Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat

206 Index
neoclassical economics – continued
neo-Ricardian critique of, xxiv
see also Homo economicus
‘new competition’, 106–7, 109
optimal states of society, see
socio-economic system
outsider ownership, 154, 165
see also privatization
parental involvement, see
socio-economic system
participation, see employee
participation; laws of optimal
participation, self-management
social, see socio-economic system
participatory economy, see
self-management
Peru, problem of Alvarado J. Velasco’s
economic reform, 16–17, 24
prisoner’s dilemma, see cooperation
Phillips curve trade-off, 5
private sector, in transition
economies, 148–9, 167
privatization, 147, 163–6, 184,
198n
and capital markets, 147
and de novo private firms, 163, 188
and economic performance, xxx,
157, 162–3, 167, 169–76,
177, 178, 180n, 181n; and
institutional factors; and
participation, 170, 178
and employee ownership, 99, 100n,
146, 149, 153, 155, 163, 176,
177; and control, 155–6; and
ESOP, 153
in Estonia, xxx; methods and
processes, 166–7; ownership
structures, 168–9; economic
effects, 169–77
and form of ownership, 163, 180;
and control, 180n; preferred,
165–6
insiders, 149, 153, 154, 165,
167–9
and labour management, xxx,
145,156, 159; see also employee
ownership, in transition
economies; transition, and
labour management
lagging, in countries of former
Yugoslavia, 149
majority ownership, 153, 164–6,
168, 170, 173, 176, 177, 179,
180n; foreign, 173
management–employee buy-outs,
105, 149
Managerially Controlled Employee
Owned Firm (MCEO), 155, 157
managerial ownership, 154, 167
mass, 149, 152, 153
methods, xxx, 147–51, 159n, 166,
171
minority ownership, 164, 165, 169,
170, 171, 173, 174, 175, 178,
179, 180n
outsiders, 149, 165, 168
in Russia, 163, 167, 177
in Slovenia, 103, 105
and state ownership, 173, 175, 177,
178
theoretical case for, 164–6
and transition effect, 169, 170,
180n, 181n
in Visegrad countries, xxx, 163,
166, 177
voucher, 149, 167
see also economic growth; employee
ownership; transition
producer cooperatives, 80, 83–5, 88,
89n, 145, 146, 155
behaviour, 83–5
capital intensity, 83
v. capitalist firms, 83
funds, securing, 83–4
James Meade on inegalitarian, 87
optimizing function, 84–5, 89n
plywood, in the US, 83
relative scarcity of, 83–4, 89n
and transition, 145, 155
and unions, 84, 89n
see also Mondragon system
prisoner’s dilemma, see cooperation
property rights
and economic efficiency, 178
in China, 178
in labour-managed firms, 82