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The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

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several years and to maintain the <strong>Army</strong>'s effectiveness<br />

as a fighting force. To accomplish<br />

that, he would need a vehicle that permitted<br />

him to exercise positive leadership.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Concepts-Based Requirements System<br />

(CBRS), which the <strong>Army</strong> had developed<br />

during the Cold War, was oriented on dollars<br />

and the Program Objective Memorandum<br />

(POM) process. CBRS governed nearly<br />

all <strong>Army</strong> change processes and had done so<br />

successfully throughout that conflict. Tied<br />

as it was into the Defense Department's Planning,<br />

Programming, and Budgeting System<br />

and into the congressional funding process,<br />

CBRS and the mechanisms that supported it<br />

would likely continue to govern most <strong>Army</strong><br />

modernization for the foreseeable future.<br />

Sullivan determined, however, that CBRS<br />

would not suffice as a leadership vehicle for<br />

the new era.<br />

As he engaged in this process of "discovery<br />

learning," seeking such a vehicle,<br />

Sullivan sought advice and good ideas from<br />

a vast array of colleagues, former subordinates,<br />

and consultants. To name all of those<br />

with whom he discussed these and related<br />

matters is not possible. He certainly did consult<br />

GENs Dennis ]. Reimer, Frederick M.<br />

Franks,] .H. Binford Peay III, jimmy D. Ross,<br />

Leon E. Salomon, john H. Tilelli, GEN (Ret.)<br />

Carl E. Vuono, MGs Lon E. Maggart and<br />

William A. Stofft, and BG Harold W Nelson.<br />

Based on his discussions, his sense of<br />

<strong>Army</strong> history, and particularly his reading<br />

of Christopher Gabel's <strong>The</strong> U.S. <strong>Army</strong> GHQ<br />

<strong>Maneuvers</strong> of 1941 (published in fall 1991) ,<br />

Sullivan decided that to change the way the<br />

<strong>Army</strong> changed he needed to engage in a<br />

"<strong>Louisiana</strong> <strong>Maneuvers</strong>" (LAM) of his own.<br />

He said that he took the name from<br />

GEN George C. Marshall's pre-World War<br />

II General Headquarters exercises in <strong>Louisiana</strong>,<br />

Texas, and the Carolinas because, "I<br />

was compelled by the power of Marshall's<br />

ideas and by his intent to conduct experiments<br />

that would be the basis for designing<br />

new units and battlefield processes . ...<br />

Borrowing Marshall's title was a signal that<br />

business as usual was not good enough, that<br />

vi<br />

I was fostering innovation and growth in<br />

extraordinary ways . .. I made it part of my<br />

office to Signal that I-not merely my staffwas<br />

going to be personally involved."<br />

During the last months of 1991 and the<br />

beginning of 1992, the Chief of Staff worked<br />

with his colleagues and advisers to develop<br />

a concept for iterative experimentation that<br />

would make extensive use of computerbased<br />

simulations to test proposed doctrine,<br />

procedures, organizations, and equipment.<br />

He relied in this work upon his staff and<br />

upon his senior commanders, notably GEN<br />

Franks, the u.S. <strong>Army</strong> Training and Doctrine<br />

Command (TRADOC) Commander, within<br />

whose command much of the original analysis<br />

of the concept's viability took place.<br />

Sullivan's objective was to evolve a process<br />

that would enable the <strong>Army</strong> to arrive at solutions<br />

that had been proven in simulation<br />

before changing policies or doctrine, buying<br />

equipment, or reorganizing forces. <strong>The</strong><br />

result of this effort, and of the interplay of<br />

creative tensions among the <strong>Army</strong>'s senior<br />

leaders that contributed to the evolution of<br />

LAM, was a strategically agile process that<br />

involved those leaders as a corporate Board<br />

of Directors in gUiding the <strong>Army</strong> into the<br />

21st century. <strong>The</strong> personal extension of the<br />

Chief of Staff's <strong>Of</strong>fice organized to make LAM<br />

work was the LAM Task Force, headquartered<br />

at Fort Monroe, Virginia.<br />

<strong>The</strong> LAM process, which functioned from<br />

mid-1992 to mid-1994, was a cyclic exercise<br />

with several definite steps. <strong>The</strong> Task<br />

Force first solicited issues and good ideas<br />

from the <strong>Army</strong>'s major commands. It next<br />

presented the issues to a General <strong>Of</strong>ficer<br />

Working Group (GOWG), composed of GO<br />

representatives of the commands submitting<br />

the issues, that discussed and approved or<br />

disapproved the various issues and prioritized<br />

them before forwarding them to the<br />

Board of Directors (BoD). <strong>The</strong> BoD then considered<br />

the issues forwarded from the<br />

GOWG, considered other issues proposed by<br />

BoD members, and approved selected issues<br />

for experimentation and investigation during<br />

that year's LAM cycle. <strong>The</strong> BoD also pri-

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