-up”<br />
through European Antidiscrimination Law. Various legal<br />
questions arise in this context: Which subject matters<br />
are covered by Art. 21 CFR? Could the unequal treatment<br />
of residents from multiethnic quarters be considered<br />
a “racial or ethnic” discrimination? How could one<br />
define appropriate spatial reference frames? Does Art.<br />
21 CFR imply positive duties to prevent unequal results?<br />
Our presentation seeks to answer these questions<br />
and put the results into the larger context of Antidiscrimination<br />
Law, European Social Law and Urban Governance.<br />
78 HOW CAN THE ABSENT SPEAK?<br />
PRESUMPTIONS AND PARADOXES<br />
OF PRESENCE IN PUBLIC LAW<br />
As states exercise power outside of their territory and<br />
against nonmembers, public law is made to step out<br />
of its national and territorial context to negotiate its<br />
place within and beyond its own borders. As boundaries<br />
of state power become less fixed, the boundaries<br />
between national, transnational, and international principles<br />
and domains are also being redefined. Where<br />
public law is so intimately dependent on democratic<br />
legitimacy for its authority, the transgression of borders<br />
and the exercise of state power over ‘others’ raises<br />
questions of how public law deals with the absent. This<br />
panel tackles the conference themes by considering<br />
the relationship between presence, absence and legitimacy.<br />
How does public law negotiate legitimacy of<br />
authority over the ‘other’ who is physically absent, as in<br />
the case of migrants? What role does the ‘reasonable<br />
person’ play in creating legitimacy through absence?<br />
And how does the mere presence of the state complicate<br />
how we think about legitimacy?<br />
Participants Dana Schmalz<br />
Valentin Jeutner<br />
Nino Guruli<br />
Name of Chair Michaela Hailbronner<br />
Room DOR24 1.404<br />
Dana Schmalz: The part of the absent <strong>–</strong> or:<br />
physical boundaries and democracy<br />
Every notion of democracy operates with an idea<br />
of the respective people (or demos). My focus here<br />
is on those notions, which have abandoned any essentialist<br />
conception of the people, notably different<br />
approaches of radical democracy. Whereas the demos<br />
in these approaches is generally understood as open,<br />
the possibility to participate in actions identified as<br />
democratic typically hinges on the physical (co-)presence<br />
of persons. This gains significance for the question<br />
whether and how rules, which condition or hinder<br />
physical presence, can become subject to democratic<br />
contestation. We find numerous examples of such<br />
rules in the area of border and migration policies. In<br />
analyzing how these rules become contested, several<br />
scholars have drawn on a Rancièrian account of democratic<br />
struggle as the “climbing of a stage” (Rancière<br />
<strong>19</strong>99, 81). It is my suggestion that this Rancièrian account<br />
can be misleading when thinking about the position<br />
of persons, who are physically distanced by the<br />
rules from the polities and publics that decide about<br />
these very rules. Against this background, I would like<br />
to discuss the significance of physical presence for<br />
democratic processes and possible consequences<br />
for conceptualizing rules of physical deterrence.<br />
Anél du Plessis: Commentator<br />
Concurring panels 1<strong>19</strong>