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The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

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ties and programs for all to see. While these<br />

additional displays should have been of some<br />

use to the synchronizers, more cynical observers<br />

noted the presentation of many<br />

proj ects within the displays, particularly<br />

those with catchy names followed by "XXI,"<br />

and suggested that the purpose was to ensure<br />

the continued viability of the agencies'<br />

programs 8<br />

During BG Ohle's tenure as Task Force<br />

Director, June 1994 to June 1995, the Task<br />

Force conducted six ever-larger SWG meetings,<br />

which became consumed with informational<br />

briefings. <strong>The</strong> need for presentations<br />

at the SWGs about all of the activities<br />

within the axes and lanes was a primary reason<br />

for this growing absorption with merely<br />

presenting information. <strong>The</strong> presence of<br />

those interested in each lane and axis accounted<br />

for much of the greater size of the<br />

meetings. As the LAM Task Force's synchronization<br />

process sought to accommodate<br />

ever larger numbers of people and amounts<br />

of information, it also became more cumbersome<br />

9<br />

As useful as its efforts were to the initial<br />

coordination of the Force XXI Campaign, the<br />

Task Force's ability to synchronize the campaign<br />

was severely weakened by its lack of<br />

directive authority. In this respect, whatever<br />

procedure the Task Force emplaced would<br />

prove to be only as effective as the willingness<br />

of the other participants to cooperate<br />

allowed.lo<br />

Challenges and Tensions<br />

Sullivan's relocation of the Task Force was<br />

bound to create tensions. First, it ran counter<br />

to DOD policy at the time to reduce the size<br />

of service headquarters and to move as many<br />

headquarters agencies away from the Washington<br />

area as possible. <strong>The</strong> transfer of even<br />

a forty-member agency into the National<br />

Capital Region, and possibly into the Pentagon,<br />

set off alarms throughout the Department<br />

of the <strong>Army</strong>. Furthermore, the Task<br />

Force had only recently begun to move into<br />

the newly renovated Old Post <strong>Of</strong>fice building<br />

at Fort Monroe, and the prospect of up-<br />

64<br />

rooting the many families and civilian employees<br />

involved and resettling them in the<br />

Washington area was a dauntingly expensive<br />

proposition.<br />

In the end, after an unavailing search for<br />

leased space in the Crystal City area of Arlington,<br />

Virginia, the Director of the <strong>Army</strong><br />

Staff, LTG Charles E. Dominy, and the DA<br />

Space and Building Management Services<br />

office temporarily placed the Task Force in<br />

a two-room Pentagon office suite in the<br />

ODCSOPS area. <strong>The</strong> size of the space available<br />

and considerations of cost and politics<br />

dictated that less of the Task Force move<br />

north than originally envisioned. In the end,<br />

BG Ohle, his secretary, and the Washington<br />

elements of the Initiatives and Issues Directorates<br />

occupied this exceedingly cramped<br />

space. Also, the <strong>Army</strong> diverted several incoming<br />

uniformed personnel from Fort<br />

Monroe to the Pentagon so that, in the end,<br />

only a few individuals and families had to<br />

move from Monroe to Washington. Thus, the<br />

Task Force's organizations in the Pentagon<br />

consisted primarily of military personnel,<br />

largely because of their inherent mobility.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Pentagon office became operational in<br />

July 1994, but only in late January 1995<br />

would much of the Task Force's Washington<br />

element move into spaces in the Hoffman<br />

BUilding. II<br />

<strong>The</strong> relocation to the Pentagon of the Task<br />

Force's headquarters and the split Initiatives<br />

and Issues Directorates, though forming a<br />

smaller element than Sullivan had envisioned,<br />

also served to eliminate much of the<br />

need for the former relationship between the<br />

Task Force and the TRADOC Commander.<br />

This was as Sullivan had planned, at least as<br />

early as June.l2 Although LTG William W<br />

Hartzog was supposed to become the<br />

TRADOC Commander, the Senate had not<br />

acted on his nomination, and GEN Franks<br />

continued to serve beyond his original retirement<br />

date. When Franks finally turned<br />

over his command to Hartzog in October,<br />

BG Ohle already had moved to the Pentagon<br />

from Fort Monroe, leaving the remnants<br />

of the Task Force tenant on Fort Monroe. By<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Modern</strong> <strong>Louisiana</strong> <strong>Maneuvers</strong>

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