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ICON S Conference 17 – 19 June 2016 Humboldt University Berlin

160606-ICON-S-PROGRAMME

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27 PROPORTIONALITY AND<br />

PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC LAW<br />

Panel formed with individual proposals.<br />

Participants Eszter Bodnár<br />

Eduardo Ribeiro Moreira<br />

Cora Sau Wai Chan<br />

Fabiana Di Porto<br />

Nicoletta Rangone<br />

Name of Chair Eszter Bodnár<br />

Room DOR24 1.601<br />

Eszter Bodnár: The Role of Public Hearings in<br />

the Constitutional Review Procedure<br />

Hungary’s Constitutional Court was often considered<br />

to be an “ivory tower” and was criticized because<br />

the lack of public hearings. In 2013, the Hungarian Parliament<br />

prescribed that, in certain cases, Constitutional<br />

Court shall hold oral hearings that should be public but<br />

since then no oral hearing has taken place. Oral hearings<br />

are not an unusual element of the constitutional<br />

review procedure. The US Supreme Court, the German<br />

Constitutional Court or the Constitutional Council in<br />

France can hold oral hearings, which are usually open<br />

to the public. What are the functions of oral hearings?<br />

Are they necessary elements of a constitutional court’s<br />

procedures? What are the advantages, disadvantages<br />

and risks of holding an oral argument? Should oral<br />

hearings be public? If yes, how broad should the openness<br />

be? To answer these questions, the paper uses a<br />

comparative perspective. Finally, it aims to explain the<br />

causes of the Hungarian situation and seek possible<br />

solutions for its improvement.<br />

Cora Sau Wai Chan: Rights, Proportionality and<br />

Deference: An Empirical Study of Judgments in<br />

Post-Handover Hong Kong<br />

The paper presents the findings of a study of<br />

judicial deference in human rights cases handed<br />

down by courts in Hong Kong since its return to<br />

Chinese sovereignty. The study uses a combination<br />

of qualitative analysis and quantitative methods<br />

structured around the two-stage approach to<br />

rights adjudication (definition first, limitation second)<br />

and a multi-part proportionality test to ascertain the<br />

degree of deference that courts exhibit in reasoning<br />

about rights. The findings reveal what factors<br />

affected the degree of judicial deference and how<br />

courts exercised deference. These findings furnish<br />

an empirical basis for testing various assumptions<br />

about the courts’ deferential behaviour. Although the<br />

study focuses on Hong Kong, its methods of analysis<br />

are (within limits) transposable to other jurisdictions,<br />

and its findings will make for interesting comparisons<br />

with judicial attitudes in the UK, Canada and<br />

ECHR <strong>–</strong> jurisdictions that inspired Hong Kong courts’<br />

approaches to deference.<br />

Fabiana Di Porto and Nicoletta Rangone: Proportionality<br />

of Regulation: What Role for Cognitive<br />

Sciences<br />

The paper addresses the question of what hampers<br />

many regulators from using cognitive sciences’<br />

insights in rule-making, dealing specifically with the<br />

critique that it expands the length and costs of regulatory<br />

procedures excessively. Quite to the contrary, we<br />

contend that cognitive sciences may help to enhance<br />

the proportionality of regulation.<br />

Eduardo Ribeiro Moreira: People’s participation<br />

in the constitution amendment process<br />

An almost forgotten point, though it has been studied<br />

by nations that do not share the same theoretical<br />

referential, is precisely the people’s participation in<br />

the process of constitutional reform. The issue is not<br />

new, nevertheless, the arrays of countries that adopt<br />

those practices have different goals: such as the treaty<br />

of Lisbon for Europe, the Constitutions of Bolivia and<br />

Venezuela, Spain or Ireland. This paper examines the<br />

different results in each experience. We will examine<br />

the protection of all forms of direct political participation<br />

that cannot be abolished, which includes referendums,<br />

plebiscites, and popular initiatives to propose<br />

bills and any other form of manifestation of the people<br />

constitutionally foreseen that, cannot be withdrawn<br />

from the constitution. One of the solutions lies in popular<br />

support with the possibility of a regular constitution<br />

reform by people’s initiative.<br />

Concurring panels 58

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