Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Dinko Dubravcaić 87 When introducing the concept of an inegalitarian producer co-op, Meade (1972) described the process of assimilation of new members. Older members will try to retain, at least for some time, an inegalitarian distribution of decision-making power that will result in a larger share of the rent. One can easily visualize the same happening in model (and real life) MSs. Meade also suggested the possibility of making lump-sum payments to co-op members willing to leave, when this increases d of the remaining members. Similar payments can be introduced by MSs to short term immigrants willing to be repatriated to their countries of origin if this increases D of the old nationals. Illyrian theories have an explanation for the fact that movements of goods prevail over movements of labour among countries. Sacks (1983: 47) analyzes the relations between two LMFs, each in a d optimum and therefore unwilling to allow labour movements between them. He defines the conditions that increase d in both LMFs and reduce the difference of their marginal productivities by trading in goods and services. Some conspicuous similarities concerning selective employment of ‘non-members’ by producer co-ops and developed states can be noted. Both ‘employers’ will give special treatment to highly qualified entrants, such as managers in the first case and scientists in the second. They will also try to attract ‘employees’ that are prepared to do menial work that old members prefer to avoid. We must admit, however, that the complexity of MSs in real life will be a major hurdle for their modeling as Illyrian ‘citizens co-ops’. In addition to having ‘employeecitizens’ who expect the MS to help them maximize their labour rent, states will consist of ‘capitalist-citizens’ who expect to be helped in maximizing the rate of return on their capital. In real life, the amount of capital rent will be limited in comparison to the labour rent since the barriers to capital movements among countries are much less significant than those to labour movements. The capitalist-citizen may try to reduce the labour rent by exporting capital to cheap labour countries, or by lobbying for a free flow of immigrants. The government will have to arbitrate, and solutions suggested by Aoki (1980), where managers in firms mediate between owners and workers, may become relevant. Very large differences of D-ratios among countries, as well as long queues of willing migrants in less developed countries, indicate the presence of large amounts of Illyrian rents in developed countries. It may be claimed that this is the most important cause of misallocation of productive factors in the world economy. Model building of the MS along Illyrian lines can, however, only marginally improve our understanding of the problem and the possibilities to find solutions. 21
88 Illyrian Theories of Cooperative Rent-Sharing Empirical research concerning similarities of operation of producer coops and citizen co-ops can probably be of some interest only in the field of structures and dynamics of employment/immigration. 5.6 Is there a future for Illyria? The Illyrian co-op model of economic activity based on a ratio maximand can be functional only if several conditions are met. A group of people must act so as to create and share a significant rent. They must possess a sense of solidarity among themselves and a wish to obtain the results while restricting non-members from taking part in them. Hiring of non-members under other than sharing arrangements will reduce the applicability of the Illyrian model. In real life, neither the producer co-op, the capitalist co-op, nor the citizen co-op meet all the necessary conditions. The producer co-ops realize rents of little substance and have difficulties in reaching fair sharing arrangements especially concerning income retained for investment. In addition, they cannot efficiently solve the problem of development by external financing. Historically, oligopolistic selling of labour by trade unions has produced better results for workers than forming producer co-ops and sharing their rent. The application of the Illyrian model to capitalist co-ops is impaired by the ability of members to participate in many firms and change their affiliation easily. The institution of various intermediate levels of membership also reduces the validity of the co-op model. In the modern state defined as a citizen co-op, the inegalitarian aspect of its members as well as non-economic aspects will crucially complicate the application of Illyrian models. The expansion of Illyrian theories in the last few decades of this century has been the result of various factors – the appearance of the socially engineered workers’ managed firms in former Yugoslavia, the search for a third way of economic and social organization beyond capitalism and communism, the feeling that industrial democracy was ethically correct and, finally, the tendency of economic scholars to follow model experiments to all possible ends. The last element may probably be the most significant determinant of future research. Illyrian theories may retain some marginal relevance in just one field – the process of hiring new members in various types of co-ops, these being workers, stock-owners, nationals or others. Some similarities may be found there as the consequence of a veiled influence of a co-operative ratio-maximand.
Page 1 and 2:
Equality, Participation, Transition
Page 3 and 4:
This page intentionally left blank
Page 5 and 6:
First published in Great Britain 20
Page 7 and 8:
vi Contents 9 Self-Management, Empl
Page 9 and 10:
List of Figures 02.1 First Law of O
Page 11 and 12:
x Foreword institution most dear to
Page 13 and 14:
Notes on the Contributors Ivo Bića
Page 15 and 16:
xiv Notes on the Contributors membe
Page 17 and 18:
xvi Notes on the Contributors done
Page 19 and 20:
xviii Notes on the Contributors pri
Page 21 and 22:
Introduction: Branko Horvat - Beyon
Page 23 and 24:
xxii Introduction Dame (1978), Univ
Page 25 and 26:
xxiv Introduction theory led him to
Page 27 and 28:
xxvi Introduction though friendly,
Page 29 and 30:
xxviii Introduction The second pape
Page 31 and 32:
xxx Introduction disciplines such a
Page 33 and 34:
Branko Horvat: Select Bibliography
Page 35 and 36:
xxxiv Branko Horvat: Select Bibliog
Page 37 and 38:
xxxvi Branko Horvat: Select Bibliog
Page 39 and 40:
xxxviii Branko Horvat: Select Bibli
Page 41 and 42:
2 Horvat’s Contributions to Econo
Page 43 and 44:
Page 45 and 46:
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
10 Horvat’s Contributions to Econ
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56:
2 Individual Initiative, Entry and
Page 57 and 58:
Page 59 and 60:
Page 61 and 62:
Page 63 and 64:
Page 65 and 66:
Page 67 and 68:
28 Egalitarianism On Its Own Thomas
Page 69 and 70:
30 Egalitarianism On Its Own projec
Page 71 and 72:
32 Egalitarianism On Its Own absenc
Page 73 and 74:
34 Egalitarianism On Its Own tithin
Page 75 and 76: 36 Egalitarianism On Its Own what s
Page 77 and 78: 38 Egalitarianism On Its Own 100% 9
Page 79 and 80: 40 Egalitarianism On Its Own contri
Page 81 and 82: 42 Egalitarianism On Its Own anothe
Page 83 and 84: 44 Egalitarianism On Its Own politi
Page 85 and 86: 46 Egalitarianism On Its Own Eckel,
Page 87 and 88: 4 Determinants of Cross-Country Inc
Page 89 and 90: 50 Determinants of Income Inequalit
Page 95 and 96: 56 GINI GINI 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 3
Page 101 and 102: Table 4.2 The regressions: dependen
Page 119 and 120: 5 Illyrian Theories of Cooperative
Page 125: 86 Illyrian Theories of Cooperative
Page 131 and 132: 92 Employee Participation in Enterp
Page 137 and 138: EMPLOYEE RETURN ONLY PROFIT PROFIT
Page 139 and 140: 100 Employee Participation in Enter
Page 141 and 142: 7 Employee Involvement and the Mode
Page 143 and 144: 104 Employee Involvement and the Mo
Page 157 and 158: 8 Uneasy Symbiosis of a Market Econ
Page 159 and 160: 120 Market Socialism in Yugoslavia
Page 177 and 178:
138 Market Socialism in Yugoslavia
Page 179 and 180:
Page 181 and 182:
Page 183 and 184:
Page 185 and 186:
146 Self-Management, Employee Owner
Page 187 and 188:
Page 189 and 190:
Table 9.1 Methods of privatization
Page 191 and 192:
Page 193 and 194:
Page 195 and 196:
Page 197 and 198:
Page 199 and 200:
Page 201 and 202:
10 Privatization and Enterprise Per
Page 203 and 204:
164 Privatization: Evidence from Es
Page 205 and 206:
Page 207 and 208:
Page 209 and 210:
Page 211 and 212:
Page 213 and 214:
Page 215 and 216:
Page 217 and 218:
Page 219 and 220:
Page 221 and 222:
Page 223 and 224:
11 Growth Theory and Transition Eco
Page 225 and 226:
186 Growth Theory and Transition Ec
Page 227 and 228:
Page 229 and 230:
Page 231 and 232:
Page 233 and 234:
Page 235 and 236:
Page 237 and 238:
Page 239 and 240:
Page 241 and 242:
202 Index economic growth - continu
Page 243 and 244:
204 Index Horvat, Branko - continue
Page 245 and 246:
206 Index neoclassical economics -
Page 247 and 248:
208 Index ‘third way’, 88, 104
show all

Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?