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Philosophy of Biology 369
general cohesion of the genotype–Dialectical materialism emphasizes that
there is a hierarchy of levels of organization, at each of which a different set of
dialectical processes may be at work. This is the reason why reduction is often
so unsuccessful.
(6) The importance of quality. The qualitative approach, for instance, is the only
meaningful way to deal with uniqueness.”
This kind of thinking by 19th century naturalists continued throughout the
20th century. But Engels would not have supported all the modern views held
by Marxists, as shown by the case of Lysenko between about 1935 and 1965.
His Lamarckian pseudo-science had nothing to do with dialectical materialism.
Some modern Marxists are apparently opposed to the Darwinian principle of
the uniqueness of the individual, presumably because it is in conflict with the
principle of equality. However, as Mayr (l.c.) pointed out, genetic uniqueness and
civic equality are two entirely different things. In view of the diverse abilities of
human individuals it was necessary to provide diverse opportunities, as Haldane
(1949) had already recognized. To insist, as many Marxists do, that all individuals
are identical would be a falling back to classical essentialism. Human heterogeneity
was not in any way in conflict with dialectical materialism.
Natural Selection
In one of his latest contributions, Mayr (2004a) discussed natural selection as
survival selection. Selection as a mechanism refers to true selection of the best or
to “culling” (eliminating) the inferior individuals leaving all the rest for breeding.
This means that in a real population in harsh years only the best individuals survive,
in a mild year only the worst individuals are culled and most individuals survive,
not only the best are “selected.” The process of mild elimination leaves a large
reservoir of variation available. This view of selection by eliminating the inferior
members of a population provides a better explanation for this second cause of
evolution than a “selection for the best,” Mayr stated and continued very correctly
that the expression “Survival of the fittest” is misleading to the extreme.
As to the controversial subject of kin selection Mayr (1990r, 2004a) distinguished
between casual and social groups. The former, like temporary fish schools or flocks
of birds, are never targets of selection, whereas social groups may have a high fitness
value and may be the target of kin selection. The members of such groups have
a potential for kin selection, if the groups are clearly delimited and compete with
other such social groups, for example in early humans. According to Mayr, species
as entities do not answer to selection. When one species replaces another, the
individuals of these species interact and compete, not the species. Such events
should be designated as species turnover or species replacement, not as species
selection.