View/Open - Scholarly Commons Home
View/Open - Scholarly Commons Home
View/Open - Scholarly Commons Home
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Self-deception<br />
For Sartre, self-deception was a necessary component of bad faith. Milgram’s findings<br />
strongly support this aspect of Sartre’s thesis. But logically, there is an irreconcilable<br />
difficulty between self-deception and bad faith. We employ methods of objectification<br />
to deceive ourselves about the reality of our freedom and choice. However, that self-<br />
deception can never be total. To be in bad faith there must be intention. For there to be<br />
intention, there cannot be total self-deception. Milgram’s experiments suggest a<br />
possible solution to this logical impasse and builds on Warnock’s interpretation that<br />
while self-deception is a necessary component of bad faith there may be different levels<br />
of deception and bad faith.<br />
Consider again the response of the different responses of Milgram’s subjects. The man<br />
positioned at the far end of the bad faith spectrum used the defence that he was only<br />
following the researcher’s orders. During the experiment, the man totally adopted the<br />
agentic state. In the follow-up interview, he is “enmeshed in the formulation, [that he<br />
was following the orders of the researchers] which he repeats several times” (p. 67).<br />
The man continues to employ mechanisms to reinforce his denial of his part in the<br />
experiments and thus maintains his self-deception long after the real formulation for the<br />
experiment was revealed to him. In contrast, another subject obeyed the researcher and<br />
continued to deliver shocks up to 255 volts. His level of self-deception was effective up<br />
to the point in the experiment when he could no longer ignore the cries of agony from<br />
the learner – actor. When asked who was accountable for shocking the learner against<br />
his will, he said “I would put it on myself entirely” (p. 68). For this man, the agentic<br />
state was only partial, existing only within the context of the experiment up to a certain<br />
point and completely dissipating on later reflection. A few did not adopt the agentic<br />
state at all. Instead, in good faith they declined to take any further part in the<br />
experiment when they realised that they were being asked to harm someone simply<br />
because they were failing to answer some questions correctly.<br />
These different responses demonstrate how there are different levels of bad faith<br />
depending on the level of self-deception achieved. Like the thin social veneer of laws,<br />
rules and conventions which when removed led to the state of nature on Golding’s<br />
desert island, individually we employ methods of objectification which create a veneer,<br />
115