The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

Sullivan knew that some members of his
Boards of Directors had not wholly agreed
with the LAM process or even the concept
of a Board of Directors. As a result, he sought
to use his position as first among equals in
that circle to stimulate their cooperation and
participation. The availability of LAM seed
money for issue investigation was a significant
incentive for most proponents and produced
enough dramatic results that many
senior generals became supporters 2 Of
course, money-or, more often, the lack of
it-was a crucial element in the course that
many programs followed during Sullivan's
tenure. The sharp decreases in the Army's
budget meant that the size of the force had
to be reduced significantly, with units inactivated
or restationed and programs curtailed
or canceled. These circumstances rendered
Sullivan's leadership task as Chief continuously
challenging, particularly since operational
commitments and stresses on the remaining
soldiers and units increased at the
same time as funds were being reduced. The
same fiscal circumstances made his efforts
to effect change immensely more difficult as
well. For many, however, the challenges did
serve to emphasize the need for change.
Sometimes, Sullivan avoided confrontation
and did not hold peers and immediate
subordinates accountable for delivering the
support he had directed for LAM and the
LAM Task Force. He announced his concept
and intent and, reasonably, expected either
compliance or a good explanation as to why
a directive could not be carried out. BG
Tommy Franks had to intimate on several
occasions that he would have to take disagreements
to Sullivan before they could be
resolved 3 In at least one case, the Task Force
did not push an issue of noncompliance with
Sullivan's directive to provide funding in
order to avoid an ugly confrontation.
It can be argued that with all the demands
on his attention Sullivan could not remedy
problems about which he was uninformed
and that the Task Force should have advised
him when his wishes were not being carried
out. The fact is that he seems not always to
Preliminary Assessment and Conclusions
have been so advised and so could not take
action. As a result of such disconnects, LAM
probably accomplished less than it otherwise
might have if the Chief of Staff had intervened.
The Task Force had to execute its
mission of making the process work, sometimes
despite resistance from various quarters,
without the attention and intervention
from Sullivan it might have expected or engendered.
Perhaps the Task Force should
have pushed harder, but perhaps it could
not. When they led the Task Force, Tommy
Franks and David Ohle were brigadier generals.
Neither had the rank or authority to
confront three- or four-star generals whose
opinions about priorities for the Army might
have differed from their own.4
LAM also was not the only change game
in town. The CBRS-and then the ECBRSand
the normal modernization process, although
revised and streamlined, still were
the means by which the POM was built and
major programs funded; LAM operated beyond
the leading edge of that process. The
TRADOC Battle Labs, although complementing
LAM efforts in many respects, also performed
much of TRADOC's combat developments-related
experimentation and responded
to both LAM issues and priorities
and the initiatives of commanders throughout
the Army. Sullivan saw a place for all
these developmental thrusts or axes of advance.
Perhaps a partial explanation of this attitude
lies in Sullivan's background. As an
Armor officer and commander, Sullivan was
accustomed to conducting high-speed maneuvers
along multiple axes and to using
speed and violence to accomplish the mission
at hand. Often, this form of warfare included
bypassing obstacles and pockets of
resistance rather than being overly careful
about cleaning up the battlefield immediately
or about the niceties of established procedures
and processes. This manner of operating
seems clear in his employment of the
Task Force after most of its involvement with
the LAM process and Force XXI synchronization
had ceased.s
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