The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

the Army. For all his efforts and the publicity
generated by the LAM Task Force, much
of the Army, even after two years, remained
ignorant or poorly informed about the Louisiana
Maneuvers, the LAM Task Force, and
the Task Force's mission.45
Sullivan used all the traditional means
available to a Chief of Staff to communicate
with the Army's leaders. He sent personal
messages to senior Army leaders and selected
others. In one such message, following the
October 1993 Board of Directors meeting,
he wrote:
I am often asked, "But, Chief, what
exactly is LAM ." I tell them that LAM
truly is about changing the way we
change . It is neither a program nor a
budget line . It is not an exercise nor a
series of exercises. It is not a replace­
ment for the test community ; the POM
process, CBRS, or the Army Staff; nor
is it a showcase for the Battle Labs or
a way to inject me into your exercises.
It does not belong to the TRAD OC or
any other command; it belongs to us
all. It is a mechanism whereby we and
our leaders can fast track changes to
our Army-policy changes in any
war fighting or Title X area. It is a "forc­
ing function" to empower our best and
brightest to focus their energies on the
future . Over the next year, we will con­
tinue to institutionalize this process
and, as you transform your com­
mands, we will break the Cold War
decision processes to be more respon­
sive to war fighting requirements, to le­
verage technological changes, and to
unleash the tremendous power of
Army people. LAM is helping us to do
all those things .46
He also wrote letters to Army general officers
and published them in the Chief of
Staff's Weekly Summaries. He encouraged attendees
at commanders and commandants
conferences to send him their ideas on LAM
and on changing the Army. He gave speeches
throughout the Army, particularly early in
his tenure when he was grappling with communicating
the need for change and later as
he discussed the increasingly sophisticated
vehicle the Louisiana Maneuvers had become.
His numerous articles and interviews
in Army- and defense-related publications
eloquently laid out his themes for the Army
of continuity, change, and growth.47
Sullivan also made productive use of the
Chief of Staff's relationship with the Association
of the United States Army (AUSA) .
GEN (Ret.) Jack N. Merritt, the AUSA President,
had conferred with him and had already
produced useful advice as Sullivan
formulated the LAM concept in late 1991
and early 1992. As the Louisiana Maneuvers
proposed problems and the high-tech orientation
of many of their solutions took
shape, the role for AUSA, particularly as a
mediator for the Army with industry and as
an advocate for Army points of view and
programs outside the Army, grew larger. The
AUSA-sponsored Winter Symposium in Orlando
in February 1992 was the forum in
which Sullivan first described LAM as a process
rather than a single event. The AUSA
Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C., 12-
14 October 1992, provided coverage of
LAM's beginnings. Over the course of the
next few years, AUSA worked closely with
Sullivan's office, the LAM Task Force, AMC,
and TRADOC to use its periodic symposia
and annual meetings as forums in which
LAM and related topics could be publiCized
to the Army and other audiences. The primary
Army displays at the 1994, 1995, and
1996 annual meetings, which linked dissimilar
simulations in ever more sophisticated
demonstrations of their capabilities, were
team efforts mounted by the LAM Task
Force, AMC, and a host of others from government
and industry. The exhibits were
entitled Army Experiment I, II, and Ill, in
part to show their Army-wide applicability
and to emphaSize the multiple sources of
support for them.48
Many of these efforts in conjunction with
AUSA seemed successful. Certainly the dialogues
that took place at the various symposia
between Army officials and members of
industry revealed good understanding by
The Louisiana Maneuvers Process in Action, 1992-1994 47