The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

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change, then the Task Force should "gracefully case its colors." Reassigning the Task Force to TRADOC would impinge on GEN Hartzog's prerogatives, as he would feel obliged to continue the Task Force with its current mission. Giving the "vehicle of change" mission to TRADOC while keeping the Task Force in another capacity, Dunn felt, would confuse everyone as to who really had the mission. Dunn also pointed out that several unique Task Force functions would need to be aSSigned elsewhere. Foremost among these was the strategic communications mission for Force XXI and the future Army, demonstrated in the Army Experiment exhibit at the AUSA annual meeting. He urged the Chief to reassign this task and other functions to other organizations, along with appropriate personnel and dollar resources. 17 Into the Future: the AVCSAJ A-8 Discussions In both Cowell's proposed charter and later briefings and Dunn's memo, one can find wording that foreshadows the Army's subsequent reactivation of the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff (OAVCSA). Many in the Army's leadership realized that the Joint Staff's Joint Requirements Oversight Council UROC) and the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment UWCA) process that supported deliberations of the JROC, as recently enhanced, had become increaSingly complex and increaSingly important to the Army. The JROC and the JWCA played crucial roles in integrating warfighting requirements and acquisition programs across the services and, thus, in allocating funding to the different services. Those leaders believed that the Army needed to organize its staff better so that it could participate more responsively in the process and compete more effectively with the other services for funds. The Joint Staff's. J-8, the Director for Force Structure , Resources, and Assessment, was responsible for the JWCA, which supported the Vice Chairman and the service Vice Chiefs who comprised the JROC.1S Since the Navy had already established an N-8 organization of its own mir- 82 roring the J-8's organization and functions, an Army organizational response clearly was reqUired. The reconstitution of the OAVCSA with an emphasis on resource management and prioritization appeared to fill that need. In fact, one of Cowell's last briefings proposed reassigning the Task Force to the AVCSA or the A-8 , whichever organization ultimately was established, as well as reassigning the Task Force's functions and projects. 19 One of the main issues discussed by those debating the Task Force's future, which dovetailed into proposals for A-8/AVCSA organizations, was the assignment of strategic resource planning. The Task Force had never really performed this function, as LTG Blackwell cogently argued. One early draft of Reimer's message announcing disbandment of the LAM Task Force had indicated "Strategic Planning: ARSTAF TBD." Responding to the draft, Blackwell pointed out the Task Force's original noninvolvement in this arena and contended that bridging any strategic resource planning gap between the POM and the Army Plan was clearly a function of the ODCSOPS. Strictly speaking, Blackwell's position was correct, so far as it went, but given the Army's need for greater organizational emphasis on rigorous resource planning and participation in the Joint processes, his argument was moot. Reimer had already decided to reestablish the AVCSA for that purpose 20 Cowell retired from the Army in February 1996, following plans he had first discussed with the Chief of Staff as early as the preceding September. His successor was COL Wayne W Boy, an engineer officer, who had had no previous connection with LAM or the Task Force. Boy did not offiCially join the organization until May 1996, and his mission was to preside over its disbandment and transition into the OAVCSA. 21 Reimer's Message and the Demise of the Task Force In the end, GEN Reimer decided that the LAM Task Force had succeeded in its task. After more than a month of staff preparation, The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers
Reimer announced in mid-March that, since the Army had institutionalized the process of "changing the way the Army changes," he would terminate the LAM Task Force, "as we know it." Strategic resource planning would go to the AVCSA, "once the position is approved." In a memorandum to the Vice Chief of Staff and several other addressees, the Director of the Army Staff confirmed the realignment of the Task Force's functions as contained in the Chief of Staff's earlier message and provided additional guidance on handling existing contracts and other relationships and on integrating the realigned functions into the addressees' organizations 22 COL Boy's function as the new LAM Task Force Director was now to disband the Task Force and oversee the transition of some of its Washington elements into the Center for Land Warfare under the new AVCSA. As the Task Force wound down its activities, COL Boy, at the end of May, laid out for the Director of Management the ways in which the LAM Task Force's budget for FY 96 should be reallocated. Part of it, he stated, should go to internal requirements, part to the new Center for Land Warfare, part to organizations assuming Task Force missions, and part to the Chief of Staff for his own strategic agility purposes. The total budget amounted to $6.28 million. COL Boy, Mr. Valliant, and Mr. John Rogers presented the Task Force's final close-out plan to the Director of the Army Staff on 13 June 1996 and received his approval.23 With the LAM Task Force on its way to dissolution, ODCSOPS seems, rather belatedly, to have realized the value of some of its functions. Following LTG Blackwell's retirement, but before the confirmation of his successor, the Assistant DCSOPS for Force Development, MG Edward Anderson, chaired the DCSOPS Force XXI Synchronization Meeting on 17 May 1996. In his closing remarks, MG Anderson commented that, with the coming disbandment of the LAM Task Force, no organization would exist to oversee the parts of the LAM process that had proven useful to the Army. He asked all present, in light of the disbandment and the assignment of a new DCSOPS, to think about the format of the DCSOPS synchronization meetings and about whether some of the former LAM Task Force functions should be included. This led to a poll of the participants and, ultimately, to an expansion of the meeting purview and format to include Force XXI strategic communications, post-AWE requirements, Army XXI fielding, and Joint/OSD issues.24 The Task Force ceased operations on 1 July and MSG Joan Ziehlke closed the Pentagon office. COL Boy and a few others had turned over their Hoffman Building spaces and some equipment to the OPMS XXI Task Force, which became operational under MG Ohle in June 1996. Boy, with others, transitioned into the emerging Center for Land Warfare. Mr. Valliant and Mr. Rogers closed the Fort Monroe operation, but Rogers and a budget assistant remained in Building 83 at Monroe to close out the Task Force's books there in September. LTC David Tyner had already closed the Carlisle Directorate . At Leavenworth , LTC Kirby Brown ceased his association with LAM on the effective date but continued work on the 1996 Army Experiment with a small staff, the last remnant of the Task Force. Conclusions The period from 20 June 1995 through 1 July 1996 was a turbulent one for the LAM Task Force. It confirmed for those on the Task Force that the LAM process, as they had known it, was clearly dead, and any ongoing remnants, like the last SWGs and the last GOWG, functioned mostly as a result of institutional inertia. Efforts by the Task Force's leaders to develop and acquire a new mission proved unavailing, as the thrust of opinion and action within the Army Staff moved inexorably toward GEN Reimer's final decision to eliminate the organization. The distinction between the LAM process and the Force XXI process, one of LAM's products, was one that most staff officers did not make, nor did most Institutionalizing LAM and Disbanding the Task Force 83
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We live in an era of dynamic change
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The preparation of this history of
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THE MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVERS CHAN
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oritized the allocation of LAM seed
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in the GOWGs and BoDs either had so
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Chapter Page 4. Institutionalizing
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On 9 March 1992, GEN Gordon R. Sull
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gers of being unprepared. He recoun
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Infantry Division (Mechanized) (lst
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eral Combat Training Centers was on
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Figure 1 A Sense of History "Strate
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R. Gabel's recently published book,
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quisition cycles, and save money an
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among the players contributed great
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BG To mmy R. Franks ODCSOPS draft c
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the briefing and established the or
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where and in what quantities, using
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1 Final Report of the Special Study
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29 See Interview, Nelson with Yarri
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10-11. See also Peay's letter to BG
Page 49 and 50: Chapter 2 THE LOUISIANA MANEUVERS P
Page 51 and 52: Figure 5 tual experimental work on
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Page 55 and 56: ing his own and the process could p
Page 57 and 58: tank crews from proper attention to
Page 59 and 60: mercially available, space-based C4
Page 61 and 62: services participated, the Joint St
Page 63 and 64: the Army. For all his efforts and t
Page 65 and 66: eal understanding of what Louisiana
Page 67 and 68: 1 GEN Sullivan to BG Mountcastle, 1
Page 69 and 70: 26 Message from Cdr SigCen to PEOs,
Page 71 and 72: eminded BG Eric Shinseki, the Direc
Page 73 and 74: Chapter 3 REORIENTING LAM: THE FORC
Page 75 and 76: Figure 7 Office of the Director Syn
Page 78 and 79: CONTROL EVENT r-- FY 95 BA DECISION
Page 80 and 81: ties and programs for all to see. W
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Page 93 and 94: Chapter 4 INSTITUTIONALIZING LAM AN
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Page 101 and 102: I Interview, Sullivan with Yarrison
Page 103 and 104: Chapter 5 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AN
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Page 111: 1 Sullivan in Sullivan Papers, Pers
Page 114 and 115: STOW-E SWG Synch TAV TDA TOE TRADOC
Page 116 and 117: Army Materiel Command (AMC) MACOM
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Page 120 and 121: Appendix C MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVE
Page 122 and 123: DATE 3-4 Oct 16-18 Oct Late Janearl
Page 124 and 125: tions, or mobilization and deployme
Page 126 and 127: MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS Nov 59-Feb 6
Page 128 and 129: FOREIGN DECORATIONS (in chronologic
Page 130 and 131: (OTN) assessment. Key points made a
Page 132 and 133: the AWD , as MG White briefed GEN F
Page 134 and 135: 23 Letter, MG White to GEN Franks,
Page 136 and 137: team. This demonstration shows the
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Page 140 and 141: 30 January 1995-The ADO issues the
Page 142 and 143: Meeting on Battlefield Digitization
Page 145 and 146: Appendix H MEMORANDUM FOR BG TOMMY
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Appendix I CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE B
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• Responsibility will remain hier
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Appendix ] CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE L
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Appendix K ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS
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Abrams, GEN Creighton W: 1, 7 Adams
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