The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

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each group of the other's efforts and positions . Their presentations made clear both their extensive cooperation and their efforts to assist the Army in achieving the changes it proposed to make, particularly in areas like acquisition streamlining. The demonstrations of emerging technologies, particularly in the simulations fields, that took place at these gatherings also evidenced a close Army-industry joint effort. 49 Many visitors to such gatherings as the AUSA symposia and annual meetings are part of a focused, parochial audience who participate as an aspect of their jobs. This was not true, however, of most attendees. Civilian officials from the Department of Defense, members of other services, representatives of members of Congress, and others from outside the Army also attended for a wide variety of reasons, as did members of the media. Without some context, however, such outsiders could have departed with only an incomplete understanding of what Sullivan hoped to achieve, despite the Army's and AUSA's efforts. Sullivan also publiCized to Congress his efforts to change the Army both through his testimony, beginning with his appearances in early 1992 before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and through the associated Army posture statements. On each occasion, he explained the Louisiana Maneuvers as they evolved and also discussed Force XXI as that effort took form. He spoke , as well, with individual legislators and members of their staffs on numerous occasions. The Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force also played an important role in publicizing what Sullivan intended to accomplish by mounting the maneuvers. Before the actual formation of the Task Force, COL Blodgett and Mr. Radda briefed the proposed maneuvers to the various commands and to the Army's models, simulations, and analytical community. Once BG Franks arrived and took charge of the Task Force, he and his staff presented literally hundreds of briefings to interested domestic and foreign audiences, including 48 foreign liaison officers, several of whom also observed the GOWGs; visiting representatives of foreign military establishments; members of other services; members of Congress; Army Secretariat, Defense, and Joint Staff officials; and others. so Since simulations and modeling were such a crucial part of LAM, the Task Force also established its own simulations center in Building 11 at Fort Monroe in the late spring of 1993. GEN Franks often placed it on the itineraries of visiting dignitaries, as an example of the ways in which the Army was moving proactively into the future. GEN Sullivan, other members of HQDA, the Secretary of Defense, and GEN John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among others, visited the facility and witnessed demonstrations of the simulations' increasingly sophisticated capabilities. 51 The Task Force also used other means to spread the word. By late spring 1993, it had completed a IS-minute video for widespread dissemination to the Army and to Congress. The video explained the purpose of the Louisiana Maneuvers and gave examples of some of LAM's activities, with voice-overs from several senior leaders. Sullivan included a copy of the video as part of his periodic command report to the Secretary of Defense. The Task Force undertook a further excursion into media communications with publication and widespread dissemination of its pamphlet, Louisiana Maneuvers: The First Year, on 1 March 1994. A highly illustrated summary of what was actually the first two years of LAM, it set the stage for Sullivan's announcement shortly thereafter of the Force XXI Campaign. s2 Yet, despite all these efforts to help the Army in the field and the general public to understand the Louisiana Maneuvers and Sullivan's vision for them, many in the Army, even those in Significant positions of authority, readily admit that they had only a superficial understanding of LAM. Two officers who served as division commanders before being called to serve in the Pentagon during this period later related that they had little or no The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers
eal understanding of what Louisiana Maneuvers was about or what LAM was accomplishing before they reached the Pentagon. 53 Misunderstandings about LAM persisted. Other officers still believed that it was to be a large field exercise, like its predecessor. Others continued to believe that the Task Force, because it was located at Fort Monroe, was a part of TRADOC. To many, the first two years of LAM's existence seemed not to have produced anything for the Army. How either Sullivan or the Task Force could have better alleviated this lack of understanding, given their diverse efforts, is problematic. On the Road to Force XXI On 5 March 1994, GEN Sullivan announced to his general officers that the service had begun its transformation into the Army of the 21st century, which he labeled "Force XXI." In the letter, Sullivan described the numerous, superficially disparate efforts the Army had been making to field the new force and enjoined the general officers' cooperation and support for the campaign ahead.54 In truth, much work remained before the Army could mount a campaign to achieve Force XXI. Although Sullivan had espoused his vision of a digitized battlefield early in his tenure, the capability to realize that vision was only gradually becoming attainable. MG Funk and others throughout the Army's experimentation, information management, and communications communities had worked hard to achieve the integration of many different processing and communications technologies to realize Sullivan's vision. Much of their work, however, was still theoretical or, at best, prototypical, without major concrete achievements that could be seen or touched by a casual observer. Sullivan's initial conception of the Force XXI effort included not only the Army Digitization Office, but also the redesign of the operating force, a proj ect he had put off in the summer of 1991. Even as late as 5 May 1994 at the Armor Conference, Sullivan referred only to the operating force redesign aspect of the effort. GEN Franks, who as the TRADOC Commander was responsible for such redesigns, announced the initiation of the Force XXI Joint Venture on 9 May. The commander's intent he had received from Sullivan was to design the entire force, from foxhole to factory, with an emphasis on digital connectivity among all of its elements. In point of fact, TRADOC's Battle Lab Integration and Technology Concepts Directorate (BLITCD) had already begun formulating concepts for a heavy division redesign. These concepts included, as well, proposals for an experimental force that would serve as a testbed for the new organizational deSigns. All of these efforts received additional impetus from the results of AWE 94-07 55 AWE 94-07 produced other useful lessons in the formulation of experimentation plans. The two concepts of a "good idea cutoff date," beyond which new ideas would not be integrated into the experiment, and of an "everything in place date," by which all personnel, equipment, and other elements to be tested in the experiment must be present, were crucial to the validity of future experiments. These concepts governed the conduct of later Force XXI experiments with the experimental force. 56 During April and May, however, the realization dawned on Sullivan and others that many of the Army's legally mandated responsibilities and much of its manpower resided in the institutional, or TDA, portion of the force and that much of the Army's activity occurred in areas of the operational continuum other than warfighting. Thus, the Force XXI Campaign, if it was truly to succeed in producing a 21st century force, must include the redesign of the institutional or TDA Army. As the planners in the LAM Task Force, with input from TRADOC, the Chief's Staff Group, ODCSOPS, and elsewhere, crafted a plan for the Force XXI Campaign , they created an additional axis to achieve the redesign of the TDA Army in much the same fashion as Joint Venture would the operational Army. In late May 1994, the LAM Task Force presented to General Sullivan a con- The Louisiana Maneuvers Process in Action, 1992-1994 49
Page 3 and 4:
We live in an era of dynamic change
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The preparation of this history of
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THE MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVERS CHAN
Page 9 and 10:
oritized the allocation of LAM seed
Page 11:
in the GOWGs and BoDs either had so
Page 14 and 15: Chapter Page 4. Institutionalizing
Page 17 and 18: On 9 March 1992, GEN Gordon R. Sull
Page 19 and 20: gers of being unprepared. He recoun
Page 21: Infantry Division (Mechanized) (lst
Page 24: eral Combat Training Centers was on
Page 27 and 28: Figure 1 A Sense of History "Strate
Page 29 and 30: R. Gabel's recently published book,
Page 31: quisition cycles, and save money an
Page 34 and 35: among the players contributed great
Page 36 and 37: BG To mmy R. Franks ODCSOPS draft c
Page 38 and 39: the briefing and established the or
Page 40 and 41: where and in what quantities, using
Page 42 and 43: 1 Final Report of the Special Study
Page 44 and 45: 29 See Interview, Nelson with Yarri
Page 46 and 47: 10-11. See also Peay's letter to BG
Page 49 and 50: Chapter 2 THE LOUISIANA MANEUVERS P
Page 51 and 52: Figure 5 tual experimental work on
Page 53 and 54: move an issue from approval by the
Page 55 and 56: ing his own and the process could p
Page 57 and 58: tank crews from proper attention to
Page 59 and 60: mercially available, space-based C4
Page 61 and 62: services participated, the Joint St
Page 63: the Army. For all his efforts and t
Page 67 and 68: 1 GEN Sullivan to BG Mountcastle, 1
Page 69 and 70: 26 Message from Cdr SigCen to PEOs,
Page 71 and 72: eminded BG Eric Shinseki, the Direc
Page 73 and 74: Chapter 3 REORIENTING LAM: THE FORC
Page 75 and 76: Figure 7 Office of the Director Syn
Page 78 and 79: CONTROL EVENT r-- FY 95 BA DECISION
Page 80 and 81: ties and programs for all to see. W
Page 82 and 83: the GOWGs in importance. In additio
Page 84 and 85: In fact, the Force XXI Campaign sho
Page 86 and 87: axis. In addition, ODCSOPS controll
Page 88 and 89: 1 Memorandum for See Distribution f
Page 90 and 91: ful enhancements to the operational
Page 93 and 94: Chapter 4 INSTITUTIONALIZING LAM AN
Page 95 and 96: ecause it had no orders to stop and
Page 97 and 98: quirements (CCIR) (see Figure 11).
Page 99 and 100: Reimer announced in mid-March that,
Page 101 and 102: I Interview, Sullivan with Yarrison
Page 103 and 104: Chapter 5 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AN
Page 105 and 106: Sullivan knew that some members of
Page 107 and 108: and shortly after Sullivan's term.
Page 109 and 110: clearer direction from the Chief fo
Page 111: 1 Sullivan in Sullivan Papers, Pers
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STOW-E SWG Synch TAV TDA TOE TRADOC
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Army Materiel Command (AMC) MACOM
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Staff, Army, to execute the Louisia
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Appendix C MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVE
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DATE 3-4 Oct 16-18 Oct Late Janearl
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tions, or mobilization and deployme
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MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS Nov 59-Feb 6
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FOREIGN DECORATIONS (in chronologic
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(OTN) assessment. Key points made a
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the AWD , as MG White briefed GEN F
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23 Letter, MG White to GEN Franks,
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team. This demonstration shows the
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ordination with the Army, to develo
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30 January 1995-The ADO issues the
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Meeting on Battlefield Digitization
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Appendix H MEMORANDUM FOR BG TOMMY
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will designate a General Officer st
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Appendix I CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE B
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• Responsibility will remain hier
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Appendix ] CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE L
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Appendix K ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS
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Abrams, GEN Creighton W: 1, 7 Adams
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