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Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat

Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat

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176 Privatization: Evidence from Estonia<br />

majority employee ownership and a large domestic m<strong>in</strong>ority sharehold<strong>in</strong>g<br />

have faster sales growth <strong>of</strong> about 42 per cent (0.9679–0.5478).<br />

In Table 10.3 we report the results <strong>of</strong> augment<strong>in</strong>g specification (2)<br />

with a vector <strong>of</strong> ‘ownership dynamics’ variables. For firms which do<br />

not change their majority owner, a set <strong>of</strong> ‘constant’ ownership variables<br />

are <strong>in</strong>cluded, for foreigners, domestic outsiders, managers,<br />

employees and no majority – respectively KMAJF, KMAJD, KMAJM,<br />

KMAJE and KMAJN. (The base case is state majority ownership<br />

throughout the period.) For firms which do change ownership, variables<br />

for ownership transitions are <strong>in</strong>cluded. For example, for firms<br />

which beg<strong>in</strong> with majority ownership <strong>in</strong> foreign hands and ownership<br />

switches to domestic outsiders, managers, employees, and to no majority,<br />

the variables are F95D97, F95M97, F95E97, F95N97 respectively.<br />

S<strong>in</strong>ce there were no switches to state ownership and no switches from<br />

no majority to either foreign or employee ownership, there was a total<br />

<strong>of</strong> 28 variables <strong>in</strong> this ‘ownership dynamics’ vector. For these variables,<br />

only estimates for which there is at least one statistically significant<br />

coefficient are reported. The key new f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g that emerges from this<br />

‘ownership dynamics’ exercise is that, for all four performance measures,<br />

the null hypothesis that the jo<strong>in</strong>t effect <strong>of</strong> the ‘ownership transition’<br />

variables on performance is zero, is supported by F tests. However,<br />

<strong>in</strong> a limited number <strong>of</strong> cases (<strong>in</strong> fact <strong>in</strong> 12/112), at least one <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />

coefficients on the ownership dynamics variables is found to be<br />

statistically significant. For example, firms which switch from majority<br />

state ownership to majority domestic ownership (S95D97) and majority<br />

management ownership (S95M97) have faster rates <strong>of</strong> employment<br />

growth. By contrast, firms which switch from employee majority ownership<br />

to domestic majority ownership (E95D97) have slower rates <strong>of</strong><br />

employment growth.<br />

10.6 Conclusions and implications<br />

In this paper, we report evidence on the effects <strong>of</strong> different forms <strong>of</strong><br />

ownership on enterprise performance. S<strong>in</strong>ce our data are for one country,<br />

our f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs would not necessarily be expected to generalize to<br />

other countries. However, the Estonian case is <strong>of</strong> special <strong>in</strong>terest s<strong>in</strong>ce,<br />

by the many <strong>in</strong>dicators, it is generally believed to be <strong>in</strong> the top tier <strong>of</strong><br />

transition economies. Moreover, our f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs are derived from a new<br />

and large panel that is representative <strong>of</strong> the whole economy. We are,<br />

therefore, able to assemble some <strong>of</strong> the first reliable evidence on these<br />

matters.

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