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or intellectual disability 28 . Of those, only the early English case of Re M [1988] appears<br />
to seriously consider sterilisation specifically on eugenic grounds.<br />
Re M [1988] was an English case concerning a 17 year old girl with Fragile X<br />
syndrome. She was described as physically normal but with the mental age of 5 or 6. It<br />
was said that she had become sexually aware and that there was a “real danger of<br />
sexual intercourse and her becoming pregnant” (Bush J, p. 1). Part of the evidence<br />
considered by the court included medical evidence that any child M might have had a<br />
50% chance of inheriting Fragile X syndrome. In response to this evidence, the judge<br />
said that people should not be sterilised because they are handicapped, “or likely to give<br />
birth to children who might equally be so” (Bush J, p. 2). The judge said he was<br />
persuaded that the medical professionals proposing the surgery were not considering<br />
M’s case from a eugenic point of view. They were simply concerned that if M became<br />
pregnant, she would have to be monitored more carefully.<br />
Whilst the decision indicates that the intention of the sterilisation is to prevent M from<br />
getting pregnant and giving birth to a disabled child, the judge denies that this intention<br />
has any part in the decision (p. 2). The doctors couch the decision in terms of both<br />
discomfort to M from the extra testing she would require during pregnancy and what<br />
was said to be a real risk of surgical complications from the inevitable recurrent<br />
abortions she would require if she were not sterilised (p. 2). The court did not question<br />
why M would have to undergo extra testing or why abortion would be the only possible<br />
outcome if the foetus was disabled.<br />
In this way, both the judge and the doctors detach their subjective judgements from the<br />
decision and the value judgements which guide a decision to terminate a potentially<br />
disabled foetus remain implicit. One of the doctors even suggested that the operation<br />
should be viewed as contraception and not sterilisation “because of the emotive feelings<br />
that the use of the word sterilisation arouses” (p. 1). Medical evidence provided the<br />
justification and the sterilisation was approved on the grounds that pregnancy, testing<br />
and abortion would be unnecessarily painful experiences.<br />
28 Re H [1993], T v T [1988], Re M [1988], Re D [1976].<br />
162