ICON S Conference 17 – 19 June 2016 Humboldt University Berlin
160606-ICON-S-PROGRAMME
160606-ICON-S-PROGRAMME
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88 THE INCLUSION OF “THE OTHER”:<br />
THE PROTECTION OF THE SOCIAL<br />
RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS IN NATIONAL<br />
AND EUROPEAN COURTS<br />
Welfare benefits provided to migrants are an essential<br />
way to guarantee their fundamental rights enshrined<br />
in national constitution and supranational Charters.<br />
They are also a vital tool for their inclusion in European<br />
society. However, social policies towards migrants have<br />
been deeply affected by the financial crisis. The cuts to<br />
welfare expenditure combined with the ever-increasing<br />
influx of migrants coming to Europe has had a noticeable<br />
impact on social cohesion and acceptance of<br />
migrants, making the role of the courts in protecting<br />
migrants social rights very crucial. The panel analyses<br />
such a role by looking at different perspectives that<br />
local and European courts assume: the use of the principle<br />
of equality as an overall justification for welfare<br />
entitlements, the concept of social citizenship in its<br />
interaction with the exclusionary meaning of political<br />
citizenship, the interaction between national and supranational<br />
legal systems in migrants’ rights protection<br />
and its effectiveness.<br />
Participants Alessandra Serenella Albanese<br />
Ulrike Lembke<br />
María D. U. Fernández-Bermejo<br />
Eva Hilbrink<br />
Name of Chair Stefano Civitarese Matteucci<br />
and Jeff King<br />
Room UL9 210<br />
Alessandra Serenella Albanese: The principle of<br />
equality and its different functions in protecting<br />
migrants’ social rights<br />
The paper examines the European and Italian<br />
court’s case law on the protection of migrants’ social<br />
rights, regarded from the point of view of the application<br />
of the principle of equality. The principle of equality<br />
can play different roles in judicial reasoning. It not only<br />
assumes the meaning of a pure non-discriminatory<br />
principle, but it can also be used as the basis to assess<br />
the reasonableness of the legislative measures<br />
introducing different welfare regimes (on grounds of<br />
nationality, duration of stay, type of permit of stay, etc.).<br />
It can finally be related to dignity and to fundamental<br />
human needs and regarded as “substantive equality”,<br />
according to art. 3 § 2 of Italian Constitution. The<br />
different facets of the principle are variously stressed<br />
or combined in court’s decisions. How the equality<br />
“tool” is used in legal reasoning, may produce different<br />
consequences on the effectiveness of migrants’ social<br />
rights protection and may indeed have a significant<br />
impact on social cohesion.<br />
Ulrike Lembke: Social citizenship and the inclusion<br />
of ‘the other’: migrants’ benefits before<br />
European and German courts<br />
For some years, the ECJ has developed a social<br />
dimension of Union citizenship counterbalancing a<br />
sole market approach. But in its recent decisions on<br />
national competences to refuse the granting of social<br />
non-contributory benefits to economically inactive<br />
Union citizens, the court put a sharp stop to the<br />
ideas of social Union citizenship and social inclusion.<br />
At the same time, German courts held that economically<br />
inactive Union citizens are entitled to basic social<br />
benefits under certain circumstances. These rulings<br />
are owed to the fundamental right to minimum subsistence<br />
following from human dignity as stated by<br />
the Federal Constitutional Court‚ for the unemployed<br />
and their families (2010) and for asylum seekers and<br />
refugees (2013). The paper examines European and<br />
German case law on migrants‚ benefits in the light of<br />
concepts of social citizenship and approaches to the<br />
social inclusion of migrants as the paradigmatic others<br />
of national social security systems.<br />
María Dolores Utrilla Fernández-Bermejo:<br />
Migrants’ legal protection under the European<br />
multilevel system of fundamental rights<br />
The purpose of this contribution is to analyze the<br />
legal regime of the protection of migrants in Europe<br />
both under supranational law <strong>–</strong> namely the European<br />
Convention on Human Rights and EU law <strong>–</strong> and national<br />
law of the EU Member States. The stress will be on the<br />
positive obligations deriving from national constitutional<br />
law and translated primarily into rights to social protection<br />
and into the delivery of social benefits (by public<br />
administrations). Moreover, the interaction of such a<br />
level of protection with supranational human rights law<br />
will be scrutinized as to check the effectiveness of this<br />
multi-layered system when projected over the figure<br />
of migrants in Europe. The subsidiary role of safeguard<br />
with which the European Convention is endowed as well<br />
as the potential constraints for human rights arising<br />
from EU internal market law will be critically assessed.<br />
Eva Hilbrink: Immigration Control as an Obstacle<br />
for Balancing in Strasbourg Legal Reasoning<br />
Strasbourg balancing in Article 8 ECHR immigration-cases<br />
has a reputation of being intransparent and<br />
unpredictable. On the basis of an empirical analysis of<br />
147 cases, this paper argues that the ECtHR follows a<br />
consistent pattern of scrutiny: it consistently refrains<br />
from scrutinising the merits or the relative importance<br />
of ‘immigration-specific’ aspects. These are aspects<br />
that only in the context of immigration may result in the<br />
physical exclusion of a person from society, such as<br />
irregular residence, severed family ties, or a lack of resources.<br />
If national immigration-specific rules are applied<br />
correctly and consistently, and if there is no good<br />
excuse for non-compliance with these rules, the Court<br />
concludes that denying residence does not violate<br />
Concurring panels 131