Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat

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Appendix: definitions of variables Ownership PRV Privatization dummy. Whether the firm was privatized in 1996. Majority Ownership MAJEE is a dummy variable for whether or not, in 1997, a firm’s majority ownership group was employees. Analogous variables are defined for MAJMAN (management), MAJDOM (domestic outsiders), and MAJFOR (foreigners). The base case is MAJSTA (state). Largest Minority In Table 10.2, 16 particular forms of ‘largest minority’ are used in the sense that a group other than the majority owner owns between 15 and 50 per cent of the total capital share. Variables are defined for firms in which, for a given majority owner (employees, EMAJ; foreigners, FMAJ; managers, MMAJ; and outside domestic, DMAJ), there is another group which has a largest minority ownership stake (MIN). Thus for firms in which employees are the majority owner, large minority variables are included for foreigners, domestic outsiders, managers and the state – respectively EMAJFMIN, EMAJDMIN, EMAJMMIN and EMAJSMIN. Majority Ownership Transitions For firms which between 1995 and 1997 do not change their majority owner, a set of ‘constant’ ownership variables are included, for foreigners, domestic outsiders, managers, employees and no majority – respectively KMAJF, KMAJD, KMAJM, KMAJE and KMAJN (The base case is state majority ownership throughout the period). For firms which do change majority ownership, firms which begin with majority ownership in foreign hands and ownership switches to domestic outsiders, managers, employees, and to no majority, the variables are F95D97, F95M97, F95E97, F95N97 respectively. Analogous variables are defined for other majority groups and other transitions. Since there were no switches to state ownership and no switches from no majority to either foreign or employee ownership, there was a total of 28 variables in this ‘ownership dynamics’ vector. Firm Characteristics and Performance Derek C. Jones and Niels Mygind 179 AVPERF average performance computed for some measure of performance using annual data over the period 1994–7, except for those firms which were privatized during that period in which case it is measured relative to the year of privatization INIPERFcorresponding measure of the level of performance during the first year of privatization Salesannualized average growth in real sales Exports to salesannualized average growth in the ratio of exports to sales
180 Privatization: Evidence from Estonia Labour productivityannualized average growth in (real sales)/employment Employmentannualized average growth in employment Control (Dummy) Variables TALLINN Dummy1 for firm located in Tallinn, the capital of Estonia IND*set of industry Dummies Notes 01 For a survey of British economic thought on the effects of worker management and worker participation on enterprise performance, see Jones (1976). 02 For reviews, see Carlin and Landsmann (1997) and EBRD (1997). 03 Unfortunately, our data do not enable us to examine the effects of other potentially important factors that influence enterprise performance (such as employee influence). We focus on ownership because that is a focus of the current debate in transition economies. 04 There is also abundant empirical evidence which points to the superior economic performance of economic systems that are neither state-owned nor capitalist. For an important contribution on the better performance of the (former) Yugoslav labour managed economy, see Horvat (1969). 05 To illustrate some of these points, Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) have noted that ownership of an asset consists of two central rights – the right to control its use and to enjoy its returns. 06 However, there are few empirical studies that have looked at minority ownership when minority ownership stakes are ‘large’ – say, more than 10 per cent. For example, in the case of Japan, employee ownership stakes average less than 2 per cent (see Jones and Kato, 1995). For the potential benefits of managerial stakes see the executive compensation literature (for example, Asch and Warner, 1997). 07 Moreover, the links between majority ownership and control are expected to be diffuse. Thus, studies of firms in many transition economies have examined the implications of different ownership configurations for corporate governance and most conclude that, irrespective of ownership form, normally employee influence is quite limited and management influence is very pronounced (Blasi, 1994; Jones and Weisskopf, 1996). Hence, it is also potentially important to take account of the effects on enterprise behaviour not only of ownership but also of control. While we will endeavour to collect measures of control for use in future studies, in this paper, we follow the bulk of the literature and assume that our measures of ownership are adequate. 08 For more exhaustive accounts, see Mygind (1996, 1997). 09 For details of the way the sample was selected see Jones and Mygind (1998). 10 Based on two sample mean t tests, there do not appear to be any significant differences in the nature of the firms for which we have only partial information. 11 This definition of ‘transition effect’ is most appropriate when privatization is accompanied by other major economic reforms such as price liberalization.
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First published in Great Britain 20
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vi Contents 9 Self-Management, Empl
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List of Figures 02.1 First Law of O
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x Foreword institution most dear to
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Notes on the Contributors Ivo Bića
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xiv Notes on the Contributors membe
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xvi Notes on the Contributors done
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xviii Notes on the Contributors pri
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Introduction: Branko Horvat - Beyon
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xxii Introduction Dame (1978), Univ
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xxiv Introduction theory led him to
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xxvi Introduction though friendly,
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xxviii Introduction The second pape
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xxx Introduction disciplines such a
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Branko Horvat: Select Bibliography
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xxxiv Branko Horvat: Select Bibliog
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xxxvi Branko Horvat: Select Bibliog
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xxxviii Branko Horvat: Select Bibli
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2 Horvat’s Contributions to Econo
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10 Horvat’s Contributions to Econ
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2 Individual Initiative, Entry and
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28 Egalitarianism On Its Own Thomas
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30 Egalitarianism On Its Own projec
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32 Egalitarianism On Its Own absenc
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34 Egalitarianism On Its Own tithin
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36 Egalitarianism On Its Own what s
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38 Egalitarianism On Its Own 100% 9
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40 Egalitarianism On Its Own contri
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42 Egalitarianism On Its Own anothe
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44 Egalitarianism On Its Own politi
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46 Egalitarianism On Its Own Eckel,
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4 Determinants of Cross-Country Inc
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50 Determinants of Income Inequalit
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56 GINI GINI 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 3
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Table 4.2 The regressions: dependen
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5 Illyrian Theories of Cooperative
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92 Employee Participation in Enterp
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EMPLOYEE RETURN ONLY PROFIT PROFIT
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100 Employee Participation in Enter
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7 Employee Involvement and the Mode
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104 Employee Involvement and the Mo
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8 Uneasy Symbiosis of a Market Econ
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120 Market Socialism in Yugoslavia
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Page 241 and 242: 202 Index economic growth - continu
Page 243 and 244: 204 Index Horvat, Branko - continue
Page 245 and 246: 206 Index neoclassical economics -
Page 247 and 248: 208 Index ‘third way’, 88, 104
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Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat

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