The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

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pended largely on Sullivan's leadership style. Sullivan's introduction and establishment of the process demanded his considerable, ongoing personal involvement. Although initially he was able to give it such attention, the Chief of Staff simply faced too many other demands on his energies to continue devoting as much time to nurturing LAM as it reqUired. While he was mounting LAM, and then the Force XXI Campaign, he was also leading the Army as it redeployed from Southwest Asia, operated in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, and responded to various requirements in the United States and around the world. He and his subordinates had to run the Army, including his own stint as Acting Secretary, respond to Congress and the Executive, and carry out a radical downsizing that left the Army over one-third smaller than the one he had inherited. LAM, though very important, was by no means Sullivan's only, or even primary, concern. As a result, Sullivan managed LAM in a less hands-on way than he otherwise might have. "Since we were faced with significant challenges," he explained toward the end of his tenure, it seemed to me the best way to handle them was as a leader in com bat would. Accordingly, it was my task to articulate the concept and my in tent and then to be present so that I could influence the process as it un folded to relate seemingly disparate events to my concept/vision. My big gest challenge, I felt then, and now, was to create a framework which would enable me to convince my troops we had a way to maintain our standing as the best army in the world.! This mode of operation evidenced itself throughout his tenure as Chief of Staff and his involvement with both the Louisiana Maneuvers and the Force XXI Campaign . In nearly every situation possible , GEN Sullivan led by example. He set the example for his subordinates-in this case, the rest of the Army-in the arena of change by be- 88 ing open to innovation and thinking "outside the box," that is, outside the confines of existing processes, procedures, and comfort zones. He found himself intellectually ahead of much of the Army in his use of a corporate Board of Directors for LAM and his willingness to explore new technologies and ways for the Army to accomplish more through increased reliance on computerization and simulation. His use of simulations outside the training arena, for fly-before-buy experiments and decisionmaking concerning organizations and equipment, caused many of his colleagues particular discomfort. And, while he was not averse to being ahead of the institutional Army on his intellectual journeys, he recognized that if he traveled too far too fast he risked the institution's not knowing how to follow him. These innovative thrusts, however, to which LAM gave a formalized structure, responded well to the Army's constrained finances and the vastly changed circumstances of the post-Cold War world and of the Army in that world-and many in the Army came to recognize that. Sullivan was also a consensus seeker. His several Board of Directors meetings and commanders conferences and his lengthy discussions on military topics with myriad contemporaries, peers, and former subordinates afforded him opportunities not only to gather information and sound out opinion but also to plant the seeds of consensus for his evolving ideas. He encouraged his senior colleagues to air their differences over his programs because he believed that the resultant tensions were creative and produced both better solutions and stronger consensus. Moreover, he derived great personal comfort from his conviction that all of those who differed with his ideas sought the best course for the Army. In addition, his willingness to adopt from others better ideas than his own assisted this process of consensus-building. As a result of this method of operation, he was able to convince his fellow senior generals to share at least some responsibility for his approach to potential solutions to the Army's problems. The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers
Sullivan knew that some members of his Boards of Directors had not wholly agreed with the LAM process or even the concept of a Board of Directors. As a result, he sought to use his position as first among equals in that circle to stimulate their cooperation and participation. The availability of LAM seed money for issue investigation was a significant incentive for most proponents and produced enough dramatic results that many senior generals became supporters 2 Of course, money-or, more often, the lack of it-was a crucial element in the course that many programs followed during Sullivan's tenure. The sharp decreases in the Army's budget meant that the size of the force had to be reduced significantly, with units inactivated or restationed and programs curtailed or canceled. These circumstances rendered Sullivan's leadership task as Chief continuously challenging, particularly since operational commitments and stresses on the remaining soldiers and units increased at the same time as funds were being reduced. The same fiscal circumstances made his efforts to effect change immensely more difficult as well. For many, however, the challenges did serve to emphasize the need for change. Sometimes, Sullivan avoided confrontation and did not hold peers and immediate subordinates accountable for delivering the support he had directed for LAM and the LAM Task Force. He announced his concept and intent and, reasonably, expected either compliance or a good explanation as to why a directive could not be carried out. BG Tommy Franks had to intimate on several occasions that he would have to take disagreements to Sullivan before they could be resolved 3 In at least one case, the Task Force did not push an issue of noncompliance with Sullivan's directive to provide funding in order to avoid an ugly confrontation. It can be argued that with all the demands on his attention Sullivan could not remedy problems about which he was uninformed and that the Task Force should have advised him when his wishes were not being carried out. The fact is that he seems not always to Preliminary Assessment and Conclusions have been so advised and so could not take action. As a result of such disconnects, LAM probably accomplished less than it otherwise might have if the Chief of Staff had intervened. The Task Force had to execute its mission of making the process work, sometimes despite resistance from various quarters, without the attention and intervention from Sullivan it might have expected or engendered. Perhaps the Task Force should have pushed harder, but perhaps it could not. When they led the Task Force, Tommy Franks and David Ohle were brigadier generals. Neither had the rank or authority to confront three- or four-star generals whose opinions about priorities for the Army might have differed from their own.4 LAM also was not the only change game in town. The CBRS-and then the ECBRSand the normal modernization process, although revised and streamlined, still were the means by which the POM was built and major programs funded; LAM operated beyond the leading edge of that process. The TRADOC Battle Labs, although complementing LAM efforts in many respects, also performed much of TRADOC's combat developments-related experimentation and responded to both LAM issues and priorities and the initiatives of commanders throughout the Army. Sullivan saw a place for all these developmental thrusts or axes of advance. Perhaps a partial explanation of this attitude lies in Sullivan's background. As an Armor officer and commander, Sullivan was accustomed to conducting high-speed maneuvers along multiple axes and to using speed and violence to accomplish the mission at hand. Often, this form of warfare included bypassing obstacles and pockets of resistance rather than being overly careful about cleaning up the battlefield immediately or about the niceties of established procedures and processes. This manner of operating seems clear in his employment of the Task Force after most of its involvement with the LAM process and Force XXI synchronization had ceased.s 89
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We live in an era of dynamic change
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The preparation of this history of
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THE MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVERS CHAN
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oritized the allocation of LAM seed
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in the GOWGs and BoDs either had so
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Chapter Page 4. Institutionalizing
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On 9 March 1992, GEN Gordon R. Sull
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gers of being unprepared. He recoun
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Infantry Division (Mechanized) (lst
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eral Combat Training Centers was on
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Figure 1 A Sense of History "Strate
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R. Gabel's recently published book,
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quisition cycles, and save money an
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among the players contributed great
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BG To mmy R. Franks ODCSOPS draft c
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the briefing and established the or
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where and in what quantities, using
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1 Final Report of the Special Study
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29 See Interview, Nelson with Yarri
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10-11. See also Peay's letter to BG
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Chapter 2 THE LOUISIANA MANEUVERS P
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Figure 5 tual experimental work on
Page 53 and 54: move an issue from approval by the
Page 55 and 56: ing his own and the process could p
Page 57 and 58: tank crews from proper attention to
Page 59 and 60: mercially available, space-based C4
Page 61 and 62: services participated, the Joint St
Page 63 and 64: the Army. For all his efforts and t
Page 65 and 66: eal understanding of what Louisiana
Page 67 and 68: 1 GEN Sullivan to BG Mountcastle, 1
Page 69 and 70: 26 Message from Cdr SigCen to PEOs,
Page 71 and 72: eminded BG Eric Shinseki, the Direc
Page 73 and 74: Chapter 3 REORIENTING LAM: THE FORC
Page 75 and 76: Figure 7 Office of the Director Syn
Page 78 and 79: CONTROL EVENT r-- FY 95 BA DECISION
Page 80 and 81: ties and programs for all to see. W
Page 82 and 83: the GOWGs in importance. In additio
Page 84 and 85: In fact, the Force XXI Campaign sho
Page 86 and 87: axis. In addition, ODCSOPS controll
Page 88 and 89: 1 Memorandum for See Distribution f
Page 90 and 91: ful enhancements to the operational
Page 93 and 94: Chapter 4 INSTITUTIONALIZING LAM AN
Page 95 and 96: ecause it had no orders to stop and
Page 97 and 98: quirements (CCIR) (see Figure 11).
Page 99 and 100: Reimer announced in mid-March that,
Page 101 and 102: I Interview, Sullivan with Yarrison
Page 103: Chapter 5 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AN
Page 107 and 108: and shortly after Sullivan's term.
Page 109 and 110: clearer direction from the Chief fo
Page 111: 1 Sullivan in Sullivan Papers, Pers
Page 114 and 115: STOW-E SWG Synch TAV TDA TOE TRADOC
Page 116 and 117: Army Materiel Command (AMC) MACOM
Page 118 and 119: Staff, Army, to execute the Louisia
Page 120 and 121: Appendix C MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVE
Page 122 and 123: DATE 3-4 Oct 16-18 Oct Late Janearl
Page 124 and 125: tions, or mobilization and deployme
Page 126 and 127: MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS Nov 59-Feb 6
Page 128 and 129: FOREIGN DECORATIONS (in chronologic
Page 130 and 131: (OTN) assessment. Key points made a
Page 132 and 133: the AWD , as MG White briefed GEN F
Page 134 and 135: 23 Letter, MG White to GEN Franks,
Page 136 and 137: team. This demonstration shows the
Page 138 and 139: ordination with the Army, to develo
Page 140 and 141: 30 January 1995-The ADO issues the
Page 142 and 143: Meeting on Battlefield Digitization
Page 145 and 146: Appendix H MEMORANDUM FOR BG TOMMY
Page 147 and 148: will designate a General Officer st
Page 149 and 150: Appendix I CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE B
Page 151 and 152: • Responsibility will remain hier
Page 153 and 154: Appendix ] CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE L
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Appendix K ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS
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Abrams, GEN Creighton W: 1, 7 Adams
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