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ethical judgements with good reasons, and we can provide explanations of why those
reasons matter. Rachels suggests that when proof for ethical judgements is called for,
people are looking for the same evidence which can be supplied, for example, by
observation and evidence in science. He argues that just because ethical reasoning
differs from reasoning in science, does not make it deficient. Furthermore, that in
ethics, rational thinking consists in giving reasons, analysing arguments, and setting out
and justifying principles (2003, p. 43).
Of course Rachels is right about ethics. Setting out arguments, giving reasoned
justifications and employing principles is exactly what ethical decision making is about.
But giving reasons is not possible without a subjective response to evidence. The
reasons that we provide are founded on our evaluative response. This has been
demonstrated using the paedophilia example. We know paedophilia is wrong because,
for example, children are innocent and vulnerable and adults should not abuse their
position of power to exploit children for their own sexual enjoyment. How do we reach
this conclusion? Our values have guided and informed our reasoning. When we provide
reasons, that is just what we are doing – providing reasons. We are not ‘proving’ that
paedophilia is wrong, nor are we objectifying the value judgement that paedophilia is
wrong because of the reasoned and well-argued justification that we provide. We are
giving our reasons based on our subjective evaluation of the evidence. In addition, the
realisation and acceptance of the subjective, evaluative nature of ethical decision
making does not make our reasoning deficient; it simply provides an honest, accurate
and fulsome account.
Rachels is not alone in asserting that judgements can achieve objectivity through
reasoning process. According to Raz, it is the way that we reason which determines
whether our arguments can be objective. Consider his explanation regarding the
epistemic objective / subjective distinction:
People are objective about certain matters if they are, in forming or
holding opinions, judgments and the like, about these matters, properly
sensitive to factors which are epistemically relevant to the truth or
correctness of their opinions or judgments, that is, if they respond to
these factors as they should. Their views or beliefs may be wrong or
mistaken, but there are no emotionally induced distortions in the way
they are reached, or the conditions under which they are held. That
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