The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

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ties and programs for all to see. While these additional displays should have been of some use to the synchronizers, more cynical observers noted the presentation of many proj ects within the displays, particularly those with catchy names followed by "XXI," and suggested that the purpose was to ensure the continued viability of the agencies' programs 8 During BG Ohle's tenure as Task Force Director, June 1994 to June 1995, the Task Force conducted six ever-larger SWG meetings, which became consumed with informational briefings. The need for presentations at the SWGs about all of the activities within the axes and lanes was a primary reason for this growing absorption with merely presenting information. The presence of those interested in each lane and axis accounted for much of the greater size of the meetings. As the LAM Task Force's synchronization process sought to accommodate ever larger numbers of people and amounts of information, it also became more cumbersome 9 As useful as its efforts were to the initial coordination of the Force XXI Campaign, the Task Force's ability to synchronize the campaign was severely weakened by its lack of directive authority. In this respect, whatever procedure the Task Force emplaced would prove to be only as effective as the willingness of the other participants to cooperate allowed.lo Challenges and Tensions Sullivan's relocation of the Task Force was bound to create tensions. First, it ran counter to DOD policy at the time to reduce the size of service headquarters and to move as many headquarters agencies away from the Washington area as possible. The transfer of even a forty-member agency into the National Capital Region, and possibly into the Pentagon, set off alarms throughout the Department of the Army. Furthermore, the Task Force had only recently begun to move into the newly renovated Old Post Office building at Fort Monroe, and the prospect of up- 64 rooting the many families and civilian employees involved and resettling them in the Washington area was a dauntingly expensive proposition. In the end, after an unavailing search for leased space in the Crystal City area of Arlington, Virginia, the Director of the Army Staff, LTG Charles E. Dominy, and the DA Space and Building Management Services office temporarily placed the Task Force in a two-room Pentagon office suite in the ODCSOPS area. The size of the space available and considerations of cost and politics dictated that less of the Task Force move north than originally envisioned. In the end, BG Ohle, his secretary, and the Washington elements of the Initiatives and Issues Directorates occupied this exceedingly cramped space. Also, the Army diverted several incoming uniformed personnel from Fort Monroe to the Pentagon so that, in the end, only a few individuals and families had to move from Monroe to Washington. Thus, the Task Force's organizations in the Pentagon consisted primarily of military personnel, largely because of their inherent mobility. The Pentagon office became operational in July 1994, but only in late January 1995 would much of the Task Force's Washington element move into spaces in the Hoffman BUilding. II The relocation to the Pentagon of the Task Force's headquarters and the split Initiatives and Issues Directorates, though forming a smaller element than Sullivan had envisioned, also served to eliminate much of the need for the former relationship between the Task Force and the TRADOC Commander. This was as Sullivan had planned, at least as early as June.l2 Although LTG William W Hartzog was supposed to become the TRADOC Commander, the Senate had not acted on his nomination, and GEN Franks continued to serve beyond his original retirement date. When Franks finally turned over his command to Hartzog in October, BG Ohle already had moved to the Pentagon from Fort Monroe, leaving the remnants of the Task Force tenant on Fort Monroe. By The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers
Sullivan's directive, the new TRADOC Commander not only had no relationship with the Louisiana Maneuvers as Deputy Director, but, in fact, he also had no experience of that former relationship. The Task Force's change in mission, as well as location, made the continued involvement of the TRADOC Commander at his former level superfluous in most respects, though the Joint Venture synchronizers continued to work with TRADOC in the latter's role as head of the Joint Venture axis. 13 Perhaps most crucial for the Louisiana Maneuvers' future, the move to Washington increased the tension between the Task Force and the ODCSOPS. A certain amount of friction had already existed between the Task Force, which reported directly to the Chief of Staff, and both TRADOC and ODCSOPS during the preceding two years. It was mild, though, by comparison with the irritation that arose between ODCSOPS and the Task Force with the latter's relocation and change of mission. The new DCSOPS, LTG Paul E. Blackwell, took office on 19 July 1994 seeking to carry out Sullivan's multifaceted mandate for his office. He took seriously Sullivan's charge that he be the ARSTAF proponent for LAM and sought, in concert with his other responsibilities, to develop ways in which processes such as synchronization of the Force XXI Campaign could be institutionalized into the Army. He expressed considerable respect for GEN Sullivan and for the role the LAM Task Force played for GEN Sullivan, characterizing it as, "in a very real sense, your Operational Maneuver Group." Further, he pledged that I will, in concert with the VCSA, give gUidance and direction to the TF to embed Force XXI in America's Army. As the role of the LAM TF shifts from that of forCing the Army to [look] at the "way we change" to that of the integra tor for Force XXI , it is appropriate to ensure that its charter and organization reflect this changed function. I will energize and synchronize ARSTAF Reorienting LAM: The Force XXI Campaign Force XXI actions, participate in Joint Venture and assume proponency under the VCSA for re-engineering of the Title lOITDA Army and the Army Digitiza tion Office. I take it as a given that ODCSOPS will continue to energize and direct ARSTAF LAM issue sponsors who assist issue proponents across the Army by providing advice and gUidance from a Departmental perspective and by developing resource tradeoff alter natives for issue decision packages. The ODCSOPS Force XXI FD Integration Division is the lead agency for this ef fort. Additionally, ODCSOPS, in close cooperation with the LAM TF, will de sign and execute the annual GHQ ex ercises.14 Blackwell appears also to have come to believe, as had his predecessors , that at least some of the areas in which the Task Force continued to involve itself rightly fell under his purview. The notion that the acknowledged synchronizer of the Army would not, ultimately, solely manage synchronization of the Army-wide redesign campaign did not make sense to Blackwell and many others around him. Blackwell had not assumed his new position when the 14 July Board of Directors meeting approved the Force XXI Campaign Plan, though he attended it. It took him only a few weeks thereafter, however, to erect the Force XXI Integration Division in DCSOPS' Force Development Directorate CDAMO-FDT, activated August 1994), mentioned above, to coordinate the various aspects of the campaign for the Army Staff. Blackwell stated that he believed he should have received the whole synchronization mission, and he activated the new agency believing that he would be receiving spaces and personnel from the LAM Task Force for that purpose, as the letter quoted above implies. He was nettled when neither the mission nor the people materialized immediately. ls Over the first year of the Force XXI Campaign, the DCSOPS' monthly synchronization meetings of mostly general officers increasingly supplanted the SWGs and even 65
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We live in an era of dynamic change
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The preparation of this history of
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THE MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVERS CHAN
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oritized the allocation of LAM seed
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in the GOWGs and BoDs either had so
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Chapter Page 4. Institutionalizing
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On 9 March 1992, GEN Gordon R. Sull
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gers of being unprepared. He recoun
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Infantry Division (Mechanized) (lst
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eral Combat Training Centers was on
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Figure 1 A Sense of History "Strate
Page 29 and 30: R. Gabel's recently published book,
Page 31: quisition cycles, and save money an
Page 34 and 35: among the players contributed great
Page 36 and 37: BG To mmy R. Franks ODCSOPS draft c
Page 38 and 39: the briefing and established the or
Page 40 and 41: where and in what quantities, using
Page 42 and 43: 1 Final Report of the Special Study
Page 44 and 45: 29 See Interview, Nelson with Yarri
Page 46 and 47: 10-11. See also Peay's letter to BG
Page 49 and 50: Chapter 2 THE LOUISIANA MANEUVERS P
Page 51 and 52: Figure 5 tual experimental work on
Page 53 and 54: move an issue from approval by the
Page 55 and 56: ing his own and the process could p
Page 57 and 58: tank crews from proper attention to
Page 59 and 60: mercially available, space-based C4
Page 61 and 62: services participated, the Joint St
Page 63 and 64: the Army. For all his efforts and t
Page 65 and 66: eal understanding of what Louisiana
Page 67 and 68: 1 GEN Sullivan to BG Mountcastle, 1
Page 69 and 70: 26 Message from Cdr SigCen to PEOs,
Page 71 and 72: eminded BG Eric Shinseki, the Direc
Page 73 and 74: Chapter 3 REORIENTING LAM: THE FORC
Page 75 and 76: Figure 7 Office of the Director Syn
Page 78 and 79: CONTROL EVENT r-- FY 95 BA DECISION
Page 82 and 83: the GOWGs in importance. In additio
Page 84 and 85: In fact, the Force XXI Campaign sho
Page 86 and 87: axis. In addition, ODCSOPS controll
Page 88 and 89: 1 Memorandum for See Distribution f
Page 90 and 91: ful enhancements to the operational
Page 93 and 94: Chapter 4 INSTITUTIONALIZING LAM AN
Page 95 and 96: ecause it had no orders to stop and
Page 97 and 98: quirements (CCIR) (see Figure 11).
Page 99 and 100: Reimer announced in mid-March that,
Page 101 and 102: I Interview, Sullivan with Yarrison
Page 103 and 104: Chapter 5 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AN
Page 105 and 106: Sullivan knew that some members of
Page 107 and 108: and shortly after Sullivan's term.
Page 109 and 110: clearer direction from the Chief fo
Page 111: 1 Sullivan in Sullivan Papers, Pers
Page 114 and 115: STOW-E SWG Synch TAV TDA TOE TRADOC
Page 116 and 117: Army Materiel Command (AMC) MACOM
Page 118 and 119: Staff, Army, to execute the Louisia
Page 120 and 121: Appendix C MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVE
Page 122 and 123: DATE 3-4 Oct 16-18 Oct Late Janearl
Page 124 and 125: tions, or mobilization and deployme
Page 126 and 127: MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS Nov 59-Feb 6
Page 128 and 129: FOREIGN DECORATIONS (in chronologic
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(OTN) assessment. Key points made a
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the AWD , as MG White briefed GEN F
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23 Letter, MG White to GEN Franks,
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team. This demonstration shows the
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ordination with the Army, to develo
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30 January 1995-The ADO issues the
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Meeting on Battlefield Digitization
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Appendix H MEMORANDUM FOR BG TOMMY
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will designate a General Officer st
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Appendix I CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE B
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• Responsibility will remain hier
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Appendix ] CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE L
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Appendix K ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS
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Abrams, GEN Creighton W: 1, 7 Adams
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