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The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

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GENs Marshall and McNair intended to<br />

shake the <strong>Army</strong> out of its prewar, peacetime<br />

mentality, accelerate preparations for war,<br />

and focus the <strong>Army</strong> on the daunting challenges<br />

of the impending global conflict. <strong>The</strong><br />

overall effect of the fast-paced maneuvers<br />

was electrifying-both for the soldiers involved<br />

and for the <strong>Army</strong>, which sensed it was<br />

much better prepared for war as a result of<br />

the extensive field exercises .4 <strong>The</strong> importance<br />

of the <strong>Louisiana</strong> <strong>Maneuvers</strong> for the<br />

<strong>Army</strong>'s success in World War II and the significant<br />

degree to which they influenced<br />

structural change throughout the service left<br />

a lasting impression on the institution's culture<br />

and lore. Indeed, the very name, "<strong>Louisiana</strong><br />

<strong>Maneuvers</strong>," connotes bold experimentation<br />

and a willingness to take risks .5<br />

As GEN Sullivan began his term as Chief<br />

of Staff, he believed that America's post-Cold<br />

War <strong>Army</strong> stood in need of changes as great<br />

as those the <strong>Louisiana</strong> <strong>Maneuvers</strong> had<br />

wrought. An avid student of history, Sullivan<br />

had thought at length about Marshall and<br />

the actions he had taken to prepare the <strong>Army</strong><br />

for World War II. Sullivan knew the significance<br />

of the <strong>Louisiana</strong> <strong>Maneuvers</strong> in galvanizing<br />

the pre-World War II <strong>Army</strong>, and believed<br />

that the post-Cold War <strong>Army</strong> would<br />

have to make similarly wrenching innovations<br />

, though for different reasons 6 Sullivan<br />

also had reflected upon the statements of<br />

GENs J. Lawton Collins and Matthew B.<br />

Ridgway on the country's dangerous proclivity<br />

for cutting <strong>Army</strong> size and readiness below<br />

safe levels in the aftermath of World War<br />

II and Korea. To simply "go along" with such<br />

measures "to get along" was a formula for<br />

disaster. 7<br />

While serving as Deputy Commandant of<br />

the U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Command and General Staff<br />

College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from<br />

1987 to 1988, Sullivan had been concerned<br />

with the issue of effecting change. Among his<br />

concerns in that assignment was the need to<br />

ensure that the <strong>Army</strong>'s modeling and simulations<br />

capabilities kept pace with those of the<br />

rest of the Department of Defense and that<br />

the <strong>Army</strong> built its own self-sustaining pool of<br />

2<br />

experts in the field B He had first begun working<br />

with simulation-based training while serving<br />

as Assistant Commandant of the U.S.<br />

<strong>Army</strong> Armor School under MG Frederic J.<br />

Brown from late 1983 to mid-198S.<br />

What he saw at Leavenworth so impressed<br />

him with the potential of the microprocessor<br />

as a facilitator of <strong>Army</strong> training<br />

that he even suggested in his end-oftour<br />

interview: "I think that the <strong>Army</strong> could<br />

do a '<strong>Louisiana</strong> maneuver' in the early 90s,<br />

using the microprocessor, and have XXIII<br />

Corps , the Leavenworth School House<br />

Corps, play one corps and III Corps , out of<br />

Fort Hood, play the other. I think that's<br />

doable."g He was also aware of the work of<br />

Dr. Christopher R. Gabel, a staff college<br />

instructor at Leavenworth, who was in the<br />

process of revising his dissertation on the<br />

<strong>Louisiana</strong> <strong>Maneuvers</strong> for publication.lO<br />

During his next assignment as Commander<br />

of the 1st Infantry Division at Fort<br />

Riley, Kansas , Sullivan contemplated establishing<br />

a special training relationship with<br />

the Combined Arms <strong>Center</strong> at Leavenworth.<br />

This relationship would have used the increasingly<br />

sophisticated capabilities of the<br />

modeling and simulations community at the<br />

Combined Arms <strong>Center</strong> to enhance the training<br />

and readiness of his own unit through a<br />

combination of live, virtual, and constructive<br />

simulation exercises . <strong>The</strong>se exercises<br />

would have taken place under the rubric<br />

"<strong>Louisiana</strong> <strong>Maneuvers</strong>," a term that was only<br />

the latest expression of Sullivan's habit of<br />

using historical terms and catch phrases Y<br />

Overtaken by other priorities and by<br />

Sullivan's short tenure at Riley, this idea never<br />

reached fruition, but the seed planted at<br />

Leavenworth continued to grow. 12<br />

As Vice Chief of Staff from 1990 to 1991<br />

and then as Chief of Staff, Sullivan again<br />

showed his proclivity for using historical<br />

references in staking out his obj ectives . He<br />

frequently used the shorthand phrase "No<br />

more Task Force Smiths" to warn against<br />

replicating the experience of the pre-Korean<br />

War <strong>Army</strong>. Speaking to a wide variety of audiences<br />

, Sullivan reminded them of the dan-<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Modern</strong> <strong>Louisiana</strong> <strong>Maneuvers</strong>

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