The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

clearer direction from the Chief for a mission
hand-off would have proven beneficial
to all involved.
Given the missions he assigned the Task
Force during his last several months as Chief,
Sullivan ultimately wanted to maintain its
ability to explore and exploit the world of
high technology and models and simulations
both to respond to current operational needs
and to assist the Force XXI Campaign . The
Task Force had definitely evolved a capability
to accomplish such missions. But Sullivan
made no effort to reinvigorate the LAM process
apart from Force XXI, perhaps because
it was impossible, given the other demands
on his and the Army's time and energies.
Critics could argue that if Sullivan needed a
group of his own to investigate strategic technology
in the fashion that COL Cowell later
articulated and proposed for the Task Force,
he might better have disbanded the LAM
Task Force and established a different group
within his office for that purpose, thereby
removing the target of a great deal of Army
Staff animosity Given the demise of the original
LAM process that had served him as the
FORSCOM Commander, the absence of a
unique mission for the Task Force, and the
Army's absorption with Force XXI and the
EXFOR, GEN Reimer's decision to disband
the Task Force is not surprising. The progress
of the Force XXI Campaign and, particularly,
that the Joint Venture and the EXFOR were
making under GEN Hartzog's leadership,
could only have encouraged the Chief in
making that decision.
Those who suggest that many aspects of
LAM did lastingly change the way the Army
changes point to a variety of evidence: the
cadre of leaders with experience as agents
of change at the GOWG level and below still
runs the Army; the Army's streamlining of
the acquisition process and the closer relationship
the Army has developed with industry
has changed that aspect of modernization
dramatically; and the use of interactive
simulations for all sorts of iterative design,
testing, training, planning, and mission
rehearsal functions is now widespread. All
Preliminary Assessment and Conclusions
these alterations to "business as usual" have
proven invaluable to today's Army and are
unlikely to suffer from a reversion to former
methods of operation. LAM's legacy seems
clear.
Conclusions
New change processes like LAM gain acceptance
if they produce the desired outcomes
in the expected time. They gain longterm
currency only if they continue to demonstrate
a long-term utility to those who
employ them. Such processes are more likely
to be institutionalized if they work and if a
receptivity to changing the way the processes
work exists or is created within the institution
and in the minds of those who have to
employ them. There were already people,
including many very senior people, throughout
the Army in the early 1990s who were
willing to change it, but many were really
comfortable effecting change only within the
existing processes. For many, LAM was too
different.
One can judge success with respect to
institutionalization of LAM less by whether
particular mechanisms, like the Board of
Directors, have achieved wider use in the
Army than by whether the institution has
moved enduringly in the direction of be coming
the kind of farsighted, innovative, learning
organization that Sullivan sought to create.
Some would argue that armies, by definition,
are conservative institutions that generally
resist changing-and that, in order to
be continuously ready and effective, they
have to be. There is some truth in this view;
however, the current rapid evolution and
unpredictability of both world events and
technology require that an army consider
almost daily the utility of possible changes
to its doctrine, organizations, or equipment.
Such an army must be able to employ an
agile and responsive process that vets possible
changes, often in the simulations environments
that are increasingly available, or
risk falling behind. Thus, a lasting willingness
to learn, grow, and change is crucial to
future success 8
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