Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat

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Derek C. Jones and Niels Mygind 171 However, to respond to some of the concerns which were raised by our discussion of the available theoretical and empirical evidence, we also draw on our data to estimate models which involve substantial augmentation of these approaches. In these preliminary exercises, we add to specification (1) at least one of two sets of other variables which are arguably of importance to economic performance: (i) OD, a vector of variables for changes in ownership; (ii) MO, a vector of variables for measuring the influence of a large minority ownership. Thus a specification which includes these two additional vectors is: AVPERF o INIPERFOL OD MO i i IND Tallinn (2) Also, we report the results of F tests (which are used to select which specification from these augmented approaches best fits the data). Findings from regression analysis are reported in Tables 10.1–10.3. The most obvious finding that emerges from these exercises is the low overall explanatory power of these estimates. The R 2 is always less than 0.1 (which is well below the fit obtained using similar specifications for samples of firms in other countries). The explanatory power of the specification for labour productivity is particularly poor. Table 10.1A shows the first set of regressions, where the dummy variable for privatization measures the effect of privatization on performance. 16 The privatization effect, however, produced the expected direction of growth for only sales and employment. More importantly, privatization only had a statistically significant and positive effect on the growth in sales and exports/sales. Thus, contrary to the Frydman et al. (1997) study, the Estonian data do not provide strong evidence that privatization per se has favourable performance effects. The magnitude of the privatization effects are also often surprisingly large. Thus for sales growth, the privatization effect is about 40 per cent per year. Privatization also had a statistically significant and negative effect on the growth rate of exports-to-sales, where privatized firms are expected to have a 48 per cent lower growth in this ratio per year relative to non-privatized firms. While this result appears to contradict the expectation that exports-to-sales would improve after privatization, it might be explained by privatized firms starting from a much higher ratio of exports-to-sales than state firms and the inadequacy of our control for initial performance. Additionally, the findings reported in Table 10.1A indicate that, relative to state firms, labour productivity fell. While this was only a small and statistically insignificant fall, this is still contradictory to the expected outcome. Also, according to this
172 Privatization: Evidence from Estonia model, privatization led to an average 3 per cent fall per year in employment growth. In all models, F tests reject the null hypothesis (and often at the 1 per cent significance level) that the joint effect of industries on performance is zero. 17 Surprisingly for all performance indicators, firms located in the capital district of Tallinn on average experienced slower Table 10.1 Performance regressions: privatization and majority ownership A Privatization Sales Labour productivity Export-to-sales Employment Constant 0.457 0.061 0.475 0.017 (0.293) (0.178) (0.623) (0.092) INIPERF 0.0000008 0.0001 0.000002 0.000044 (0.0000007) (0.000089) (0.000004) (0.000035) Tallinn 0.307*** 0.114 0.325 0.023 (0.1240) (0.078) (0.265) (0.039) PRV 0.393* 0.04 0.483** 0.03 (0.149) (0.094) (0.318) (0.047) Industry Yes*** Yes Yes** Yes n 481 471 481 466 Adj R 2 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.04 B Majority ownership Constant 0.417 0.057 0.5 0.025 (0.301) (0.181) (0.628) (0.094) INIPERF 0.0000009 0.0001 0.000003 0.00004 (0.0000007) (0.00009) (0.000004) (0.000035) Tallinn 0.337* 0.114 0.0274 0.046 (0.128) (0.08) (0.269) (0.039) MAJFOR 0.459*** 0.012 0.101** 0.179** (0.197) (0.127) (0.042) (0.062) MAJDOM 0.354** 0.027 0.574 0.054 (0.18) (0.11) (0.37) (0.055) MAJMAN 0.351*** 0.191 0.446 0.021 (0.191) (0.098) (0.40) (0.059) MAJEE 0.344*** 0.004 0.118* 0.002 (0.213) (0.13) (0.045) (0.065) NOMAJ 0.361 0.111 0.25* 0.064 (0.396) (0.242) (0.084) (0.12) Industry Yes*** Yes Yes* Yes n 481 471 481 466 Adj R 2 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.02 * significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 10% level.
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Equality, Participation, Transition
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First published in Great Britain 20
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vi Contents 9 Self-Management, Empl
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List of Figures 02.1 First Law of O
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x Foreword institution most dear to
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Notes on the Contributors Ivo Bića
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xiv Notes on the Contributors membe
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xvi Notes on the Contributors done
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xviii Notes on the Contributors pri
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Introduction: Branko Horvat - Beyon
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xxii Introduction Dame (1978), Univ
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xxiv Introduction theory led him to
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xxvi Introduction though friendly,
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xxviii Introduction The second pape
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xxx Introduction disciplines such a
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Branko Horvat: Select Bibliography
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xxxiv Branko Horvat: Select Bibliog
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xxxvi Branko Horvat: Select Bibliog
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xxxviii Branko Horvat: Select Bibli
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2 Horvat’s Contributions to Econo
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10 Horvat’s Contributions to Econ
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2 Individual Initiative, Entry and
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28 Egalitarianism On Its Own Thomas
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30 Egalitarianism On Its Own projec
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32 Egalitarianism On Its Own absenc
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34 Egalitarianism On Its Own tithin
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36 Egalitarianism On Its Own what s
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38 Egalitarianism On Its Own 100% 9
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40 Egalitarianism On Its Own contri
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42 Egalitarianism On Its Own anothe
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44 Egalitarianism On Its Own politi
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46 Egalitarianism On Its Own Eckel,
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4 Determinants of Cross-Country Inc
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50 Determinants of Income Inequalit
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56 GINI GINI 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 3
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Table 4.2 The regressions: dependen
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5 Illyrian Theories of Cooperative
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92 Employee Participation in Enterp
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EMPLOYEE RETURN ONLY PROFIT PROFIT
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100 Employee Participation in Enter
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7 Employee Involvement and the Mode
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104 Employee Involvement and the Mo
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8 Uneasy Symbiosis of a Market Econ
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Page 189 and 190: Table 9.1 Methods of privatization
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Page 203 and 204: 164 Privatization: Evidence from Es
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Page 223 and 224: 11 Growth Theory and Transition Eco
Page 225 and 226: 186 Growth Theory and Transition Ec
Page 241 and 242: 202 Index economic growth - continu
Page 243 and 244: 204 Index Horvat, Branko - continue
Page 245 and 246: 206 Index neoclassical economics -
Page 247 and 248: 208 Index ‘third way’, 88, 104
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Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat

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