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The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

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With cancellation of the 1993 version of<br />

Exercise PRIME DIRECTIVE, the exercise that<br />

was to have been the vehicle for much GHQx<br />

93 experimentation, it became necessary to<br />

find other ways to evaluate the 1993 LAM<br />

issues and to assess HQDA's ability to perform<br />

its Title 10 functions. As of the initial<br />

exercise coordination conference on 12-13<br />

January 1993, HQDA had not yet settled on<br />

a way to do this, but during a LAM Quarterly<br />

IPR later in the month, GEN Sullivan<br />

directed that a GHQx be conducted during<br />

FY 93 in which the DA staff would participate<br />

and be forced to allocate scarce resources.<br />

By February, Sullivan had chosen<br />

to participate in Exercises ULCHI/Focus LENS<br />

(Korea) and FUERTES DEFANSAS (SOUTH COM)<br />

during July and August. Through mandating<br />

DA participation in these exercises,<br />

Sullivan sought to accomplish the GHQx 93<br />

mission, which was to stress the headquarters'<br />

crisis-response and decisionmaking system<br />

to see if the Department could resource,<br />

synchronize, and maintain asset visibility in<br />

two concurrent regional conflicts. When<br />

conducted 12-28 August, GHQx 93 did<br />

challenge existing capabilities, particularly<br />

the staff in the DCSOPS' Operations Directorate,<br />

which established a Crisis Action<br />

Team to support the two exercise headquarters<br />

on mobilization, deployment, sustainment,<br />

and redeployment issues 35 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Army</strong>'s<br />

Concepts Analysis Agency and the Joint Staff<br />

supported the exercise, which postulated one<br />

major regional contingency (MRC) and one<br />

lesser regional contingency (LRC) , occurring<br />

nearly simultaneously, to better test the <strong>Army</strong><br />

Staff.<br />

GHQx 94, a four-phase CPX, began in<br />

November 1993 and consisted of four weeks<br />

of active play spread in increments over eight<br />

months. Although the exercise again presented<br />

a scenario of two simultaneous regional<br />

crises, it involved many more agencies and<br />

participants than had the previous version and<br />

included, in the third phase, a linkage to the<br />

Command and General Staff College's endof-course<br />

exercise, PRAIRIE WARRIOR 94. A highlight<br />

of PRAIRIE WARRIOR 94, from the point of<br />

44<br />

view of the LAM, was the first full exercise,<br />

through simulation, of the Mobile Strike Force<br />

(MSF), a brigade task force with Information<br />

Age equipment and capabilities 36<br />

<strong>The</strong> extensive GHQ exercise resulted in<br />

several observations, which the ODCSOPS<br />

Operations Directorate briefer listed as "insights"<br />

in his presentation to the July 1994<br />

Board of Directors meeting. First, force projection<br />

requires proactive, anticipatory<br />

decisionmaking; second, force proj ection<br />

with a two-MRC strategy requires establishing<br />

priorities and ensuring a balanced force<br />

structure; third, continuous staff interaction<br />

is necessary to ensure National Command<br />

Authority and CINC decisions that allocate<br />

scarce <strong>Army</strong> resources effectively; fourth,<br />

early access to Reserve Component forces is<br />

essential in support of a force-proj ection<br />

<strong>Army</strong>; fifth, total asset visibility is essential<br />

to support a force-projection <strong>Army</strong>; sixth,<br />

projected available deployment dates for RC<br />

combat forces are inconsistent; and, finally,<br />

some units identified for the first MRC could<br />

not initially meet published criteria for deployment.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Board of Directors approved<br />

the DCSOPS recommendations and taskings<br />

resulting from the findings, and the Director<br />

of the <strong>Army</strong> Staff distributed the briefing<br />

slides with his own cover memo, setting suspense<br />

dates for corrective action plans.<br />

DCSOPS representatives also received approval<br />

of the concept for GHQx 95 at the<br />

same July 1994 Board of Directors meeting 3?<br />

Although Sullivan understood quite well<br />

the essential Joint character of modern war,<br />

and although the <strong>Army</strong> secured Joint Staff<br />

support of the GHQx's, the <strong>Army</strong> made no<br />

concerted effort, at least during the first two<br />

years of the Task Force's existence, to involve<br />

the Joint Staff or the Joint Chiefs any further<br />

in the <strong>Louisiana</strong> <strong>Maneuvers</strong>. While the Joint<br />

Staff apparently expressed some interest in<br />

what the <strong>Army</strong> was doing with LAM, certainly<br />

GEN Powell, as an <strong>Army</strong> officer, could<br />

not push greater JCS involvement. Sullivan<br />

himself was concerned on two counts: first,<br />

that integrating the other services would be<br />

very tough to do, and, second, that if other<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Modern</strong> <strong>Louisiana</strong> <strong>Maneuvers</strong>

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