The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers - US Army Center Of Military History

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the GOWGs in importance. In addition, most of those involved in managing the activities of the axes had become accustomed to coordinating with their counterparts to ensure that most conflicts were avoided or resolved at the level of colonel and below. The DCSOPS also dictated, for the most part, the agendas of his synchronization meetings. Under LTG Blackwell, briefers and discussants religiously adhered to the times allocated, and the meetings, though sometimes rescheduled, never lasted more than ninety minutes. Many general officers participated, a number of whom made the relevant decisions. Thus, this short, focused forum, which met more frequently than the SWGs, provided the DCSOPS and the others involved with a more efficient tool for proper coordination of their efforts than the SWGs. The composition of these meetings and his own role also enabled the DCSOPS, rather than the GOWGs, to set at least some of the agendas for subsequent Board of Directors' meetings. 16 Ohle saw the DCSOPS' assumption of increasing responsibility in this area as an indication that one of the processes the Task Force had started was becoming embedded in the Army Staff, and he relinquished the function gladly. By February 1995 most synchronization functions had passed from the Task Force to DCSOPS and the axis "meisters." Ultimately, the Task Force reassigned two officers from the Synchronization Directorate to ODCSOPS to assist with the synchronization effort. 17 Within the LAM Task Force, Force XXI activity naturally took precedence over LAM issue identification as the campaign progressed. The synchronization effort fed into the former LAM process with the SWGs' outputs going to the Force XXI GOWGs. These GOWGs, while still responsible for identifying new LAM issues for investigation, were primarily supposed to synchronize further the three axes' campaign plans and decision points, adjust the Force XXI Campaign Plan as necessary, and prioritize recommendations for resources. As finding funds for new experiments became more difficult, new ideas- 66 and thus new ways to spend money-became less welcome. Only two GOWGs met during BG Ohle's tenure. IS Those GOWGs that did occur during the remainder of Sullivan's tenure were largely information sessions with very little, if any, work on new issues or challenges. The major issues were all being handled by the Force XXI axes and ODCSOPS through their internal channels. Likewise, the Task Force's new focus on Force XXI synchronization and issues inevitably meant less attention to LAM issues not directly related to Force XXI and to the LAM process. Shortly after the Force XXI Campaign opened, the Task Force met at the 24- 25 August GOWG with the proponents of outstanding LAM issues to align them with the axes of the Force XXI Campaign . All involved understood that, in a time of increasingly constrained resources, those issues which could not fit into the new campaign likely would lose their priority with the Board of Directors and, as a result, their funding. Many viable and potentially fruitful issue evaluations were "archived" and fell by the wayside as a result of this winnowing. 19 Although the GOWGs continued until October 1995, the LAM process after the fall of 1994, as it had to do with the original intent of the Louisiana Maneuvers, exerted Significantly less influence. In the eyes of a number of observers, the opening of the Force XXI Campaign also had the effect of distancing the four-star members of the Board of Directors from the resolution of challenges and issues important to both their commands and to the whole of the Army. In the revised process, the Board, which met following the GOWG, an intervening SWG, or another form of in-process review, went over campaign progress, provided appropriate guidance for the future, recommended accelerated funding for particular programs, and allocated resources for Force XXI. Once TRADOC, the ADO, and the Vice Chief of Staff, represented by the DCSOPS, took charge of their respective axes, however, the more usual staff processes assumed the task of moving Force XXI for- The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers
ward. Thus, the decline in the need for the four stars' input and their proponency for resolution of LAM issues-the feature that had driven the Louisiana Maneuvers process-made them seem less responsible for the solutions to Army problems and less important to the overall workings of the new Force XXI development process. As a result, their involvement in and enthusiasm for these new change processes may have waned, particularly in light of the lower priority assigned to issues that might have been important to them 20 The original LAM process rolled forward through much of 1995. But for all intents and purposes it ceased to serve as an agent for substantive change in the Army by the late fall of 1994. As the LAM process lost momentum and as other agencies assumed more and more of the synchronization mission, the Task Force became mostly a special mission force for the Chief of Staff. This was a Significant change in the organization's orientation. Although it always had been a part of the Chief of Staff's office, the Task Force's focus while working the LAM process had been on issues and challenges affecting the whole Army and on responding to the whole of the Army's leadership through the Board of Directors. Now it functioned more like a different sort of Staff Group, reacting to special missions and qUick-response taskings from Sullivan. Much of its original raison d'etre, if not its utility to the Chief and the Army, seemed to have dissipated. Perhaps sensing this, Sullivan and Harper discussed as early as the summer of 1994 whether or not they should "declare victory and close down LAM." At that point, Sullivan decided against it, probably to ensure that the Task Force remained available to get the Force XXI Campaign started 21 As it turned out, those parts of the Task Force primarily responsible for the synchronization of the Joint Venture campaign continued to be busy with that mission until the spring of 1995, but most of the rest of the Task Force found itself working increasingly on Sullivan's special projects. 22 Reorienting LAM: The Force XXI Campaign For example, elements of the former Operations Directorate not tasked with synchronizing the Joint Venture axis continued to search for promising new information-based and information-producing technologies that could enhance the capabilities of Force XXI when ultimately it took the field. 23 The catalyzing, coordinating, and facilitating efforts of Task Force members such as COL Charles Moldenhauer, LTC John Geddes, Mr. Richard Maruyama, and others were critical to the success of programs like battlefield visualization, the synthetic theater of war (STOW) , and the several technologies that made possible a common, relevant situational awareness. Ironically, the decline of the original LAM process gave these Monroe Directorate individuals the freedom to play what proved to be a very useful role for the Army in these arenas. The Task Force's Significant Activities Reports for this period are replete with accounts of conferences, meetings, and demonstrations in which they were involved. Most of these fruitful programs, particularly STOW-E and STOW, might not have progressed as qUickly or as far as they did without their efforts. In LTG Blackwell's opinion, however, these activities were at a level of detail below that at which a Chief of Staff task force should be operating. 24 The Louisiana Maneuvers and the Force XXI Campaign Through Ohle's Year The Force XXI Campaign's first year coincided with BG Ohle's tenure as Task Force Director. Ohle had served as General Sullivans executive officer during Sullivan's first year as Chief of Staff, and Sullivan knew him well. After a stint as an Assistant Division Commander in the 1st Infantry Division, he had been selected by Sullivan to lead the Task Force because of his knowledge of the Army and Sullivan's confidence in him. As he directed the Task Force in its reorganization and relocation, he ensured that it played a central role in initially synchronizing the many developments that took place as the Force XXI Campaign gathered momentum. 67
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We live in an era of dynamic change
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The preparation of this history of
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THE MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVERS CHAN
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oritized the allocation of LAM seed
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in the GOWGs and BoDs either had so
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Chapter Page 4. Institutionalizing
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On 9 March 1992, GEN Gordon R. Sull
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gers of being unprepared. He recoun
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Infantry Division (Mechanized) (lst
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eral Combat Training Centers was on
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Figure 1 A Sense of History "Strate
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R. Gabel's recently published book,
Page 31: quisition cycles, and save money an
Page 34 and 35: among the players contributed great
Page 36 and 37: BG To mmy R. Franks ODCSOPS draft c
Page 38 and 39: the briefing and established the or
Page 40 and 41: where and in what quantities, using
Page 42 and 43: 1 Final Report of the Special Study
Page 44 and 45: 29 See Interview, Nelson with Yarri
Page 46 and 47: 10-11. See also Peay's letter to BG
Page 49 and 50: Chapter 2 THE LOUISIANA MANEUVERS P
Page 51 and 52: Figure 5 tual experimental work on
Page 53 and 54: move an issue from approval by the
Page 55 and 56: ing his own and the process could p
Page 57 and 58: tank crews from proper attention to
Page 59 and 60: mercially available, space-based C4
Page 61 and 62: services participated, the Joint St
Page 63 and 64: the Army. For all his efforts and t
Page 65 and 66: eal understanding of what Louisiana
Page 67 and 68: 1 GEN Sullivan to BG Mountcastle, 1
Page 69 and 70: 26 Message from Cdr SigCen to PEOs,
Page 71 and 72: eminded BG Eric Shinseki, the Direc
Page 73 and 74: Chapter 3 REORIENTING LAM: THE FORC
Page 75 and 76: Figure 7 Office of the Director Syn
Page 78 and 79: CONTROL EVENT r-- FY 95 BA DECISION
Page 80 and 81: ties and programs for all to see. W
Page 84 and 85: In fact, the Force XXI Campaign sho
Page 86 and 87: axis. In addition, ODCSOPS controll
Page 88 and 89: 1 Memorandum for See Distribution f
Page 90 and 91: ful enhancements to the operational
Page 93 and 94: Chapter 4 INSTITUTIONALIZING LAM AN
Page 95 and 96: ecause it had no orders to stop and
Page 97 and 98: quirements (CCIR) (see Figure 11).
Page 99 and 100: Reimer announced in mid-March that,
Page 101 and 102: I Interview, Sullivan with Yarrison
Page 103 and 104: Chapter 5 PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AN
Page 105 and 106: Sullivan knew that some members of
Page 107 and 108: and shortly after Sullivan's term.
Page 109 and 110: clearer direction from the Chief fo
Page 111: 1 Sullivan in Sullivan Papers, Pers
Page 114 and 115: STOW-E SWG Synch TAV TDA TOE TRADOC
Page 116 and 117: Army Materiel Command (AMC) MACOM
Page 118 and 119: Staff, Army, to execute the Louisia
Page 120 and 121: Appendix C MODERN LOUISIANA MANEUVE
Page 122 and 123: DATE 3-4 Oct 16-18 Oct Late Janearl
Page 124 and 125: tions, or mobilization and deployme
Page 126 and 127: MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS Nov 59-Feb 6
Page 128 and 129: FOREIGN DECORATIONS (in chronologic
Page 130 and 131: (OTN) assessment. Key points made a
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the AWD , as MG White briefed GEN F
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23 Letter, MG White to GEN Franks,
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team. This demonstration shows the
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ordination with the Army, to develo
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30 January 1995-The ADO issues the
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Meeting on Battlefield Digitization
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Appendix H MEMORANDUM FOR BG TOMMY
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will designate a General Officer st
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Appendix I CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE B
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• Responsibility will remain hier
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Appendix ] CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE L
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Appendix K ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS
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Abrams, GEN Creighton W: 1, 7 Adams
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