Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat

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Saul Estrin 161 Furubotn, E. and Pejovich, S. (1970) ‘Property Rights and the Behavior of the Firm in a Socialist State: The Example of Yugoslavia’, Zeitschrift fur Nationalökonomie, 30: 431–54. Hansmann, H. (1990) ‘The Viability of Worker Ownership: an Economic Perspective on the Political Structure of the Firm’, in M. Aoki, B. Gustafsson and O. E. Williamson (eds.), The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties, London: Sage. Horvat, B. (1978) The Yugoslav Economic System: The First Labor-Managed Economy in the Making, New York: International Arts and Sciences Press. Jensen, M. H. and Meckling, W. H. (1979) ‘Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination’, Journal of Business, 52(4): 459–506. Jones, D. and Svejnar, J. (1985) ‘Participation, Profit-Sharing, Worker Ownership and Efficiency in Italian Producer Cooperatives’, Economica, 52(November): 449–65. Meade, J. (1972) ‘The Theory of Labor-Managed Firms and Profit Sharing’, Economic Journal, 82(March): 402–28. Perotin, V. (1987) ‘Conditions of Survival and Closure of French Cooperatives: Some Preliminary Findings’, in D. Jones and J. Svejnar (eds.), Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-managed Firms, vol. 2 Greenwich CT: JAI Press pp. 201–25. Sertel, M. R. (1982) Workers and Incentives, Amsterdam: North-Holland. Stephen, F. H. (1980) ‘Bank Credit and the Labor-managed Firm: A Comment’, American Economic Review, 70(4): 796–9. Stiglitz, J. E. (1994) Whither Socialism?, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Uvalić, M. and Vaughan-Whitehead, D. (eds.), (1997), Privatization Surprises in Transition Economies – Employee Ownership in Central and Eastern Europe, International Labour Organization and Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Vanek, J. (1970) The General Theory of Labor-Managed Market Economies, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Vanek, J. (ed.) (1975) Self-Management, Economic Liberation of Man, Baltimore: Penguin. Ward, B. (1958) ‘The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism’, American Economic Review, 48(4): 566–89. World Bank (1996) From Plan to Market – World Development Report 1996, New York: Oxford University Press.
10 Privatization and Enterprise Performance: Evidence from Estonia* Derek C. Jones and Niels Mygind 10.1 Introduction The relationship between different organizational forms and economic efficiency has long attracted the interest of many influential economists including Mill, Marshall, Pigou and Keynes. 1 Important contributions which led to a widening of this debate to include labour-managed firms have also been made by Branko Horvat, including an early survey of theoretical and empirical evidence which pointed to the better performance of labour-managed firms compared to firms that were either state-owned or capitalist (Horvat, 1982: ch. 6). Since the collapse of the command economies, the main issue that has emerged in this realm of comparative organization and efficiency concerns the effects of the different forms of private ownership upon economic performance. The main aim of this paper is to provide fresh empirical evidence on this matter for the interesting case of the transition economy of Estonia. In considering the effects of privatization on economic performance, most economists expect that privatization per se will have favourable economic effects. In addition, economic outcomes are expected to vary * In facilitating this work, the authors acknowledge support from ACE Phare, NSF SES 9511465, the Danish Research Council for Social Sciences and the National Council on Soviet and Eastern European Studies. In addition, the paper has benefited from research assistance by Lindsey Culbertson and comments from J. Bonin, J. Pliskin, P. Kalmi, L. Tikla, E. Peev, and participants at the 9th Conference of the International Association for the Economics of Participation, Bristol, June 1998; the workshop on corporate governance, London Business School, June 1998; the first International Conference on Economic Restructuring and Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, August 1998, and a seminar at UNWIDER, Helsinki, August 1998. 162
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First published in Great Britain 20
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vi Contents 9 Self-Management, Empl
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List of Figures 02.1 First Law of O
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x Foreword institution most dear to
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Notes on the Contributors Ivo Bića
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Introduction: Branko Horvat - Beyon
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xxii Introduction Dame (1978), Univ
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xxiv Introduction theory led him to
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xxvi Introduction though friendly,
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xxviii Introduction The second pape
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xxx Introduction disciplines such a
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Branko Horvat: Select Bibliography
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2 Horvat’s Contributions to Econo
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10 Horvat’s Contributions to Econ
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2 Individual Initiative, Entry and
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28 Egalitarianism On Its Own Thomas
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42 Egalitarianism On Its Own anothe
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44 Egalitarianism On Its Own politi
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46 Egalitarianism On Its Own Eckel,
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4 Determinants of Cross-Country Inc
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50 Determinants of Income Inequalit
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56 GINI GINI 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 3
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Table 4.2 The regressions: dependen
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5 Illyrian Theories of Cooperative
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92 Employee Participation in Enterp
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EMPLOYEE RETURN ONLY PROFIT PROFIT
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100 Employee Participation in Enter
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7 Employee Involvement and the Mode
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104 Employee Involvement and the Mo
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Page 245 and 246: 206 Index neoclassical economics -
Page 247 and 248: 208 Index ‘third way’, 88, 104
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Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat

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