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The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

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widely distributed video with senior-officer voiceovers<br />

that displayed highlights of the meeting. He only<br />

confirmed the next Board of Directors meeting for 3-<br />

5 March 1993 to BG Franks during a trip to Redstone<br />

Arsenal and Fort Rucker, Alabama, on 4-5 February<br />

1993. See Memorandum for Distribution from<br />

Sullivan, 11 February 1993, sub: Trip to Redstone<br />

Arsenal and Fort Rucker, Alabama, in LAM TF Files,<br />

Box 1, File 3-4b . See letter, Valliant to Yarrison, 6<br />

November 1997, p. 15. Subsequent Board of Directors<br />

meetings took place on 3-5 March 1993, 20 October<br />

1993, 13-14 July 1994, 20-21 October 1994,<br />

1-3 March 1995, and 11 July 1995.<br />

15 Interview, Rodgers with Yarrison, 28 June 1996,<br />

pp. 8-11, 18-19. See also CMH Memorandum for<br />

Chief, RA, from Yarrison, 9 December 1992, sub:<br />

<strong>Louisiana</strong> <strong>Maneuvers</strong> (LAM) GO Wo rking Group<br />

(GOWG) Meeting. See also the Electronic Meeting<br />

System printouts from the meeting in historian's reference<br />

files. Subsequent GOWGs took place 28-29<br />

July 1993, 15-16 February 1994, 24-25 August 1994,<br />

15-16 February 1995, and 3-4 October 1995.<br />

16 Assessments of the effectiveness of the Board of<br />

Directors concept have been mixed, though building<br />

consensus among the <strong>Army</strong>'s leaders through such a<br />

device was one of the original recommendations of<br />

Sullivan's transition team. See Chapter 1 above, n. 1.<br />

For the range of assessments, see Interview, Rodgers<br />

with Yarrison, 28 June 1996, pp. 21-26; Interview,<br />

Harper with Yarrison, 2 October 1996, pp. 22-25; Interview,<br />

Franks with Yarrison, 18 February 1997, pp.<br />

12-15; Interview, Sullivan with Yarrison, 29 April 1997 ,<br />

pp. 10-12; Interview, Tilelli with Yarrison, 26 January<br />

1998, pp. 2-5. See also e-mail memorandum from BG<br />

Franks to GEN Franks, 11 August 1992, sub: Visit with<br />

GEN Saint, in LAM TF Files, Box 2, File 3-4f.<br />

17 Interview, Paige with Yarrison, 15 August 1996,<br />

p. 2.<br />

18 Message, PEO Command and Control Systems,<br />

personal for multiple addressees, 291222ZJuly 1993,<br />

sub: Digitized Mapping, agrees that "our goal should<br />

be a map display in every combat vehicle " In LAM<br />

TF Files, Box 3, File 3-6e2. See also Interview, LeCuyer<br />

with Yarrison, 23 October 1996, pp 14-16.<br />

19 Franks' letter to Mountcastle, 23 February 1998,<br />

in historian's files.<br />

20 Interview, Franks with Yarrison, 18 February<br />

1997, pp. 24-25. See also John L. Romjue, American<br />

<strong>Army</strong> Doctrinefor the Post-Cold Wa r, pp. 137-138.<br />

21 Franks' letter to Mountcastle, 23 February 1998.<br />

22 Interview, COL (Ret.) John Klevecz with Dr.<br />

Susan Canedy, 16 July 1996, p. 7. Funk briefed<br />

Sullivan and Franks on battlefield digitization efforts<br />

and plans as part of a VTC held at Monroe during<br />

Sullivan's visit there on 21 August 1992.<br />

23 Interview, Franks with Yarrison, 18 February<br />

1997, pp. 24-26. Franks' letter to Mountcastle, 23<br />

February 1998. In all those places and in Tom Clancy<br />

with Franks, Into the Storm: A Study in Command (pp.<br />

52<br />

509-510), Franks particularly notes the importance<br />

of his conversations, beginning at the NTC, with the<br />

platoon sergeant of the MIA2 platoon, then-SFC<br />

Philip Johndrow, and how those discussions opened<br />

his eyes to the possibilities for nearly every aspect of<br />

fu ture warfare inherent in an accurate, common relevant<br />

picture of the battlefield.<br />

24 Messages from GEN Franks Personal for GEN<br />

Sullivan, 061533Z Apr 93, sub Advanced Warfighting<br />

Demo of Battlefield Synchronization (AWDBS), and<br />

011705Z Sep 93, sub : Advanced Warfighting Demonstration<br />

(AWD): Battlefield Synchronization, reporting<br />

to Sullivan on the results of the March-April demonstration<br />

and the July 93 exercise at the NTC with the<br />

1st Cavalry Division, both messages in historian's files.<br />

See also John W Cranston, U. S. <strong>Army</strong> Armor <strong>Center</strong><br />

and Fort Knox Annual Command <strong>History</strong>, 1 January 1993<br />

to 31 December 1993, pp. 63-70, for discussions of the<br />

experiments and of planning for AWE DESERT HAM­<br />

MER VI (NTC 94-07) in April 1994. For a summary,<br />

see John C. Johnston, "<strong>The</strong> Journey to Force XXI's<br />

Mounted Component," Armor. CIII:2 (March-April<br />

1994), 14-16.<br />

25 Interview, Franks with Yarrison, 18 February<br />

1997, pp. 24-27; Interview, Maggart with Yarrison,<br />

27 September 1996, pp. 31, 43; Interview, Sullivan<br />

with Yarrison, 29 April 1997, pp. 21-22. Maggart<br />

jOined Funk as his Assistant Commandant at Knox in<br />

1994 and succeeded Funk as Commandant when the<br />

latter moved on to corps command. See also Sullivan<br />

writing in his sketch books, 24 April 1994, in Sullivan<br />

Papers, Personal Papers, Sketch Books, December<br />

1989-February 1995, Box 1 of 5, Sketchbook #8 ,<br />

April-December 1994, "NTC: To ok a risk, not a big<br />

one but a risk, and it apparently paid off. My goal<br />

was to conduct experiment with purpose of beginning<br />

process of real change-set next CSA up-get<br />

press telling our story, excite <strong>Army</strong>, involve industry,<br />

move into 21st century. Real risk was it would collapse<br />

of its own weight. Press would declare failure<br />

& whatever support we had in Congress and amongst<br />

informed public would evaporate. Failure would have<br />

been seen as 'proof' <strong>Army</strong> is really Willie and Joe &<br />

not high tech-take it down & bring it back when<br />

needed." See also Sullivan and Harper,_Hope Is Not a<br />

Method, pp. 175-176. See also the comments in Interview,<br />

Blackwell with Yarrison, 16 October 1996,<br />

pp. 11-12, 31-33; and Interview, Hubbard with<br />

Yarrison, 9 July 1996, pp. 14, 28-29, and 16 July<br />

1996, pp. 29-33. Sullivan later observed (Letter,<br />

Sullivan to Mountcastle, 1 July 1998), "By 1994 I had<br />

become experienced enough to know [that] much of<br />

what was being touted as an experiment was in reality<br />

a demonstration, rather than a reasonably controlled<br />

scientific experiment capable of withstanding<br />

scrutiny on Capitol Hill and a close look within DOD.<br />

Thus the requirement for up front hypotheses and<br />

MOE, and the involvement of OPTEC and <strong>Army</strong> Audit<br />

Agency in the process." In historian's files.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Modern</strong> <strong>Louisiana</strong> <strong>Maneuvers</strong>

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