The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

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96 97 * INTERIM DESIGN: - What is the Forecasted Threat Analysis & Risk Assessment? - What is the Forecasted National Security and Military Strategy? - What are the Required Force XXI Division Capabilities? - What is the range of Forecasted Political-Economic Requirements and Constraints? - What is the Communications Infrastructure Required to Support Seamless Communications between Advanced Simulations (Training Mission Rehearsal/Mission Planning) and I nformation Management Systems? Can these Systems be made Compatible between the Operational and Institutional Army? - At what Echelon within the Force Structure will Combined Arms, CS, and CSS be Placed in order to Provide the Greatest Flexibility for Deployment and Mission Accomplishment? - To what Degree will Technology Provide a C41 System which Provides Common Situational Awareness, Integrates Command Structure to Speed the Decision Making Process and Improves our Capability to Apply the Elements of Combat Power? - Will Division Redesign Impact the AC/RC mix and the AC/RC Force Alignment; if so, how? To what Degree will Division Redesign and subsequent Force Structure changes Impact Dependence on a Civilian Force which includes Contractor Support? - What New Collective and Individual Skills will be Required based on New Capabilities within the Interim Designed division? How long will it take RC Units and the IRR to become Operationally Capable to Support Force XXI? How Dependent will the Future Force Structure be on the IRR? ! * ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION DESIGN: - What is the Capability to Support Assigned Divisions on Independent Missions in and from outside its Area of Operations? - What is the Deployability of the EAD Structure? - What are the Sustainment Requirements for the EAD Structure? - What are the Trade Offs with Reserve Components to achieve Affordability with the New Structure? - At what Echelon will Information Dominance be Maintained? - How will Sustainment (Factory to Foxhole) be Accomplished for FXXI? - What are the Critical Technology Requirements of EAD Units and Compatability with the Total Force? Figure 11 **** CDRS LEGEND ! DESIGN STRAWMAN COMMANDERS CCIR/DECISION SUPPORT TIMING * DECISION I 98 99 00 * INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: - What are the Statutory JCS Requirements of the 21 st Century Institutional Army? - What are the Functional Similarities between the Operational and Institutional Army that should Require Common Technology? - What are the Trade Offs to achieve Affordability within Predicted End Strength and Fiscal Levels for the 21 st Century? - What is the Training Strategy to Support FXXI Deployment to various Missions? - Will all Installations be Capable of Fielding New Equipment to Sub-Organization and Te nants? - Does a Logistics Planning and Operational Capability exist in the New Organization to Issue Critical Supplies for Deploying Units? - Will the New Organization be Able to Mobilize Reserve Component Forces? - What are the Institutional support Requirements for 21 st Century Conflict Resolution, Demobilization, and Force Reconstitution across the Spectrum of Conflict? - How can Technology Assist in Redesigning the Institutional Army to produce Organizations with Greater Efficiency and Capability for Greater Responsibility? - Does the Redesigned Institutional Army have the Capability to Support Total Force Projection Doctrine? - What Functions, Currently Performed in the Operational Army, can be Transferred to the Institutional Army to Better Enable Execution of Total Force Projection Doctrine? - How will Information Technology make the Army's Force Generation and Materiel Acquisition Process more Efficient? - What are the Forecasted Industrial Requirements fo r the XXI Century? How will these be Linked to the Operational Army? - What is the Minimum Institutional Army End Strength Required to Support Force XXI? * DIVISION DESIGN: - What is the Functional Ability and Utility of the New Organization to meet its Primary Mission and other Forecasted Missions? How well does the Division meet the capabilities required/identified? - What is the Capability of the New Organization to win against various Forecasted Threats to U.S. Interests? - What is the Deployability of the New Organization? - What is the Sustainability of the New Organization? - What are the Special Training Requirements for the New Organization? - What are the Reasonable Trade Offs to achieve Affordability within Predicted End Strength and Fiscal Levels for the 21 st Century? - What are the Critical Technology Elements of the New Organization? - Does the FXXI Division have a Sufficient Intelligence Capability to see the enemy within its battle space and the Fusion Capability to Sustain the Requirements of Information Dominance/Advantage? If not, does the FXXI Division have Adequate Intelligence Command and Control Capability to Manage its Planned Organizational and Attached assets? - Does the FXXI Division have a Balanced Capability to see the Enemy Deep, Close and Rear? - Does the FXXI Division require Special Support? What will be the Capability of the FXXI Division to Employ these assets When/If attached?
quirements (CCIR) (see Figure 11). The CCIR concept was designed primarily to support the Senior Leader Seminar Program, a biennial exercise that was to bring together senior Army leaders to consider actions along the entire continuum of war. This seminar program, which Cowell proposed to GEN Reimer and LTG Jay M. Garner, the Assistant VCSA, was intended to resurrect at least a part of the former GHQx's so that Army leaders could address questions about what the Army would do in phases of war other than combat, in particular. Interestingly, this was very much the concept of the GHQx that then-LTG Peay had thought initially Sullivan wanted for the Louisiana Maneuvers and the approach that Peay personally had favored. 13 With regard to Force XXI, the CCIR concept sought to identify requirements for otherwise unavailable information that was needed to support the force design decisions identified on the campaign synchronization matrix. The Task Force formulated umbrella questions and issues to be addressed by each axis that would generate the information necessary for the best possible design decisions. The CCIR questions covered four force design-related subj ects for which information was required: interim design (those decisions needed before the next categories could be usefully addressed), division design, echelon-above-division design, and institutional design . While the information requirements identified in the CCIR questions may have influenced the ways in which action officers gathered information, the program appeared to have little impact beyond the life of the Task Force. The Senior Leader Seminar Program, per se, was never implemented, though elements of it found their way into the Army After Next wargames 14 What To Do with the Task Force? The fact remained, however, that the Task Force, with the essential demise of the LAM process, was still in search of a more permanent mission. Discussions about the Task Force and its future proceeded along several tracks during the first six months or so of GEN Reimer's tenure, often reflecting the tone of the original recommendation of his transition team to disband it. Nearly all those involved in these deliberations, however, realized that even if the LAM Task Force as it then existed no longer seemed necessary, at least some of its functions and ongoing proj ects somehow should be preserved elsewhere in the Army. COL Cowell made several efforts during those first months to interest GEN Reimer and the Vice Chief of Staff, GEN Ronald H. Griffith, in a new mission for the Task Force as the Chief's "strategic scouts." Under a draft charter that he forwarded to GEN Reimer in mid-October 1995, Cowell proposed that the Task Force focus on contributing to the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment UWCA) and J oint Requirements OverSight Council UROC) processes (which resulted in the integration of Joint warfighting requirements with acquisition programs), analyzing the results of Joint and combined exercises, and exploiting concepts and technology to develop dominant battlespace awareness. The Vice Chief's response to Cowell's 17 October briefing on the proposal appeared to encourage the tack Cowell was taking. 15 GEN Reimer's Staff Group, meanwhile, continued to recommend the Task Force's elimination 16 On 15 November, COL Richard Dunn, Chief of the Staff Group, succinctly summarized Reimer's options for him. Dunn wrote that, "When all is said and done, the future of the LAM TF is really a question of management styles." He pointed out that keeping the Task Force in existence and using it as Cowell had proposed would both continue the Task Force as the Chief's personal instrument for guiding change and send the message that he would involve himself personally and directly in that change. If this was Reimer's intent, Dunn continued, the Chief of Staff should be prepared to continue the Task Force, provide it with a BG who shared his own philosophy, and devote the required amount of time and energy to those issues. Alternatively, Dunn stated, if the Chief wanted TRADOC to be his instrument for Institutionalizing LAM and Disbanding the Task Force 81
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We live in an era of dynamic change
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The preparation of this history of
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THE MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVERS CHAN
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oritized the allocation of LAM seed
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in the GOWGs and BoDs either had so
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Chapter Page 4. Institutionalizing
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On 9 March 1992, GEN Gordon R. Sull
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gers of being unprepared. He recoun
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Infantry Division (Mechanized) (lst
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eral Combat Training Centers was on
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Figure 1 A Sense of History "Strate
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R. Gabel's recently published book,
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quisition cycles, and save money an
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among the players contributed great
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BG To mmy R. Franks ODCSOPS draft c
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the briefing and established the or
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where and in what quantities, using
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1 Final Report of the Special Study
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29 See Interview, Nelson with Yarri
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Page 49 and 50: Chapter 2 THE LOUISIANA MANEUVERS P
Page 51 and 52: Figure 5 tual experimental work on
Page 53 and 54: move an issue from approval by the
Page 55 and 56: ing his own and the process could p
Page 57 and 58: tank crews from proper attention to
Page 59 and 60: mercially available, space-based C4
Page 61 and 62: services participated, the Joint St
Page 63 and 64: the Army. For all his efforts and t
Page 65 and 66: eal understanding of what Louisiana
Page 67 and 68: 1 GEN Sullivan to BG Mountcastle, 1
Page 69 and 70: 26 Message from Cdr SigCen to PEOs,
Page 71 and 72: eminded BG Eric Shinseki, the Direc
Page 73 and 74: Chapter 3 REORIENTING LAM: THE FORC
Page 75 and 76: Figure 7 Office of the Director Syn
Page 78 and 79: CONTROL EVENT r-- FY 95 BA DECISION
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Page 84 and 85: In fact, the Force XXI Campaign sho
Page 86 and 87: axis. In addition, ODCSOPS controll
Page 88 and 89: 1 Memorandum for See Distribution f
Page 90 and 91: ful enhancements to the operational
Page 93 and 94: Chapter 4 INSTITUTIONALIZING LAM AN
Page 95: ecause it had no orders to stop and
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Page 101 and 102: I Interview, Sullivan with Yarrison
Page 103 and 104: Chapter 5 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AN
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Page 107 and 108: and shortly after Sullivan's term.
Page 109 and 110: clearer direction from the Chief fo
Page 111: 1 Sullivan in Sullivan Papers, Pers
Page 114 and 115: STOW-E SWG Synch TAV TDA TOE TRADOC
Page 116 and 117: Army Materiel Command (AMC) MACOM
Page 118 and 119: Staff, Army, to execute the Louisia
Page 120 and 121: Appendix C MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVE
Page 122 and 123: DATE 3-4 Oct 16-18 Oct Late Janearl
Page 124 and 125: tions, or mobilization and deployme
Page 126 and 127: MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS Nov 59-Feb 6
Page 128 and 129: FOREIGN DECORATIONS (in chronologic
Page 130 and 131: (OTN) assessment. Key points made a
Page 132 and 133: the AWD , as MG White briefed GEN F
Page 134 and 135: 23 Letter, MG White to GEN Franks,
Page 136 and 137: team. This demonstration shows the
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Page 140 and 141: 30 January 1995-The ADO issues the
Page 142 and 143: Meeting on Battlefield Digitization
Page 145 and 146: Appendix H MEMORANDUM FOR BG TOMMY
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will designate a General Officer st
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Appendix I CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE B
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• Responsibility will remain hier
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Appendix ] CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE L
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Appendix K ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS
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Abrams, GEN Creighton W: 1, 7 Adams
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