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Appendix H - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoUiu,-2oo1-11
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I however, criteria would require that exposures be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
2 Administrative controls would include radiation work permits, exposure limits, and escort
3 requirements. Physical controls would include batriers, postings, and personnel surveys. In
4 accordance with site procedures, administrative and physical controls applicable to this project
5 would be defined in job-specific work plans and procedures. Compliance with the job-specific
6 work practices and procedures would ensure that personnel exposures do not exceed allowable
7 limits.
8
9 Installing a perimeter fence and implementing a site-entry procedure would control access to the
10 work site. The procedure would require either training or escorts for site visitors. Additionally,
11 operating methods that depend primarily on equipment would be used, and the number of
12 operating personnel would be minimized to the extent practicable.
13
14 11.1.1.1.2 Control Environmental Hazards. The potential dispetsion/migration of dangerous
15 and/or radioactive waste would be an inherent risk of Alternative 6. Wind is the principal cause
16 of dispersion, and water is the main transport mechanism for migration. Dangerous/radioactive
17 contaminants could also migrate through the inadvertent contamination of vehicles and personnel
18 leaving the project site. Radiological limits for exposure to the public are provided by
19 DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection ofthe Public and the Environment.
20
r 21 Implementing a combination of procedural and physical controls would mitigate wind dispersion
22 of contaminants. Procedural controls would typically consist of wind-speed restrictions on work
23 activities. Also, demolition techniques (such as diamond wire sawing) would be selected due in
24 part to their ability to minimize contamination dispersion. Physical controls would include spray
25 fixatives ( i.e., water sprays and chemical coagulants), minimizing the size of the work area,
26 pressurized application of concrete slurries through a hose and nozzle (guniting), clean fill,
27 and/or containerization. Radiation air monitoring would be performed on the work site perimeter
28 to confirm the effectiveness of airborne contamination control.
29
30 The potential for water migration would also be mitigated by implementing a combination of
31 procedural and physical controls. Procedural controls would consist of work restrictions during
32 precipitation events if the potential for contaminant migration exists. Physical controls would
33 include a combination of temporary shelters and/or sealing products. ShelieFswouldbetased!
34 sAield-wASte^rem-pceFiPitatien-Dcmolition activities would be scheduled to occur after the
35 equipment removal is complete and the fixative sealer has been applied to surfaces with
36 smearable or loose contamination. o
37 eentemine inntenF.
38
39 Personnel and equipment leaving the site present a risk of contaminant migration. This risk
40 would be mitigated by procedural and physical measures. Work procedures would require
41 equipment used an the site and exposed to dangerous/radioactive wastes to be decontaminated
42 before the equipment is released. Personnel working the site would wear proper protective
43 clothing. Protective clothing exposed to dangerous/radioactive wastes would be controlled in
44 accordance with Hanford Site procedures. Personnel leaving radiologically contaminated areas
45 would require an exit survey before leaving.
Final Feasibility Study for the Canyon Diapositian lnitiative (221-U Faciliy)
J unc' 003 H-6