Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat

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Derek C. Jones and Niels Mygind 175 Table 10.3 Performance regressions: majority ownership and changes in ownership Sales Sales/L Exp./sales Employment INIPERF 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00003) MAJDOMOUT 0.6822** 0.0778 0.0991 0.0510 (0.2816) (0.1899) (0.6364) (0.732) MAJFOR 0.4580 0.0107 0.2113 0.1056 (0.4305) (0.2919) (0.9857) (0.1103) MAJEE 0.7839* 0.0202 0.6771 0.0518 (0.3006) (0.211) (0.7000) (0.0813) MAJMAN 0.5207** 0.1097 0.1744 0.0468 (0.2932) (0.1968) (0.6617) (0.0762) NOMAJ 0.0963 0.6988*** 1.6800 0.0752 (0.6769) (0.4374) (1.5486) (0.1733) KMAJD 0.5018*** 0.1399** (0.2881) (0.0745) KMAJN 0.8380*** (0.5224) M95D97 1.1398* 0.9111* (2.858) (0.2657) 5.5032* M95N97 (2.298) E95D97 0.2198** (0.1011) E95M97 0.9691** (0.4515) S95D97 0.2388* (0.0848) S95M97 0.2759** (0.1085) N95M97 6.2525* 5.3845** (1.1498) (2.6347) TALLINN 0.3818* 0.1899** 0.3364 0.0596*** (0.1226) (0.0824) (0.2724) (0.0302) INDS Y Y Y Y*** R 2 0.04 0.007 0.03 0.02 * significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 10% level. Moreover, the addition of the ‘large minority ownership’ variables yields some surprising results for the magnitudes of the ownership effects. For example, relative to a firm which has majority employee ownership and no large minority, the estimates imply that sales grow faster by an incredible 97 per cent in firms with large domestic minority ownership. Or relative to firms with majority state ownership, firms with
176 Privatization: Evidence from Estonia majority employee ownership and a large domestic minority shareholding have faster sales growth of about 42 per cent (0.9679–0.5478). In Table 10.3 we report the results of augmenting specification (2) with a vector of ‘ownership dynamics’ variables. For firms which do not change their majority owner, a set of ‘constant’ ownership variables are included, for foreigners, domestic outsiders, managers, employees and no majority – respectively KMAJF, KMAJD, KMAJM, KMAJE and KMAJN. (The base case is state majority ownership throughout the period.) For firms which do change ownership, variables for ownership transitions are included. For example, for firms which begin with majority ownership in foreign hands and ownership switches to domestic outsiders, managers, employees, and to no majority, the variables are F95D97, F95M97, F95E97, F95N97 respectively. Since there were no switches to state ownership and no switches from no majority to either foreign or employee ownership, there was a total of 28 variables in this ‘ownership dynamics’ vector. For these variables, only estimates for which there is at least one statistically significant coefficient are reported. The key new finding that emerges from this ‘ownership dynamics’ exercise is that, for all four performance measures, the null hypothesis that the joint effect of the ‘ownership transition’ variables on performance is zero, is supported by F tests. However, in a limited number of cases (in fact in 12/112), at least one of the individual coefficients on the ownership dynamics variables is found to be statistically significant. For example, firms which switch from majority state ownership to majority domestic ownership (S95D97) and majority management ownership (S95M97) have faster rates of employment growth. By contrast, firms which switch from employee majority ownership to domestic majority ownership (E95D97) have slower rates of employment growth. 10.6 Conclusions and implications In this paper, we report evidence on the effects of different forms of ownership on enterprise performance. Since our data are for one country, our findings would not necessarily be expected to generalize to other countries. However, the Estonian case is of special interest since, by the many indicators, it is generally believed to be in the top tier of transition economies. Moreover, our findings are derived from a new and large panel that is representative of the whole economy. We are, therefore, able to assemble some of the first reliable evidence on these matters.
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Equality, Participation, Transition
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First published in Great Britain 20
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vi Contents 9 Self-Management, Empl
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List of Figures 02.1 First Law of O
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x Foreword institution most dear to
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Notes on the Contributors Ivo Bića
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xiv Notes on the Contributors membe
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xvi Notes on the Contributors done
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xviii Notes on the Contributors pri
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Introduction: Branko Horvat - Beyon
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xxii Introduction Dame (1978), Univ
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xxiv Introduction theory led him to
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xxvi Introduction though friendly,
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xxviii Introduction The second pape
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xxx Introduction disciplines such a
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Branko Horvat: Select Bibliography
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xxxiv Branko Horvat: Select Bibliog
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xxxvi Branko Horvat: Select Bibliog
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xxxviii Branko Horvat: Select Bibli
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2 Horvat’s Contributions to Econo
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10 Horvat’s Contributions to Econ
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2 Individual Initiative, Entry and
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28 Egalitarianism On Its Own Thomas
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30 Egalitarianism On Its Own projec
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32 Egalitarianism On Its Own absenc
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34 Egalitarianism On Its Own tithin
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36 Egalitarianism On Its Own what s
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38 Egalitarianism On Its Own 100% 9
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40 Egalitarianism On Its Own contri
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42 Egalitarianism On Its Own anothe
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44 Egalitarianism On Its Own politi
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46 Egalitarianism On Its Own Eckel,
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4 Determinants of Cross-Country Inc
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50 Determinants of Income Inequalit
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56 GINI GINI 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 3
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Table 4.2 The regressions: dependen
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5 Illyrian Theories of Cooperative
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92 Employee Participation in Enterp
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EMPLOYEE RETURN ONLY PROFIT PROFIT
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100 Employee Participation in Enter
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7 Employee Involvement and the Mode
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104 Employee Involvement and the Mo
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8 Uneasy Symbiosis of a Market Econ
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120 Market Socialism in Yugoslavia
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122 Market Socialism in Yugoslavia
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Page 189 and 190: Table 9.1 Methods of privatization
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Page 241 and 242: 202 Index economic growth - continu
Page 243 and 244: 204 Index Horvat, Branko - continue
Page 245 and 246: 206 Index neoclassical economics -
Page 247 and 248: 208 Index ‘third way’, 88, 104
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Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat

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