The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

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discussions through much of 1993, particularly regarding the communications equipment, software, and protocols to permit horizontal integration of battlefield systems, had resulted in some progress but had not resolved all outstanding issues 26 Thus, MG jay M. Garner, the ADCSOPS for Force Development (DAMO-FD), and MG Ronald V Hite, Deputy for Systems Management in OASA(RDA) , cochaired a meeting in early November 1993 to address the scope and costs of these efforts. The meeting resulted in the TRADOC and ASA(RDA) representatives describing numerous costly but unintegrated programs. MG Garner then instructed his Director of Requirements (Combat), BG Ronald E. Adams, to form a speCial task force (STF) to study how the various digitization initiatives should be integrated and managed 27 Adams' STF consisted of officers, DA civilians, and contractors from ODCSOPS, TRADOC, DISC4 , OASA(RDA) , DPA&E, CECOM, and Mitre Corp . The group worked overtime from 16 November through 22 December, with Adams ultimately briefing its recommendations to GEN Sullivan at a Requirements Review Council session on 22 December 1993. The STF recommended that an Army digitization office be established within the Army Staff and made a number of other recommendations about the allocation of digital information systems within the force, the need for an experimental unit, and related issues. GEN Sullivan enthusiastically accepted the Adams group's recommendations and directed the establishment of a second STF to recommend a management structure for the new office. BG joseph E. Oder, the new Director of Horizontal Technology Integration in DAMO-FD, headed the second STF on Digitization. 28 On 14 january 1994, Sullivan and Secretary of the Army Togo D. West announced the formation of this second SpeCial Task Force on Digitization to explore existing technology, make initial plans for information architecture, and lay the groundwork necessary for the establishment of the Army Digitization Office (ADO) and the realiza- 42 tion of the digitized battlefield. Even as AWE 94-07 was proceeding, the Digitization Special Task Force published, on 14 April 1994 , the concept plan for the ADO. Finally, on 8 july 1994, the Special Task Force issued its final report, and the ADO came into existence with MG joe W Rigby as its director. Establishment of the ADO and its management structure put into place a major piece of Sullivan's plan to achieve Force XXU9 Another example of an issue that evolved far beyond its initial visualization was the growth of a requirement to investigate the exploitation of space-based capabilities to enhance the Army's warfighting capabilities. The issue of evaluating and incorporating space-based capabilities into the Army, including the development of doctrine, training programs, materiel, and an investment strategy, was nominated during the second GOWG (7-8 December 1992). The issue was approved for FY 94 investigation during the second Board of Directors meeting (3 and 5 March 1993), with U.S. Army Space Command (later Space and Strategic Defense Command) leading as the proponent. 30 The investigations proceeded qUickly and led rapidly to the definition of capabilities that the Army needed to exploit to perform its space-oriented functions and to the identification of commercial, off-the-shelf technologies to facilitate this exploitation. The results of experimentation and evaluation of this issue enabled horizontal integration within the Army of improvements in communications as well as intelligence collection and dissemination, including tactical imagery, mapping, weather forecasting, and missile warning. The resulting advances these improvements permitted in the areas of en-route mission planning and rehearsal and of warning and response to tactical ballistic missile attack were dramatic. The Army Space and Strategic Defense Command validated its research and proposed solutions in the tactical ballistic missile-related areas during live-fire tests at White Sands Missile Test Range, New Mexico. In addition, a request for procurement of a package of com- The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers
mercially available, space-based C4I equipment from the Commander of the Joint Task Force Somalia in November 1993 resulted in the rapid definition and acquisition of the items required through the ongoing LAM process investigation into the space issue 3l On the other hand, owning the night, an investigation begun in October 1991 before LAM or the Battle Labs had taken shape, proceeded apace during this period. Although it was not one of the warfighting issues approved at the first GOWG, Peay, Franks, and Sullivan agreed that it belonged on the list of issues that the first Board of Directors meeting would consider. That first meeting (14 October 1992) approved owning the night as one of the ten FY 93 LAM issues. Nearly a year's effort within TRADOC, AMC, and HQDA had preceded the action, but its inclusion as a LAM issue gave it immediate high-level visibility throughout the Army's senior leadership. As noted earlier, AMC had joined the investigation effort in late 1991; planning and initial experimentation at Fort Benning as TRADOC's portion of the effort actually began shortly thereafter, during October 1992. MGJerry A.White, the Infantry Center Commander, led the experimentation team, which joined the efforts of all interested agencies, including ASA(RDA) , AMC, ODCSOPS, and TRADOC. GEN Franks offiCially chartered the Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab (DBBL) at Fort Benning on 26 January 1993, appointing MG White as the Battle Lab Director. Among other things, the charter tasked White spe Cifically to focus his efforts on optimizing the night-fighting capability of the combined arms force, with particular emphasis on focal plane arrays and second generation forward-looking infrared (2d generation FUR).32 The DBBL took the lead in experimentation deSigned to enhance current night-fighting capabilities and to extend those capabilities across the force. Simultaneously, the 2d generation FUR technology began to emerge. The early emphasis on integrating such technologies across the force led to designs for 2d and 3d generation FUR devices and installation modules for about 120 systems that provided Significantly more standardization, commonality, and ease of maintenance than otherwise might have occurred had the initial design efforts not been horizontally integrated 33 Efforts within the TRADOC-AMC HQDA night vision communities that would produce the 2d generation FUR technologies over the next two years continued. At the same time, however, the GOWG and the Board of Directors recognized early (late 199 2-early 1993) that owning the night meant more at a strategic level for the future Army than just being able to fight well tactically at night. Redefining the LAM issue under the rubric of "Continuous Operations" and including owning the night in it, the leadership recognized that fighting better at night than prospective opponents, while significant, was only one aspect of operating continuously and controlling OPTEMPO throughout the course of operations. The Board of Directors shepherded this broader, more inclusive issue and the investigations of it through succeeding iterations of the LAM process. Experiments with continuous operations, and particularly their owningthe-night aspects, continued in numerous simulation exercises. The experiments' results helped the doctrine writers and combat developers understand better how the future force should be organized, trained, and equipped to operate continuously. 34 The GHQ Exercises The Louisiana Maneuvers began with an ultimate obj ective of conducting a General Headquarters exercise (GHQx) in 1994. During much of 1992, this still seemed to be the objective , although GENs Sullivan and Franks considered evaluating some known issues in 1992 as part of the preparation to conduct the 1994 maneuvers. Among the decisions coming out of the first Board of Directors meeting on 14 October 1992, however, was a directive for a General Headquarters exercise in the spring of 1993. The Louisiana Maneuvers Process in Action, 1992-1994 43
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We live in an era of dynamic change
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The preparation of this history of
Page 7 and 8: THE MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVERS CHAN
Page 9 and 10: oritized the allocation of LAM seed
Page 11: in the GOWGs and BoDs either had so
Page 14 and 15: Chapter Page 4. Institutionalizing
Page 17 and 18: On 9 March 1992, GEN Gordon R. Sull
Page 19 and 20: gers of being unprepared. He recoun
Page 21: Infantry Division (Mechanized) (lst
Page 24: eral Combat Training Centers was on
Page 27 and 28: Figure 1 A Sense of History "Strate
Page 29 and 30: R. Gabel's recently published book,
Page 31: quisition cycles, and save money an
Page 34 and 35: among the players contributed great
Page 36 and 37: BG To mmy R. Franks ODCSOPS draft c
Page 38 and 39: the briefing and established the or
Page 40 and 41: where and in what quantities, using
Page 42 and 43: 1 Final Report of the Special Study
Page 44 and 45: 29 See Interview, Nelson with Yarri
Page 46 and 47: 10-11. See also Peay's letter to BG
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Page 51 and 52: Figure 5 tual experimental work on
Page 53 and 54: move an issue from approval by the
Page 55 and 56: ing his own and the process could p
Page 57: tank crews from proper attention to
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Page 63 and 64: the Army. For all his efforts and t
Page 65 and 66: eal understanding of what Louisiana
Page 67 and 68: 1 GEN Sullivan to BG Mountcastle, 1
Page 69 and 70: 26 Message from Cdr SigCen to PEOs,
Page 71 and 72: eminded BG Eric Shinseki, the Direc
Page 73 and 74: Chapter 3 REORIENTING LAM: THE FORC
Page 75 and 76: Figure 7 Office of the Director Syn
Page 78 and 79: CONTROL EVENT r-- FY 95 BA DECISION
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Page 84 and 85: In fact, the Force XXI Campaign sho
Page 86 and 87: axis. In addition, ODCSOPS controll
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Page 93 and 94: Chapter 4 INSTITUTIONALIZING LAM AN
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Page 101 and 102: I Interview, Sullivan with Yarrison
Page 103 and 104: Chapter 5 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AN
Page 105 and 106: Sullivan knew that some members of
Page 107 and 108: and shortly after Sullivan's term.
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clearer direction from the Chief fo
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1 Sullivan in Sullivan Papers, Pers
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STOW-E SWG Synch TAV TDA TOE TRADOC
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Army Materiel Command (AMC) MACOM
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Staff, Army, to execute the Louisia
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Appendix C MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVE
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DATE 3-4 Oct 16-18 Oct Late Janearl
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tions, or mobilization and deployme
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MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS Nov 59-Feb 6
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FOREIGN DECORATIONS (in chronologic
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(OTN) assessment. Key points made a
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the AWD , as MG White briefed GEN F
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23 Letter, MG White to GEN Franks,
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team. This demonstration shows the
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ordination with the Army, to develo
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30 January 1995-The ADO issues the
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Meeting on Battlefield Digitization
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Appendix H MEMORANDUM FOR BG TOMMY
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will designate a General Officer st
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Appendix I CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE B
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• Responsibility will remain hier
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Appendix ] CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE L
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Appendix K ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS
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Abrams, GEN Creighton W: 1, 7 Adams
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