The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

a range of views about LAM and the LAM
Task Force, many of which were negative.
His own transition team's view was characteristic.
The team had recommended-without
noted obj ection-that, since LAM had
done its job and Force XXI was on track,
GEN Reimer should keep the Task Force in
existence for a year and then disband it. That
would avoid the appearance of an outright
rejection of Sullivan's program. The team
ignored the question of the possible future
utility of the LAM process separate from
Force XXI or even separate from the Task
Force. In the team members' minds, as in
the minds of many others, the Louisiana
Maneuvers and the LAM process were inextricably
bound to the Task Force and to the
redesign of the force; the purpose of the Task
Force thus had been fulfilled by the production
and implementation of the Force XXI
Campaign 3 LTG Blackwell, the DCSOPS,
also pressed his case with the new Chief for
the disbandment of an organization that he
saw as redundant, and for the reassignment
of at least some of its personnel to the
ODCSOPS.4
COL Cowell and a few other members
of the Task Force were aware of the transition
team's recommendations but uncertain
of GEN Reimer's reaction beyond his initial
statement that he would continue the Task
Force for another year. Reimer's decision on
the Task Force's fate was a long time coming
and evidently was an open question for
the first several months of his tenure.5 The
first apparent indication members of the
Task Force had of the organization's standing
with the new Chief, however, came
when they received notification at the last
minute that BG Ohle's scheduled replacement,
BG Mark Hamilton, would not be
coming to the Task Force after all. The Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had
requested the immediate assignment of an
Army brigadier general for a Joint Staff assignment,
and Hamilton was the only officer
immediately available. He was not replaced
at the Task Force because of the
simple unavailability, at that point, of an-
78
other general officer. Cowell, the head of
the Synchronization Directorate and Ohle's
de facto deputy in Washington, became the
Acting Director of the LAM Task Force.
When Cowell asked Reimer who the next
Task Force Director would be, the Chief
advised Cowell that he was his man to continue
leading the Task Force. 6
GEN Reimer was more forthcoming on
Force XXI . Although he continued to push
forward Force XXI, he reoriented the campaign
somewhat, blessing each of the axes'
continuing efforts while designating
TRADOC as the overall architect of the
Army's future. This new emphasis on
TRADOCs leadership role in defining the
Army's future led GEN Hartzog in February
1996 to create within the staff of his
Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine an organization
that focused on the "Army After
Next"-that is, the Army after Army
XXI had been fielded.7 The intense efforts
of GEN Hartzog, TRADOC, and the partners
in the Joint Venture axis would produce
a new heavy division design by mid-
1998. After discussion with other senior
Army leaders, Reimer also announced, on
11 July 1995, at his first Force XXI Board
of Directors meeting that those gatherings
henceforth would be called commanders
conferences. Although the ODCSOPS presented
the results of GHQx-95 at this
meeting, no further GHQ exercises were
proposed or scheduled B
GEN Reimer and his staff concentrated
on Force XXI and bringing the 21st century
Army into existence. As a result, they dealt
mostly with the several elements of the Force
XXI Campaign and with the Experimental
Force and the AWEs associated with its evolution.
Little remained of the former LAM
process, and the LAM Task Force itself became
less and less a substantive participant
in these deliberations.
The Task Force and LAM Under
Cowell
The LAM Task Force continued LAM-related
activities well into late 1995, partly
The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers