The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

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among the players contributed greatly to that learning and evolution. A number of those involved in the concept's definition, even some at the highest levels, were unsure of where Sullivan wanted to go with LAM, particularly in terms of its relationship to existing Army processes. For some, their own perceptions of how such change ought best to occur colored their understanding of Sullivan's dissatisfaction with the existing processes and procedures and of how he wanted to effect change.49 One challenge in the struggle to develop a workable concept statement appears to have been the differing views of Sullivan and Peay on the Louisiana Maneuvers. Sullivan's concept was an expansive one. He wanted to "break the mold," get away from business as usual, work qUickly and fleXibly to evaluate issues and options, and allow the Army's "Board of Directors"-its fully involved senior generals-to consider issues and decide on them, as a corporate body, for the good of the Army. Key to the success of this process would be the relative speed with which full decision and action cycles could be completed. He thus saw the emerging Louisiana Maneuvers process as the best way to ensure that the most productive changes occurred in a timely manner with the Army's leaders fully engaged in gUiding and implementing them. He focused mostly on operational-level issues because those were the aspects of the prospective maneuvers that he thought would provide the greatest returns for the Army. 50 Peay's view, while supportive, was materially different. As the DCSOPS, and later as the Vice Chief of Staff, he believed that the force development processes that had governed change in the Army during the Cold War and that he, as DCSOPS, controlled, were entirely adequate to bring about whatever future alterations might be needed. Indeed, he believed that working through those processes was vital to ensuring that those changes that did occur were properly funded and institutionalized. In early 1992, he forwarded a thoughtful memorandum to Sullivan that de- 18 scribed an exercise for training senior Army leaders for operations at the theater level of war. He voiced a number of suggestions and concerns about what he envisioned as the shape of the 1994 exercise, including discussions of the potential perils of joint involvement and of who should direct the exercise (CSA as Director, TRADOC Commander as Deputy Director, VCSA to chair in-process reviews, DCSOPS as lead ARSTAF proponent). Sullivan eventually adopted many of Peay's suggestions, but his vision of the purpose of LAM and of the form it should take remained different. 51 By 1994 Peay's views had evolved somewhat and, in that year, he did describe the Louisiana Maneuvers as useful and suggested they might "make inroads on the margins" in the future-after the process had been in existence for over two years. He favored the intellectual debate and investigations entailed in the LAM process and found the results of the General Headquarters exercises useful, but he believed that the Army would continue to handle the high-cost issues through the normal, computer-linked process by means of which the services developed their Program Objective Memoranda (POM)-which, for established programs, was true. The POM projected prioritized funding requirements for approved programs for the five years beyond the current budget fiscal year. Most of the major funding decisions, Peay believed, would take place before the LAM process could act on the issues involved. He viewed the Board of Directors as a group of senior professionals who cooperated in the LAM process as another aspect of their assigned responsibilities, not as a separate body. 52 One closely involved observer characterized the difference between Peay's and Sullivan's views on LAM as a disjuncture between Peay's concern with funding and protecting the whole Army in constrained times and Sullivan's focus on the need for effecting change in a time- and resource-constrained window. Peay, as both the DCSOPS and the Vice Chief of Staff, was principally The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers
esponsible for ensuring that the Army consistently functioned as smoothly as possible. For Peay and his successors, many major initiatives and activities had to be kept constantly on track to ensure the Army stayed ready and progressing. In their view, these activities supported GEN Sullivan's overall vision for the Army and provided the most capable force the Army could field within the constraints of its resources. Peay characterized these activities-ultimately, fourteen-as "major muscle movements." They included such programs as acquiring necessary sealift ships, emplacing POMCUS materiel afloat, implementing total asset visibility, exploring force digitization, and developing Joint Publication 3.0, an important Joint doctrinal manuaP3 Simply managing these and the other important actions for which he was responsible imposed considerable demands on his time and energies. In his view the Louisiana Maneuvers constituted a speCial program, in his view, in only one of his many areas of concern , and he wanted to ensure that his institutional interests in what became the LAM's mission area were not disrupted by LAM activities 54 GEN John H. Tilelli, Peay's successor as DCSOPS and as VCSA, has observed that Peay was also very concerned that LAM's process and activities not overwhelm and break the CBRS, which he knew worked, whatever streamlining benefits LAM achieved. Given the Army's constrained finances at the time and the ongoing drawdown and BRAC activities, Peay's attitude was reasonable.55 Whatever the opposing views aired in senior leader debates, Sullivan wanted to proceed with LAM. On 9 March 1992, he announced his concept for the maneuvers to the Army's senior leaders. 56 The message did not end the Army Staff's work on LAM but rather moved this effort into a new phase as the Staff sought to define the Louisiana Maneuvers process and organization. At a Louisiana Maneuvers in-process review for the Army senior leadership on 24 March, Sullivan approved the latest version of the concept and indicated that it should be pre- The Genesis of the Louisiana Maneuvers GEN John H. TileW sented to the Army's top commanders at the Spring Senior Commanders Conference at the end of March. He also stated that he needed to narrow the scope of the concept and that he would provide a list of his expectations for LAM to accompany a draft prepared by the Vice Chief of Staff and the Staff Group 57 By the next day, the Staff Group provided a draft statement of the Chief of Staff's expectations for the Louisiana Maneuvers. Sullivan and the other conferees reworked it and, eventually, it reached the status of a charter. Even at this stage, debate continued. Again, the various agencies developed differing versions of a charter, the most prominent being drafted by TRADOC. By mid April, the ODCSOPS had evolved its own charter version, which Peay forwarded to GEN Franks. This proposal limited the operations of the LAM Task Force by confining the scope of its inquiries to strategic and Title 10 issues and imposed laborious approval procedures for its consideration of issues that would have rendered it unable to function agilely, as Sullivan envisioned. The 19
Page 3 and 4: We live in an era of dynamic change
Page 5 and 6: The preparation of this history of
Page 7 and 8: THE MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVERS CHAN
Page 9 and 10: oritized the allocation of LAM seed
Page 11: in the GOWGs and BoDs either had so
Page 14 and 15: Chapter Page 4. Institutionalizing
Page 17 and 18: On 9 March 1992, GEN Gordon R. Sull
Page 19 and 20: gers of being unprepared. He recoun
Page 21: Infantry Division (Mechanized) (lst
Page 24: eral Combat Training Centers was on
Page 27 and 28: Figure 1 A Sense of History "Strate
Page 29 and 30: R. Gabel's recently published book,
Page 31: quisition cycles, and save money an
Page 36 and 37: BG To mmy R. Franks ODCSOPS draft c
Page 38 and 39: the briefing and established the or
Page 40 and 41: where and in what quantities, using
Page 42 and 43: 1 Final Report of the Special Study
Page 44 and 45: 29 See Interview, Nelson with Yarri
Page 46 and 47: 10-11. See also Peay's letter to BG
Page 49 and 50: Chapter 2 THE LOUISIANA MANEUVERS P
Page 51 and 52: Figure 5 tual experimental work on
Page 53 and 54: move an issue from approval by the
Page 55 and 56: ing his own and the process could p
Page 57 and 58: tank crews from proper attention to
Page 59 and 60: mercially available, space-based C4
Page 61 and 62: services participated, the Joint St
Page 63 and 64: the Army. For all his efforts and t
Page 65 and 66: eal understanding of what Louisiana
Page 67 and 68: 1 GEN Sullivan to BG Mountcastle, 1
Page 69 and 70: 26 Message from Cdr SigCen to PEOs,
Page 71 and 72: eminded BG Eric Shinseki, the Direc
Page 73 and 74: Chapter 3 REORIENTING LAM: THE FORC
Page 75 and 76: Figure 7 Office of the Director Syn
Page 78 and 79: CONTROL EVENT r-- FY 95 BA DECISION
Page 80 and 81: ties and programs for all to see. W
Page 82 and 83: the GOWGs in importance. In additio
Page 84 and 85:
In fact, the Force XXI Campaign sho
Page 86 and 87:
axis. In addition, ODCSOPS controll
Page 88 and 89:
1 Memorandum for See Distribution f
Page 90 and 91:
ful enhancements to the operational
Page 93 and 94:
Chapter 4 INSTITUTIONALIZING LAM AN
Page 95 and 96:
ecause it had no orders to stop and
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quirements (CCIR) (see Figure 11).
Page 99 and 100:
Reimer announced in mid-March that,
Page 101 and 102:
I Interview, Sullivan with Yarrison
Page 103 and 104:
Chapter 5 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AN
Page 105 and 106:
Sullivan knew that some members of
Page 107 and 108:
and shortly after Sullivan's term.
Page 109 and 110:
clearer direction from the Chief fo
Page 111:
1 Sullivan in Sullivan Papers, Pers
Page 114 and 115:
STOW-E SWG Synch TAV TDA TOE TRADOC
Page 116 and 117:
Army Materiel Command (AMC) MACOM
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Staff, Army, to execute the Louisia
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Appendix C MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVE
Page 122 and 123:
DATE 3-4 Oct 16-18 Oct Late Janearl
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tions, or mobilization and deployme
Page 126 and 127:
MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS Nov 59-Feb 6
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FOREIGN DECORATIONS (in chronologic
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(OTN) assessment. Key points made a
Page 132 and 133:
the AWD , as MG White briefed GEN F
Page 134 and 135:
23 Letter, MG White to GEN Franks,
Page 136 and 137:
team. This demonstration shows the
Page 138 and 139:
ordination with the Army, to develo
Page 140 and 141:
30 January 1995-The ADO issues the
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Meeting on Battlefield Digitization
Page 145 and 146:
Appendix H MEMORANDUM FOR BG TOMMY
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will designate a General Officer st
Page 149 and 150:
Appendix I CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE B
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• Responsibility will remain hier
Page 153 and 154:
Appendix ] CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE L
Page 155 and 156:
Appendix K ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS
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Abrams, GEN Creighton W: 1, 7 Adams
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